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Part I
Dissertation Overview

Dissertation Overview
The recent financial turmoil that began in late 2007 pinned the starting point of
the worst financial crisis for decades. A new wave of bank runs shocked many modern
and developed financial systems around the world. Big banks had to be rescued by
their governments, which in turn began to stumble over large amounts of outstanding
debt. Central banks in the U.S., in Great Britain, and particularly in the Eurozone area
reacted decisively and flooded financial markets with cheap and long-term liquidity. The
sovereign debt crisis in peripheral European countries to date challenges the survival of
the European monetary system.
Understanding the determinants of financial crises in general as well as tackling the
current crisis has become an important strand of economic research. While bank runs
have long been thought to be a relic of the early 20th century, they reemerged in new
clothing. In modern-day bank runs, we do not necessarily see long queues of depositors
lining up in front of bank branches, eager to withdraw their deposits. Instead, it is
large institutional wholesale investors that withdraw short-term deposits, refuse to roll
over short-term debt or draw down on credit-lines. The threat of institutional bank runs
makes studying system stability in a world of highly levered and short-term financed
financial institutions indispensable.
The first chapter of this thesis, Should I Stay or Should I Go? An Experimental Study
of Banking Crises, covers an empirical investigation of a theoretical bank run model. Since
micro-level data about investors that are deciding whether they want to withdraw their
funds early or leave it invested for longer is almost inexistent, I implement a controlled
experiment similar to Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) to measure the effect various treatments
would have on withdrawal behavior. The experiment bases on the model of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) using an application of the global games approach by Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005). I investigate the effects of priming subjects with a financial boom or bust
scenario before they play a bank run game to study the effect of a mentally salient financial
boom or bust, increased background fear and changed risk aversion. Furthermore, I also
test the effect of level-k thinking, i.e., a measure to what extent subjects generate beliefs
about other subjects’ beliefs and further higher order beliefs. Finally, I change a parameter
in the bank run game that determines the accuracy of the information that depositors
receive before they decide when to withdraw their investment.
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My results suggest that subjects primed with a bust treatment have an increased prob-
ability of withdrawing their deposit early. This could lead to a self-reinforcing feedback
loop. Furthermore, higher orders of level-k thinking, as well as lower accuracy of pri-
vate information, also increase the likelihood of bank runs. However, I do not find direct
evidence that individual risk aversion or the emotion of fear impact system stability.
In the second chapter, Which Swiss Gnomes Attract Money? Efficiency and Repu-
tation as Performance Drivers of Wealth Management Banks, which is a joint project
with Urs W. Birchler, Michael R. Reichenecker, and Alexander F. Wagner, we study the
effects that “skill” or bad media coverage have on the performance of Swiss private banks.
The financial sector as a whole and the wealth management segment, in particular, are
substantial contributing factors to GDP in Switzerland. Swiss banks have a long and
successful tradition in managing assets for wealthy individuals. Especially in turbulent
times, both economically and politically, Switzerland profited from its reputation as a
financially “safe haven” and attracted large amounts of assets of foreign origin. Yet, a
part of the attraction of Switzerland as a domicile for cross-border wealth may also be
attributed to the Swiss banking secrecy combined with fraudulent business practices of
Swiss banks. Many banks managed cross-border assets that were deposited in Switzerland
because of tax evasion reasons. In recent years, international pressure against the Swiss
banking secrecy increased; be it through theft of bank’s client data, tax evasion scandals,
or the introduction of the so-called automatic exchange of information that informs fiscal
authorities of foreign countries about the bank accounts of its citizens in Switzerland.
In our paper, we first establish a measure of the unobservable “skill” of wealth manage-
ment banks. We identify relatively skilled banks by using a regression model that explains
cost-efficiency measured as the cost-income ratio. Banks that are more cost-efficient than
predicted by their observable input factors are deemed to be more skilled. Second, we
combine this skill variable with a measure of reputation changes to predict the perfor-
mance in attracting net new money. For this purpose, we use a unique hand-picked panel
data set of 98 private banks in Switzerland and Liechtenstein for the period 2002-2014 and
measure reputation changes by generating an indicator variable for bad media coverage
of individual banks in any given year.
We find that relatively cost-efficient banks perform significantly better in attracting
net new money. Furthermore, we find that negative media coverage in one year sharply
diminishes the ability to attract new funds in the coming year. This finding is particularly
strong for small banks. The estimated present value of lost profits accounts to 3.35
(0.73) times the median annual net profit of small (large) banks. Strikingly, we do not
find evidence that investment performance for clients has any explanatory power when
5attracting new funds. In sum, these results underscore the importance of trust in money
management.
The third and final chapter, The ECB’s Three-Year Bank-Refinancing Operations and
Eurozone Bank Equity (joint work with Jiri Woschitz), investigates the impact of the
European Central Bank’s intervention on the Eurozone interbank market at the height
of the European debt crisis in December 2011. At the time, banks faced a dry interbank
market due to a loss of confidence. This impaired a smooth transmission of conventional
monetary policy, such as lowering key interest rates, to the real economy. Since the
looming threat of a credit crunch became ever more apparent, the ECB reacted to this
adverse market condition with the announcement of two extraordinary three-year Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). These are supplementary repo transactions that
entitle banks in the Eurosystem to take up unlimited amounts of liquidity at a fixed rate for
three years in exchange for eligible collateral. The demand by banks was extraordinarily
high. In the two cash settlements, a total of 800 banks took up over EUR 1,018 billion
in liquidity (in standard LTRO transactions roughly 100 to 300 banks bid for aggregate
amounts between EUR 15 and 70 billion).
We claim that both the announcement of the transactions as well as the size of the
first cash settlement represent unexpected large-sized shocks to the financial markets. To
measure the effect of these shocks, we employ an event study methodology and assess the
impact of liquidity operations on banks’ equity prices. We estimate abnormal returns for
89 listed Eurozone banks across 12 different countries using a standard market model as
described by MacKinlay (1997).
The results show that particularly banks in peripheral Eurozone countries show high
positive abnormal returns during the announcement and the first cash settlement period.
Furthermore, abnormal returns are highest in countries where liquidity uptake in the
three-year LTRO transactions was high. This finding is in line with the argument that
the three-year liquidity operations served as an indirect bailout for banks in financially
weaker countries (Nyborg, 2017).
In sum, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of
banking crises and attempts to decrease the gap between the theoretical predictions in
global games theory and observed behavior in reality. Furthermore, it provides insight over
efficiency and performance measures in private banking and emphasizes the value of trust
in wealth management. Finally, it shows the impact of the hitherto largest unconventional
repo transaction ever conducted by the ECB on bank equity prices in the Eurozone.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The three research articles are found
as Chapters 1, 2, and 3 in Part II, for which Part III contains the Appendices. Part IV
provides the bibliography, and Part V presents my curriculum vitae.

Part II
Research Articles

1 Should I Stay or Should I Go?
An Experimental Study of Banking Crises
1.1 Introduction
The breakdown of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers are prominent ex-
amples of how financial institutions that rely heavily on short-term liquidity may quickly
turn insolvent when investors decide to withdraw short-term deposits, neglect to roll over
short-term debt or draw down on credit-lines. Many banks that used market refinancing
and operated with high leverage using short-term debt experienced near-collapses in the
banking crisis that started in late 2007. A critical aspect of this banking crisis is that bank
runs were not necessarily started by retail customers but rather by institutional wholesale
investors (Cornett et al., 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Ippolito et al., 2016).1 The
initial mortgage and liquidity crisis led to a credit crunch, an erosion of capital and eventu-
ally amplified into a global financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009). Many governments had
to bail out their largest financial institutions using vast amounts of tax money, thereby,
in turn, exposing themselves to solvency risks. The recent crisis has thus put a renewed
focus on the regulation of liquidity as well as the term-structure of both the asset and
financing side of banks specifically and financial institutions at large.
In this paper, I experimentally study how large and sophisticated wholesale investors
coordinate on withdrawal decisions and potentially create banking crises. Specifically, I
investigate the impact of priming subjects with a financial boom or bust scenario, measure
the effect of higher order beliefs, and test whether less accurate private signals increase
the likelihood of crises. The experiment used in this thesis is a classroom experiment
based on Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) that applies a global games approach by Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) on the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (henceforth, D&D). While
game theoretical models have clear predictions about behavior of market participants,
empirical evidence using micro-data on institutional investors is still almost nonexistent.2
1Examples of such “institutional runs” on financial institutions were Northern Rock (Sep 2007), Bear
Stearns (Mar 2008), Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual (both Sep 2008). For further analyses
of institutional bank runs during the financial crisis, see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).
2Iyer and Puri (2016) is a notable exception. They study contagion and network effects on the
withdrawal behavior of bank customers in a unique natural experiment for a bank in India that faced a
bank run after the collapse of a neighboring bank.
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Controlled experiments offer a simple way to test theoretical models and ceteris paribus
changes of input parameters. I find that priming subjects with a bust scenario negatively
affects system stability, individuals that generate higher order beliefs are more likely to
lose trust in vis-a-vis other depositors, and noisier signals decrease system stability.
A bank generates liquid claims on illiquid assets (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). In
doing so, a bank enables liquidity risk-sharing among different agents: impatient investors
have the opportunity to withdraw deposits early, if needed, while patient agents benefit
from profitable long-term investment and late withdrawal (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983). Whenever a bank has sufficiently many agents (depositors) engaging in
a demand deposit contract, the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks of individual agents can
be eradicated and we achieve an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium of
agents acting in autarky. However, as shown by D&D, demand deposit contracts also have
a severe second equilibrium: as soon as sufficiently many depositors lose trust in their
banks’ solvency they coordinate on a second devastating equilibrium in which everyone
prefers to withdraw deposits early. The bank then has to sell off assets at fire-sale prices
and we end up in a bank run situation. We thus have a model of multiple equilibria; a
good equilibrium in which the demand-deposit contract offers risk-sharing and a welfare
increase and a bad equilibrium in which we observe panic-based bank runs that decrease
welfare. Depositors face a coordination problem and a crisis occurs whenever depositors
fail to coordinate on the good equilibrium.3
Since D&D a large strand of literature has emerged that focuses on the determination
of the fundamentals/information driving the equilibrium selection. One rising strand of
literature bases on the theory of global games that allow modeling coordination games
in which thanks to a noisy private signal multiple equilibria are eradicated and a unique
equilibrium results (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998, 2001, 2004;
Rochet and Vives, 2004). One particular application of global games theory developed by
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) focuses on the resolution of the multiple equilibria problem
occuring in bank runs. This model will be the theoretical cornerstone of this paper.
3In the wake of the financial crisis in late 2007, banks themselves also faced coordination problems
and failed to coordinate on the good equilibrium, when they ran into liquidity and solvency problems
(Brunnermeier, 2009). At any time, banks can borrow short-term liquidity at the central bank’s discount
windows when they are able to pledge enough valid collateral. However, borrowing at the discount
window is associated with the stigma that obtaining central bank money is a signal of weakness, i.e.,
that the borrowing bank is not credit-worthy enough to borrow on the interbank market. Similarly,
banks with eroding capital, such as Lehman Brothers, could have strengthened their balance sheet by
issuing new equity. However, being the only bank issuing equity could also be interpreted as a signal of
desperation and thus be very costly. The former stigma was solved eventually in December 2007 by the
Federal Reserve bank when they allowed financial institutions to bid anonymously for their repo loans.
The coordinated bail-out programs in late 2008 may have circumvented the problem of equity issuances.
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Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) present a model in which economic fundamentals define
whether bank runs occur. Every agent in the model receives a private noisy signal about
the fundamental health of the economy. This makes it possible to calculate the likelihood
of a bank run which depends on the amount of risk-sharing of the short-term payment in
a demand-deposit contract. Using the existence of dominance regions in both extremely
good and bad states of the world, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) prove that in between
these extrema a unique switching threshold has to exist for which depositors withdraw
their funds early (late) in case they observe a signal below (above) this threshold. They
provide several valuable insights: panic-based bank runs still occur and are driven by bad
expectations of patient investors. Patient agents withdraw their deposit early whenever
they observe a signal below a certain threshold, whereby this threshold is increasing with
an increase in risk-sharing by the bank.
A very similar global games model is proposed by Vives (2014) to investigate the
reaction of market participants for different precisions of the signal that investors receive
and risk aversion parameters of agents. He finds that less precise private information
(a more noisy signal) as well as being a more risk averse agent leads to more sensible
reactions of individual investors, i.e., requiring them to receive a higher signal in order
not to run the bank.
Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) build an experimental design based on the theoretical model
by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) to investigate the reaction of investors with respect
to higher risk-sharing offered by the bank. They observe that investors apply threshold
strategies as predicted by theory. However, while the global games theory would suggest
drastic reactions to changes in risk-sharing, they observe only minor reactions in behavior
that may better be explained by level-k approaches. Furthermore, they find that threshold
levels do not change over time and experience.
In this paper, I use a simplified version of the experimental design proposed by Klos
and Stra¨ter (2013) to investigate several conjectures that are claimed to have an influence
on the threshold level of investors. First, I use a priming treatment similar to the one
used by Cohn et al. (2015) to test the effect of inducing higher risk aversion or fear.
Second, I measure to what extent subjects use higher order beliefs when participating in
a beauty contest derived from Nagel (1995). And third, I study the effect of a change of
the precision of the private signal that agents receive in the global game.
As subjects I use students of a banking lecture that is being taught every year at the
University of Zurich in the Bachelor’s program. The subjects participate in the experiment
as part of a mandatory homework assignment and are incentivized by gaining ECUs
(experimental currency units) that may later be transformed into chocolate pralines in
class. In the main treatment students assume the role of one out of six depositors of a
12 Experimental Study of Banking Crises
bank and have to decide either to withdraw their investment either early or late depending
a signal of the fundamental state of the economy.
I find that subjects that have been primed with a financial bust have a 32% higher
odds ratio to withdraw early than subjects without priming. Similarly, depositors that
were primed with a beauty contest before they participate in the bank run treatment
have a 29% higher odds ratio to run on the bank. The probability of early withdrawal
also increases for subjects that take higher order beliefs into account. Furthermore, I find
evidence that less accurate private information increases the probability of a bank run.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives a review of exper-
imental finance literature in the context of bank runs. Section 1.3 covers the theoretical
model of bank runs in general and the global games solution in particular. Section 1.4
introduces the experimental bank run design for which Section 1.5 presents empirical
analysis. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature
Investigating financial crises and bank runs in the context of experimental finance is a
newly emerging and growing strand of literature. Madie`s (2006) is among the first to
use an experimental setup to study bank runs. He tests to what extent banking panics
can be curbed through learning effects. In his experimental design he uses three different
treatments: i) higher and lower values of the early payment to simulate “narrow banking”,
ii) a short or long suspension of convertibility of deposits once a run has started, and iii) a
system of deposit insurance with either a coverage ratio of 25% or 75%. He finds that self-
fulfilling bank runs are very common and recurring phenomena. However, the likelihood of
a bank run can be reduced by temporary suspension of convertibility of demand deposits
combined with narrow banking. To prevent panics completely, he suggests that full deposit
insurance might be required.
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) and Garratt and Keister (2009) test the impact of
information in a sequential move bank run model. Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) imple-
ment a sequential decision game where depositors choose to withdraw in one out of four
subsequent periods. There are several treatments in their study to test the sensitivity
of depositors to i) low or high information availability, ii) asymmetric information distri-
bution, and iii) existence of deposit insurance. They find that depositors that are able
to observe the behavior of other depositors (high information availability) are less likely
to withdraw their deposits early. If there is an “insider” in the group, i.e., a depositor
that knows the true quality of the bank, the likelihood of a banking crisis is reduced and
coordination of all depositors is increased. Finally, they also show that deposit insurance
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helps curb the severity of a bank run. On the other hand, Garratt and Keister (2009) also
study the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal but use i) chang-
ing number of opportunities in which depositors are able to withdraw their funds and ii)
add players that are randomly chosen and forced to withdraw early (similar to impatient
agents in the model of D&D). They confirm the results of Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009)
that panic frequency drops once withdrawal behavior is made transparent. In addition,
they find that subjects have a higher probability to run on the bank if they have more
opportunities to do so. Furthermore, adding stochastic withdrawal demand (forcing a
random number of depositors to withdraw) increases the overall likelihood of bank runs.
Kiss et al. (2012) implement a bank run model in which depositors decide sequentially
whether they want to withdraw their money. This allows them to study how observability
of actions of other depositors affects the probability of a bank run while controlling for
different levels of deposit insurance. They find that observability and deposit insurance
both reduce the probability of bank runs. In two later publications, the same authors first
restrict the observability of actions to the condition of being in the same social network
(Kiss et al., 2014a) and second highlight gender differences (Kiss et al., 2014b). The
probability of withdrawal decreases for the first to decide if the action is being observed
by the second depositor in a sequential game. In general, they do not find evidence that
women react differently from men. Gender only makes a difference if withdrawal decisions
is being observed by other depositors. Furthermore, they do not find evidence that risk
aversion has explanatory power for investors’ decisions.
Arifovic et al. (2013) set up an experimental bank run model to study whether co-
ordination failures causes depositors to withdraw funds. Specifically, they measure the
effect of exogenous changes in the required fraction of late withdrawing depositors needed
to keep a bank liquid. This generates a variation in the complementarity of coordinated
actions. They are able to show that there is a coordination parameter threshold at around
70%, i.e., coordination fails more often if there are more than 70% of all depositors re-
quired to withdraw late in order to prevent a bank run. For lower parameters coordination
is perceived as easier and bank runs are less frequently.
Chakravarty et al. (2014) and Brown et al. (2016) investigate the mechanisms behind
bank run contagion, i.e., whether runs on one bank may trigger runs on another bank.
Both studies use a model based on D&D with two banks that are either economically
linked or independent. Before depositors of the first bank may decide to withdraw their
funds they receive information about the level of liquidity of their bank (Chakravarty et al.,
2014) or the liquidating value of the long-term asset of the bank (Brown et al., 2016).
Depositors of the other bank only observe the withdrawal decisions of the depositors
of the first bank. Clearly, depositors of the first bank show higher withdrawal rates if
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liquidity is low or if fundamentals are weak. If the two banks have economic linkages,
withdrawal rates of the second bank increase if depositors observe high withdrawal rates
at the first bank. More interestingly, the two studies differ when there are no economic
linkages between the banks. Only Chakravarty et al. (2014) find a positive contagion
effect between banks without economic linkages. This might indicate that panic-based
contagion can rather be explained by liquidity problems than by low long-term asset
returns.
A similar experimental setup has been used by Dijk (2015) to study the impact of
inducing emotional states on the likelihood of a panic-based bank run. Before subjects
participate in the main bank run treatment he lets them write a short essay of a particu-
larly fearful, sad, or happy memory. He finds that subjects that have been induced with
a target emotion of fear are significantly more likely to withdraw their deposits early. Fe-
male subjects in the fear treatment react stronger than men. While sadness decreases the
likelihood of a bank run, happiness does not change the withdrawal behavior of depositors.
1.3 Theoretical Analysis of the Bank Run Model
1.3.1 Formal Framework
Models of bank runs are coordination games with strategic complementarities under in-
complete information that usually lead to multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium where
depositors trust the bank, and a bad equilibrium where depositors loose trust and run on
the bank. One way to eradicate the multiple equilibria problem in coordination games
is the implementation of global games. The framework and notation used in this section
are based on the global games approach by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) that extends
the seminal paper by D&D. The model has three periods (t = 0, 1, 2) and a continuum of
consumers [0, 1] that are all equally born in t = 0 with an endowment of a single unit of a
homogeneous good. Agents may consume in period 1 or 2, where ct denotes consumption
level in period t ∈ {1; 2}. Consumption goods can be transferred from one period to
another without loss (e.g. by storing it). With a probability λ an agent is impatient
and with 1 − λ she is patient. Agents learn their type at the beginning of t = 1 as a
private information. Impatient agents can only derive utility from consumption in t = 1,
i.e. u(c1) > 0, while patient agents can derive utility in both periods (u(c1 + c2)). The
utility function u(c) is twice continuously differentiable and has an Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative risk aversion −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for any c ≥ 1.
Agents deposit their endowment in a productive technology that may be liquidated in
t = 1 or t = 2. In t = 1, the technology gives one unit of output per unit of input, i.e., there
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is no loss from early liquidation. Per unit of input the long-term investment (until t = 2)
yields R units of output with probability p(θ), or 0 with probability (1 − p(θ)), where θ
denotes the fundamental state of the economy drawn in t = 0 from a uniform distribution
θ ∼ U [0, 1] with p′(θ) > 0. Agents do not learn the true value of θ until t = 2. In
expectation, long-term investment dominates early liquidation, i.e. Eθ[p(θ)]u(R) > u(1).
In autarky, impatient agents would liquidate the project in t = 1 and consume one unit
while patient agents leave their money invested and consume R in t = 2 with probability
p(θ) and 0 with probability (1− p(θ)). As shown by Bryant (1980) and D&D, due to risk
aversion a contract that offers risk sharing by a transfer from patient to impatient agents
could, ex ante, be beneficial to all agents. Assume for a moment that types are third-
party verifiable. A social planner would choose c1 such that overall utility λu(c1) + (1−
λ)u
(
1−λc1
1−λ R
)
Eθ[p(θ)] is maximized. λc1 denotes the amount of early liquidation needed
to satisfy the impatient agents, (1 − λc1) remains invested in the production technology
and yields a return of R that will be distributed pro rata among the (1−λ) patient agents.
This allows the social planner to determine first-best cFB1 using the first-order condition
(FOC):
u′(cFB1 ) = Ru′
(
1− λcFB1
1− λ R
)
Eθ[p(θ)]. (1.1)
The marginal benefit of impatient agents (LHS) equals marginal costs of patient agents
(RHS). Since cu′(c) decreases in c (by assumption of RRA > 1) and Eθ[p(θ)] < 1, the
marginal benefit at c1 = 1, u′(1), exceeds the marginal costs, Ru′(R)Eθ[p(θ)]. Thus, in
the social optimum there is risk sharing with cFB1 > 1. This means that ex ante patient
agents agree to give up some consumption to insure against the risk of experiencing a
liquidity shock (being of the type ‘impatient’).
1.3.2 Demand-Deposit Contracts and Multiple Equilibria
The social planner above optimized c1 assuming agents’ types are observable. Unfortu-
nately, types are private information and agents cannot write enforceable contracts upon
being impatient or not. As illustrated by D&D, banks offer such risk-sharing in the form
of demand-deposit contracts. In such a contract every agent deposits her initial endow-
ment with the bank at t = 0. The bank offers a payment of r1 > 1 to all agents that want
to withdraw at t = 1 and a stochastic payment r˜2 at t = 2 to all remaining agents. The
payment r˜2 depends both on the state of the economy, θ, and on the fraction of agents
that withdraws early, defined as n. Payment in t = 1 is subject to a sequential service
constraint: depositors are lined up randomly and paid out as long as the bank is solvent.
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Assume that the bank sets r1 = cFB1 . As long as only impatient agents withdraw in
t = 1, i.e. n = λ, the expected utility for patient agents is u
(
1−λr1
1−λ R
)
Eθ[p(θ)]. If this is
larger than u(r1), patient agents have no incentive to withdraw in t = 1 and we achieve
the first-best equilibrium by the social planner. However, as D&D illustrate, if all agents
were to decide to withdraw in t = 1 (n = 1), the bank would need to liquidate all assets,
the expected payment in t = 1 is 1/r1 and there will be no payment in t = 2. This is
the bank run equilibrium in which no patient agent has an incentive to withdraw late.
Panel A in Table 1.1 illustrates the general theoretical ex post payoff matrix from the
demand-deposit contract depending on θ and n.
Insert Table 1.1 around here.
This second equilibrium is even inferior to the payoff structure in autarky. What drives
depositors to coordinate on the bad equilibrium? In the model by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983, p. 410) it is assumed that “...anything that causes [depositors] to anticipate a run
will lead to a run.” This may be related both to fundamentals of the bank or to any other
coordination device such as runs on other banks, bad news in the media, or even sunspots.
Nevertheless, there is no prediction on which equilibrium agents will coordinate.
1.3.3 Global Games: Introduction of Private Noisy Signals
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) solve the multiple equilibria problem in the traditional bank
run model by introducing a private signal about the fundamental state of the economy.
In their model θ is established at the beginning of t = 1 but not publicly observable until
t = 2. However, all individuals i receive private noisy signals θi = θ + i, where i is a
i.i.d. small error term in [−, ] with a uniform distribution.
Patient agents infer from the private signal θi firstly a belief about the true state of
the economy θ and secondly a belief about the distribution of signals that other agents
may have received. The signal acts as a coordination device for equilibrium selection:
extremely low signals diminish the probability that the production technology yields R
and increases the incentive to withdraw early and, vice versa, extremely high signals
increase the incentive to withdraw late. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) show that in
between these ranges there is a unique switching point θ∗ for which agents withdraw early
(late) if their signal is below (above) this threshold. This result can be derived as follows:
assume that dominance regions exist, i.e., there are ranges of extreme values of signals
θi for which the behavior of patient agents is independent of other agents’ actions. This
results in all agents withdrawing for very bad signals and no patient agents withdrawing
for very good signals. For signals close to these extreme values agents take the best actions
at the corresponding extreme end into account. Signals farther away makes depositors
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consider best actions for signals nearby. Eventually, closing the gap from above and below,
a unique equilibrium with a threshold value emerges for which signals below lead to early,
and signals above lead to late withdrawal while signals equal to the threshold lead to
indifference.
Let θ(r1) denote the value for which u(r1) = p(θ)u((1 − λr1)/(1 − λ)R). For any
fundamental value θ in the interval [0, θ(r1)) the probability of default is so high that the
expected utility from withdrawal at t = 2 is lower than withdrawing at t = 1 irrespective
of what other depositors do. This range is the so-called lower dominance region. However,
true fundamentals are not observed at t = 1: An agent only receives a noisy signal θi and
thus only knows that she is located within the lower dominance region if she observes a
signal θi ∈ [0, θ(r1) − ). The same analysis for the upper dominance region leads to an
interval (θ¯(r1), 1], where an agent that receives a signal θi ∈ (θ¯(r1) + , 1] will always wait
until t = 2, regardless of the other agents’ actions.
The fraction n of how many agents withdraw early depends on the fraction of impatient
agents λ, and the fraction of patient agents withdrawing early. The latter use the signal
θi to infer two ranges: an interval for the true fundamental, θ ∈ [θi − , θi + ], and an
interval for signals that any other depositor j might have received, θj ∈ [θi−2, θi+2]. In
the interval [θ−2, θ) a depositor thus assigns a positive probability that other depositors
have received private signals equal to or above θ−. The higher θ the lower the probability
that other agents received signals in the lower dominance region and the lower the fraction
of patient agents withdrawing early. As the noise term i is uniformly distributed, the
fraction of patient agents that receive signals below θ −  linearly decreases in θ.
To derive the optimal threshold first assume that a unique equilibrium for which
patient agents withdraw early only if they receive a signal below a threshold θ∗(r1) exists.
Given this equilibrium, the fraction of depositors that withdraw early depends on the
fundamental state of the economy θ and equals:
n(θ, θ∗(r1)) = λ+ (1− λ)p [i < (θ∗(r1)− θ)] , (1.2)
where the first term on the RHS equals all impatient agents, λ, and second term is
the expected fraction of patient agents with signals falling below the threshold value
θ∗(r1). If the fundamental value θ is below θ∗(r1) − , all patient agents withdraw early.
Fundamentals above θ∗(r1) +  leave only the impatient agents withdrawing early. In
between these values the fraction of patient agents descreases linearly in θ due to the
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uniform distribution of the noise term :
n (θ, θ∗(r1)) =

1 if θ ≤ θ∗(r1)− 
λ+ (1− λ)
(
1
2 +
θ∗(r1)−θ
2
)
if θ∗(r1)−  ≤ θ ≤ θ∗(r1) + 
λ if θ ≥ θ∗(r1) + .
(1.3)
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) prove that the signal θi acts as the single coordination
device in equilibrium selection with a unique threshold value θ∗.4 To derive the threshold
value θ∗ they compute the utility differentials between withdrawing in period 2 compared
to period 1 based on the payoffs in Table 1.1:
v(θ, n) =
 p(θ)u
(
1−nr1
1−n R
)
− u(r1) if λ ≤ n ≤ 1r1
0− 1
nr1
u(r1) if 1r1 ≤ n ≤ 1.
(1.4)
Withdrawal in period 2, p(θ)u
(
1−nr1
1−n R
)
, yields the highest utility if only the impatient
agents withdraw in period 1, i.e. n = λ. For an increase in n, waiting becomes less attrac-
tive until for n = 1/r1 the bank has to declare bankruptcy and payoff in period 2 is null.
Unlike traditional global games approaches, see, e.g., Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) or
Morris and Shin (1998, 2001), we only have one-sided instead of global strategic comple-
mentarities, i.e., the more agents decide to withdraw late the more attractive it becomes
for other agents to withdraw late too. For early withdrawal, however, the incentive of a
patient agent to withdraw early is highest if the bank has just declared bankruptcy, i.e.,
when n = 1/r1. If the bank is bankrupt, the more depositors demand their deposit the
lower the probability to receive payment r1 and therefore the incentive to withdraw early
decreases. This can be seen in Figure 1.1 that shows the utility differential of withdrawing
late rather than early for any fraction n of agents withdrawing in period 1.
Insert Figure 1.1 around here.
As Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) have shown, it suffices to prove that the utility differ-
ential function v crosses zero only once to prove the uniqueness of the threshold strategy
θ∗. To calculate θ∗ we assume that all patient agents use a common threshold θ′. Since
the signal is noisy, any agent that receives a signal θi, calculates the expected utility
differential ∆r1(θi, θ′) from withdrawal in period 2 versus period 1 as the average utility
differential over [θi − , θi + ]:
∆r1(θi, θ′) =
1
2
∫ θi+
θi−
v (θ, n(θ, θ′)) dθ. (1.5)
4This is in contrast to the proclaimed sunspot theories as in Williams (1961) or Cass and Shell (1983).
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Whenever ∆r1(θi, θ′) is positive, a patient agent should reduce the threshold value as a
best response to θ′ and, vice versa, increase the threshold if ∆r1(θi, θ′) is negative. In
equilibrium we must have ∆r1(θ′, θ′) = 0. Due to the single crossing condition, this only
holds for the unique threshold equilibrium θ∗.
1.4 Experimental Design and Predictions
This article is based on one main and three auxiliary experimental treatments. A flowchart
of the whole experiment with the order of the individual treatments and treatment as-
signment path of subjects is shown in Figure 1.2. Detailed treatment instructions as well
as all questionnaires are provided in Appendix A.1.
Insert Figure 1.2 around here.
The main treatment, called the Bank Run Treatment, uses a simplified version of
the experimental bank run model of Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) based on Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005). Subjects are in a coordination game with incomplete information where
their payoff depends on their action, the actions of other subjects, and on the state of the
world. Subjects assume the role of depositors and have to make a binary decision whether
they want to withdraw their investment early or wait. As basis for their decision they
receive private noisy signals about the fundamental state of world. In this treatment I am
able to identify whether subjects employ a threshold strategy and where the most likely
threshold value lies.
The second treatment is a Priming Treatment in which subjects are asked to fill
in a short questionnaire with investment tasks. Subjects are shown charts that either
resemble a stock market boom or a bust and have to answer simple questions about
optimal investment behavior in these situations. This questionnaire primes the subjects
and renders the situation of a boom or bust mentally salient. The treatment is based
on Cohn et al. (2015) who showed that subjects’ risk-aversion is countercyclical, i.e.,
subjects in a bust exhibit higher risk-aversion than subjects in a boom treatment. In this
experiment, individuals are assigned to one of three sub-treatments: 1) boom treatment,
2) bust treatment, or, as a control treatment, 3) no priming. Chronologically the priming
takes place before the main bank run treatment.
Global games theory requires that individuals take higher order beliefs into account,
i.e., the beliefs about other individuals’ beliefs about other individuals’ beliefs ... ad infini-
tum. In the third treatment, I want to test to what extent subjects perform this so-called
level-k thinking. To do this I use the most prominent example of beauty contest games:
the Guess the Number Treatment (GTN) that was proposed by Nagel (1995). Subjects
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in this treatment simultaneously have to pick a number in the interval [0, 100] such that
it comes closest to 2/3 of the average of all picked numbers. The more sophisticated a
subject is and the more the subject believes that the other subjects are sophisticated too,
the lower should the guessed number be. The eventual Nash equilibrium would be zero.
However, subjects usually only employ a finite number of iterations k. Since playing the
GTN game has a priming effect in itself I randomize the order in which the bank run
treatment and the guess-the-number treatment are played. This allows me to use the
order of the games as a treatment in itself.
The last treatment is a variation of the main bank run treatment. Vives (2014) shows
in a very similar bank run model that an increase in the noise of the private signal leads
to larger sensitivity of subjects to bad signals, i.e., increases the threshold value required
for coordination on the good outcome. I test this experimentally by increasing the range
of the noise term .
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to fill in a questionnaire with a risk-
aversion elicitation question, questions about the experiment as well as demographic and
study-related details.
1.4.1 Bank Run Treatment
The Bank Run Treatment (BR) is the main treatment of this paper. It is based on
the global games bank run model by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and uses a similar
parametrization as in Klos and Stra¨ter (2013). A timeline of the BR treatment is depicted
in Figure 1.3. At the beginning of a period every subject is randomly assigned to a group
of six investors.5 Every investor deposits 1 ECU in the bank. The total of 6 ECUs is then
being invested by the bank in a risky project that yields an uncertain return R in t = 2.
The bank promises a payment of 1.5 ECU to any depositor that decides to withdraw early
(in t = 1). I assume that ex ante there is no impatient agent in the setup, i.e. λ = 0.
If there is a positive number of early withdrawers (n > 0) the bank has to liquidate a
part of the investment (n× 1.5) in order to repay the impatient subjects in t = 1. If four
or more depositors decide to withdraw early (n × 1.5 ≥ 6), we have the case of a bank
run, the bank has to liquidate the full project and declares bankruptcy.6 If three or less
5A group size of N = 6, i.e., a bank that is funded by six depositors only, is an extreme case compared
to traditional atomistic-sized individual depositors that we usually see in banking. The impact of such a
small group size is that a depositor in this model rather equals an institutional investor than a depositor.
Furthermore, six seems to be a reasonable size weighing off reality and experimental simplification. The
experimental bank run studies by Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) and Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) also form
groups of six depositors.
6In case of n = 5 or n = 6 early withdrawers, four investors are randomly selected and receive the
payment of 1.5. The other early withdrawer(s) receive nothing. This mechanism is a way to model the
sequential service constraint (SSC) in t = 1.
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depositors decide to withdraw early, the bank remains solvent and liquidates the project
in t = 2. The proceeds of the final liquidation is distributed evenly among the remaining
depositors.
Insert Figure 1.3 around here.
At the beginning of t = 1, every investor receives a noisy signal regarding the funda-
mental range of the project return R. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) model the project
return as a mapping function of the fundamental θ that defines ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of
the production technology, p(θ) : R −→ [0, 1]. This paper uses a simplification and
parametrization similar to Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) and define the fundamental state of
the economy as the uniformly distributed project return θ ≡ R where R ∼ U(1.3, 3.0).
The signal investors receive is private and noisy with uniform distribution  ∼ U(−0.1, 0.1)
(or  ∼ U(−0.3, 0.3) in the noisy treatment).
The return of any investor thus depends on the individual and on the collective with-
drawal decision in period t = 1. This coordination problem is illustrated in Panel B in
Table 1.1. If an investor decides to withdraw in t = 1 and less than three other depositors
withdraw early (in total n < 4) the early repayment is r1 = 1.5. Whenever a total of four
or more depositors (n ≥ 4) decide to withdraw early, we have the situation of a bank run
and the repayment is r1 = 1.5 with probability 4/n, and zero otherwise. If a depositor
waits until t = 2 and there was no bank run in t = 1 the repayment is R(6 − n × 1.5),
i.e., the realized return of the project times what was left invested after period 1. If there
was a bank run in t = 1, the payment late withdrawers receive is zero.
One period in the BR model consists of two stages. A decision stage and a results stage.
In the decision stage every investor receives the private noisy signal, θi, that indicates the
range of the true fundamental R ∈ [θi − , θi + ]. Since it would be very time-consuming
for an experimental subject to compute potential payoffs for any given fundamental they
are presented with an extended payoff table in the decision stage. This table shows the
individual payoffs for any given number of early withdrawers assuming that R = θ. A
sample payoff table with θ = 2.0 is depicted in Table 1.2.
Insert Table 1.2 around here.
The payoff of one investor thus depends on the decision to withdraw early or late and
on the withdrawal decisions of all other depositors. Given the case of θ ≥ 1.50, investors
have an incentive to coordinate on the same action, i.e., every investor wants to stay with
the bank until t = 2 as long as enough other depositors decide to stay as well. In case
of θ < 1.50 we have the situation of a fundamental bank run where withdrawing early
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becomes a dominant strategy irrespective of the behavior of the other depositors. For any
θ < 1.5 we are located in the lower dominance region.7
The optimal threshold θ∗ is derived similar to Heinemann et al. (2004) and Klos and
Stra¨ter (2013). The computation is based on three steps: 1) describe the probability
that a patient agent j withdraws early given that agent i receives signal θi and assuming
that a common threshold θ′ exists, 2) derive the expected utilities from early and late
withdrawal for any given signal θi, 3) compute the numerical optimal threshold θ∗ by
iterated elimination of dominated strategies θ′.
For the first step, assume that a common threshold θ′ is given exogenously, i.e., any
depositor i withdraws early if and only if the signal θi received in t = 1 is below this
threshold. From the signal θi, the depositor i can infer the range of the true fundamental
θ(= θi ± ) and the range of signals that other depositors may receive (= θi ± 2). Since
the fundamental and the noise term are uniformly distributed, the distribution of signals
that any other depositor j may have received is a symmetrical triangular distribution
with mean θi and range [θi−2, θi+2]. The probability that depositor j withdraws early
(denoted by ‘withdraw’) given a common threshold θ′ and a signal θi for depositor i is
thus:
P(withdraw|θi, θ′) = P(θj < θ′|θi, θ′) =

0 if θ′ < θi − 2
(θ′−(θi−2))2
82 if θi − 2 ≤ θ′ < θi
1− (θi+2−θ′)282 if θi ≤ θ′ < θi + 2
1 if θi + 2 ≤ θ′.
(1.6)
In the second step, expected utilities of early withdrawal and late withdrawals are
derived. For early withdrawal, the expected utility corresponds to the sum of expected
utilities that none, one, ..., or all of the other N − 1 investors withdraw early, weighted
with the corresponding probability:
EUwithdraw(θi, θ′) =
N−1∑
n=0
1
2
∫ θ′+
θ′−
B (n,N − 1,P(withdraw|θi, θ′))E(Uwithdraw|n)dθi. (1.7)
The term B(n,N −1,Pwithdraw(θi, θ′)) denotes the binomial probability that exactly n out
of N − 1 other depositors receive a signal below the threshold θ′ given the signal θi of
depositor i. Since the true fundamental is unknown we integrate over all possible values
7The lower dominance region is defined as [1.3, 1.5). This model lacks an upper dominance region in
which no investor has an incentive to withdraw early. However, as Goldstein and Pauzner (2005, Appendix
B, p. 1325) point out, the condition of having an upper dominance region may be neglected as long as
three reasonable refinement criteria are met: (a) agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium,
(b) agents coordinate on the no-run equilibrium for very high signals, and (c) agents coordinate on an
equilibrium that has monotonic strategies and individual actions depend on received signals.
Chapter 1 23
for θ ∈ [θi − , θi + ] and scale by the width of the range 2. The expectation of utility
Uwithdraw depends only on n and equals:
E(Uwithdraw|n) =
 u[1.5] if n < 4u[1.5 ∗ (4/n)] if n ≥ 4. (1.8)
The expected utility from early withdrawal does not depend directly on the exact real-
ization of the fundamental θ. The fundamental only defines the range of signals which
in turn defines the probability of early withdrawal. On the other hand, the expected
utility from late withdrawal (denoted by ’wait’) does depend on θ. It may be calculated
analogously:
EUwait(θi, θ′) =
N−1∑
n=0
1
2
∫ θ′+
θ′−
B (n,N − 1,P(withdraw|θi, θ′))E(Uwait|n, θi)dθi. (1.9)
The only difference between Equation 1.9 and Equation 1.7 is the last term. The expected
utility of waiting depends both on the number of early withdrawers n as well as on the
true fundamental θ. However, since a depositor does not know θ we integrate over the
possible range ([θi − , θi + ]) and use the simplification that θi ≡ R:
E(Uwait|n, θi) =
 u[θi(6− n× 1.5)] if n < 40 if n ≥ 4. (1.10)
In the third step to derive the optimal threshold θ∗ we use iterative elimination of
dominated strategies. So far it was assumed that all investors use a common threshold
θ′. Consider investor i who receives a private signal θi. If θi ≤ θ′ and EUwithdraw(θi, θ′) <
EUwait(θi, θ′) it would be optimal for i to wait with withdrawal until t = 2 since the ex-
pected utility from waiting is higher than the expected utility from withdrawing early. In-
vestor i should thus use a higher threshold. The best-response of investor i is θ∗i = BR(θ′).
Since all investors are homogeneous we can eliminate θ′ as a threshold strategy and con-
duct the same analysis with the next higher threshold value. We iterate this proce-
dure until we have BR(θ∗) = θ∗. The optimal threshold thus solves EUwithdraw(θ∗, θ∗) =
EUwait(θ∗, θ∗).
1.4.2 Additional Treatments
1.4.2.1 Priming Treatment
The first additional treatment is a priming treatment on risk preferences that is played at
the beginning of the experiment. Priming is a method that has long been used primarily
24 Experimental Study of Banking Crises
in psychology and has become increasingly popular in economics and banking to study
changes of preferences and behavior of subjects in different environments.8 Closely related
to this study, Dijk (2015) uses a priming treatment to induce background fear, sadness or
happiness before participants participate in a bank run game. He observes that subjects
primed with fear exhibit a higher likelihood to loose trust and run on the bank.
I use a priming procedure that has successfully been applied by Cohn et al. (2015)
to investigate the reaction of financial professionals after increasing the subjects’ saliency
of financial booms and busts. Subjects in their experiment are filling in a questionnaire
before they let the participants play risky lotteries. They find that individuals that
have been answering questions about their hypothetical behavior in a bust scenario are
emotionally negatively affected compared to individuals in a boom scenario. Subjects in
the bust treatment have a significantly decreased willingness to take risks. This helps
explain countercyclical risk aversion that can be observed in financial markets, i.e., higher
equity risk premia in recessions compared to booms. If households have a higher risk
aversion in downturns and require a higher equity risk premium this might lead to an
adverse and self-reinforcing feedback loop. If stock prices fall this could arouse fear and
higher risk aversion among investors. Investors would then sell their assets and depress
markets and increase risk aversion even further (Cohn et al., 2015).
This paper uses a similar priming treatment to induce a change in risk preferences
and the emotion of fear of subjects before they play the BR treatment. First, subjects are
randomly assigned to either a Boom or a Bust Treatment, or receive no treatment at all
(this is a control treatment, called No Priming). In the boom and bust treatments they
start with an identical priming introductory questionnaire intended to warm up and make
subjects salient to investment decisions.9 In the main priming part, subjects in the boom
(bust) treatment are presented with a green strongly rising (red sharply decreasing) stock
market price chart. At the end of the price charts an arrow points upwards (downwards) to
indicate the expected trend in the near future. This chart is followed by three subsequent
questions whether the subject would rather buy or sell shares / gold / real estate. The
questions do not differ in the two treatments. The priming treatment ends with a short
final questionnaire to elicit subjects’ affective state (ranging from ‘very negative’ to ‘very
positive’ on a nine-point scale of manikins proposed by Bradley and Lang (1994)) and
emotion of fear (ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘a lot’ on a seven-point Likert scale).
8See Bargh and Chartrand (2000) for a general practical guide and Cohn and Mare´chal (2016) for a
survey of the use of priming in economics. Cohn et al. (2014) provides an application of priming in the
context of banking: They measure honesty of bank employees after reminding them of their occupational
role.
9See Appendix A.1.2 for the original questionnaire as well as all instructions.
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Higher risk aversion increases the optimal threshold θ∗ subjects should use in the BR
treatment to decide whether to withdraw early or late. We should thus observe a lower
(higher) probability of bank runs in the subsequent BR treatment if subjects have been
primed with a boom (bust) treatment. Banking crises possess self-reinforcing feedback
loops too; experiencing a bank run (loss of wealth) could evoke fear among depositors
and render them more risk averse. Higher risk aversion in turn increases the likelihood of
inefficient panic-based bank runs (due to the higher required fundamental θ to trust the
bank). The priming treatments provide a test whether a boom or bust sparks positive
feedback loops in banking crises.
1.4.2.2 Guess the Number Treatment
The second additional treatment in this study is an implementation of a so-called ‘beauty
contest’ or ‘guessing game’ (see, e.g., Duffy and Nagel (1997); Ho et al. (1998); Nagel
(1995); Stahl and Wilson (1995)).10 This game builds on the belief of subjects to have
an above average ability to identify best responses to actions of other subjects, i.e., to
think one step further than the average of all other subjects does. In the most commonly
used game, participants are asked to simultaneously pick a number in the closed interval
of [0, 100]. The participant that comes closest to the arithmetic average of all picked
numbers multiplied with a factor p is the winner. The parameter p is predetermined and
common knowledge. In case of a tie, the payoff is divided equally.
For any parameter p in the range [0, 1) it is obvious that there is only one Nash
equilibrium: all subjects pick zero. Experimental evidence, however, repeatedly showed
that players only employ bounded rational strategies.11 The winning number usually is
significantly larger than zero. Assume, we set p = 2/3. In the simplest case, a subject
randomly chooses a number in the interval [0, 100]. This player assumes a uniform distri-
bution for the winning number and randomly chooses an estimate. This player is called
the ‘level-0 thinking player’ and in expectation picks the number (0 + 100)/2 = 50. The
next higher order player forms a belief that all other participants are level-0 players and
10The name ‘beauty contest’ for this category of strategic game has been coined by John Maynard
Keynes, who described an analogy of the behavior of investors on the financial markets with the newspaper
beauty contests where readers were asked to bet on the six prettiest faces out of a hundred photographs.
The winner of the newspaper beauty contest would be the person whose bets were closest to the average
bets of all other participants. A participant has to pick the photographs that she thinks all others would
pick too. This is not necessarily the person she thinks is prettiest nor even the average person would
think is prettiest. Rather the winning photograph might be on a higher degree where a person forms
beliefs about what the average expects the average opinion to be. As Keynes states it: “And there are
some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees” (Keynes, 1936, p. 140). Analogously,
stock traders might not be concerned primarily about the stock they think is most valuable. Rather they
try to anticipate what the average trader expects other traders to value the most.
11For a general survey see, e.g., Camerer (2003); Camerer et al. (2004) or Kahneman (2003).
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chooses p150 = 2/350 = 33.33. In general, the level-k thinking player chooses pk50 as
best-response to the (k − 1) order beliefs of all other players.
Nagel (1995) shows experimentally that in the first round players deviate strongly
from the game-theoretic prediction. Most frequently, individuals only conducted one to
two orders of higher beliefs, i.e., k = 1 or k = 2. Similarly, Camerer et al. (2004) find that
players on average perform 1.5 steps in most higher order games. However, Nagel (1995)
finds that after some rounds players use their experience and approach Nash equilibrium
strategies.
The theoretic global games solution in the BR treatment builds on the assumption
that individuals are able to perform k =∞ steps and build infinitely higher order beliefs.
The more sophisticated a depositor is and the more she believes that other depositors are
sophisticated too the higher the degree of rationality and thus the closer is the strategic
behavior in line with the global games solution. This treatment allows measuring level-k
thinking on banking crises, i.e., whether more rational behavior increases the likelihood
of bank runs. Depending on how many iterations k a subject performs the more I expect
her to alter her expectation about the behavior of other investors in the BR game.
The experimental implementation of the GTN treatment consists of two rounds. In a
first round, subjects have no prior information regarding the behavior of other subjects.
The range of numbers lies in [0, 100] and subjects are asked to pick the number that comes
closest to 2/3 of the average of all picked numbers. This first round is intended as a warm-
up exercise to help subjects understand the game and build a strategy when picking a
number. Since the guessing game is relatively well-known among students and many even
know the Nash equilibrium from their studies, they subsequently pick zero.12 A potential
explanation for this could be that rather than trying to win the game subjects want to
show that they understood the principle behind the Nash equilibrium in this game. To
show the subjects that it is not necessarily the player who chooses the Nash equilibrium
that wins the game I present the participants with the winning number of a previous
experimental study.13 This number provides a common knowledge starting point for the
second round.
To obtain the numeric level k, I simply solve 50pk = xi for k where xi represents
the picked number of individual k, i.e. k = ln(xi/50)/ ln(p) . Later on, in the empirical
analysis part, I only use the results from the second round and generate an additional
filter for subjects performing level-∞ thinking.
12In fact, I ask the subjects in the final questionnaire (only in sessions 2015 and 2016) whether they have
played the GTN game before and roughly 37.3% state that they knew the game already. In comparison,
only 1.2% stated that they have played a BR game before. See Table 1.5 for details.
13I use the first round results of Nagel (1995) which generated a mean of 36.73. The winning number
in Nagel’s study would thus have been 36.73 23 = 24.49.
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1.4.2.3 Noisy Bank Run Treatment
The noise associated with the signal about the fundamental is essential to global games
theory as it generates strategic uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the behavior of other
players in equilibrium (Morris and Shin, 2001). Understanding global games requires an
understanding of how an equilibrium depends on the uncertainty of a player about other
players’ payoffs. But, as shown in section 1.4.2.2, beliefs about other players’ payoffs are
not sufficient. One has to take the beliefs about the beliefs of other players, and further
higher order beliefs, into account. The introduction of the noise term in the global games
approach eliminates the problem of multiple equilibria that we would have if economic fun-
damentals were common knowledge and agents would perfectly know each others payoff
functions, such as in D&D. This offers a way to investigate the value of public informa-
tion in the context of coordination problems, e.g., when “[f]inancial markets apparently
‘overreact’ to announcements from central bankers that merely state the obvious” (Morris
and Shin, 2001, p. 5). From a central point of view there is an apparent trade-off between
having multiple equilibria and providing less accurate information.
In this study, I am able to manipulate the accuracy of the information that subjects
receive. For this I do not add any additional treatment but slightly change my BR
treatment to study the effect of the size of the noise term. Instead of the range [−0.1, 0.1]
that defines the noise term  in the ‘normal’ BR game I increase the range of the error
term in the ‘noisy’ treatment to [−0.3, 0.3]. Vives (2014) states that agents receiving a
less precise private information react more sensitive to bad signals. Hence, the larger the
variation of the noise term the higher the required signal in order to prevent panic-based
bank runs.
1.4.3 Theoretical Predictions
Theoretical predictions of optimal thresholds are derived similarly to Heinemann et al.
(2004) and Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) as lined out in Section 1.4.1. Table 1.3 presents the
global games optimal thresholds, θ∗, that agents should use to decide on early or late
withdrawal. Thresholds depend on the size of noise, , as well as on the risk aversion,
denoted as α, of the individual. Furthermore, since subjects in the experiment receive
signals that only have limited discrete accurateness there are two ways to compute the
optimal thresholds: (1) discrete and (2) continuous. The discrete derivation limits signal
and noise precision in the estimation to two decimal points. This means that there are
only 191 different signals θ in the range from 1.20 to 3.10 available (and 21 noise terms 
in the range from -0.10 to +0.10). This leads to the problem that there is not a unique
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threshold in the discrete derivation but rather a range of signals that would represent
optimal thresholds.
Insert Table 1.3 around here.
The influence of risk aversion, α, is taken into account assuming a power utility func-
tion of the form u(c) = x1−α−11−α with an initial wealth of 1. For the noisy signal with high
risk aversion, subjects should withdraw early for any signal received, i.e., the optimal
threshold θ∗ is above the range of signals. This is denoted with W .
For example, a risk neutral individual in the normal BR treatment (small noise term)
should use a threshold of θ∗ = 2.6822. For any signal below that threshold she should
withdraw her deposits early and wait otherwise. For discrete input parameters the optimal
threshold extends to an interval of θ∗ ∈ [2.69, 2.87]. For signals within this interval she
would be indifferent between early and late withdrawal. As expected, the higher the
risk aversion the higher is the optimal threshold. However, an increase in the noise term
increases the threshold level only for individuals with a sufficiently large risk aversion.
For risk loving individuals an increase in noise decreases θ∗.
1.4.4 Experimental Implementation
The experiment is implemented as a classroom experiment of a mandatory course on
‘Banking’ in the Bachelor of Arts program in Banking & Finance at the University of
Zurich. Subjects are students of the course that have to participate in the experiment as
a mandatory homework assignment that is part of their course assessment.
The experiment has been played in three consecutive cohorts in March 2014, March
2015, and April 2016. Before the students participate in the experiment they receive
extensive training in banking theory in general and in the theory behind bank runs with
a focus on the model of D&D in particular. Using sophisticated subjects (in the sense
of knowledgeable in the theory of bank runs) is an attempt to simulate the behavior of
institutional investors.
In every session, subjects have a pre-announced time frame of 24 hours to participate
in the experiment. Students were informed about the conditions to participate in the
experiment at the beginning of the course (8 weeks before the experiment). To ensure
that a large fraction of the students participate they are granted five exam points (out
of a total of 120) if they finish all treatments within the time frame.14 The experiment
is implemented as a browser game such that students can participate using their own
computer with any modern web browser. Instructions are given in the form of text and
video (see Appendix A.1 for transcripts).
14Participation rate is very high with 97.8% in 2014, 98.6% in 2015, and 95.5% in 2016.
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At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to one of six (eight)
treatments as lined out in Figure 1.2. Table 1.4 lists the realized random assignments of
the students to the different treatment orders.
Insert Table 1.4 around here.
A coordination game like the BR game in general requires players to participate in
the experiment simultaneously. However, since I use students that participate in the
experiment as part of a homework assignment, they may play at any time in a fixed time
frame. I resolve this simultaneity issue by using decisions that I recorded for the identical
BR game in Hegglin (2011). For the simulation there are a total of 648 group decisions
for any possible value of the fundamental value θ. At the beginning of a round in the BR
treatment a participant is randomly assigned to one of these 648 groups and randomly
replaces one of the six depositors in this group. In total there are thus 3,888 different
observed withdrawal scenarios. The advantage of this simulation approach is that it is
impossible to build a reputation. Furthermore, there is no end-of-game effect being played
by any other player.
1.5 Empirical Analysis
In total, there are 555 valid observations from 580 subjects that participated in the ex-
periment. I drop 12 observations of subjects that always either withdrew early or late
since it is technically not possible to estimate a binary outcome variable model without
variation. Furthermore, I exclude 13 observations of subjects for which the probability of
withdrawal early increases in the signal.15 Furthermore, for 22 subjects not all 20 decision
situations were recorded due to technical reasons. Subjects were able to participate in
the experiment on any device with an internet connection, even mobile phones that may
experience connection problems. I assume that connection problems are randomly dis-
tributed among subjects and hence do not drop the correctly recorded decision situations
from the sample.
Table 1.5 provides an overview on descriptive statistics. Panel A presents some overall
subject characteristics. Since the experiment was played as part of a mandatory lecture in
the Bachelor’s program of Banking & Finance most students belong to this study program
for which the 4th semester equals the most likely point of study progress to attend the
course. The fraction of females approximates the overall fraction in the study program
(roughly 23%).
Insert Table 1.5 around here.
15Results remain qualitatively the same but lose power if I do not exclude these 13 observations.
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Individual risk preferences are measured using a lottery-based risk elicitation task
based on Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects are presented with a list of 10 paired lotteries
for which the preferred lottery, A (safe choices) or B (risky choices), has to be picked in
every row. Payoffs in the lotteries remain constant, only the probabilities change. Moving
down the list the expected payoff of the risky option increases more than in the safe lottery
until in the last row option B strictly dominates A. Risk aversion is estimated by counting
the number of safe choices. Subjects are either risk averse (> 4 safe choices), risk loving
(< 4 safe choices), or risk neutral (= 4 safe choices). Charness et al. (2013) estimates
that choosing four safe options is approximately the equivalent of a CRRA coefficient α
in the range of [−0.15,+0.15]. I observe that the majority of individuals (50.6%) chooses
exactly the risk neutral strategy, while 35.9% (13.5%) are in line with risk averse (loving)
preferences.
The affective state and the emotion of fear are measured as described in section 1.4.2.1.
On average more than 90% claim they are rather happy and only roughly 7% declare that
they experience the emotion fear at the time of playing the experiment.
Both risk aversion as well as affective state and fearfulness are measured in the ex-
periment after some treatments already have taken place. Treatments are expected to
have impact on some but not all individual characteristics. For example, the fraction of
female participants should not differ between the treatments. On the other hand, risk
preferences should be affected if priming was successful. Table 1.6 provides a series of
randomization and treatment comparison tests that are based on the variables and sub-
samples of Table 1.5. Figures in the table correspond to the respective p-value of the
underlying comparison test. As an example: The null hypothesis that the fraction of
females is equivalent in the boom treatment and the control treatment cannot be rejected
(p-value of 0.971 using a Pearson χ2-test). Hence, we cannot say that females are not
randomly distributed between the two groups. However, the same test for the same two
groups reveals that the fraction of risk loving individuals differs at a significance level of
10% (p-value of 0.060). There are significantly more risk averse individuals in the boom
treatment (17.0%) than in the control treatment (9.7%). Analogously we observe that the
fraction of risk loving subjects was lower in the bust treatment (11.8%) than in the boom
treatment but the difference is not significant (see column “Boom vs Bust” in Table 1.6).
The randomization check also shows that individuals that play the GTN treatment first
experience the emotion fear to a higher extent (p-value of 0.079). I later control for the
order of the treatments in the regression analysis.
Insert Table 1.6 around here.
Panel B of Table 1.5 presents descriptive statistics for the BR treatment. I measure
a total of 11,042 individual decisions from 555 subjects. On average, the subjects receive
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a signal of θ = 2.171 with a standard deviation of σ = 0.493. Since the true fundamental
state is randomly and independently sampled from an identical sample space (see Section
1.4) the average value does not vary strongly between the different treatments. An average
depositor decides to withdraw early in 6.66 out of 20 decision situations and faces 2.29
bank runs during the experiment. A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-rum test reveals that
individuals in the bust treatment have a higher probability to withdraw early than in the
no priming or the bust treatment (p-values of 0.059 and 0.010 respectively).
1.5.1 Estimation of Most Likely Thresholds
The first analysis of the BR treatment is a test of the Theorem I of Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005). According to the global games theory agents decide to run on the bank if they
receive a signal below a unique threshold θ∗ and wait until t = 2 otherwise. I investigate
whether agents use a unique threshold by estimating “most likely thresholds” and mea-
suring corresponding error rates of these thresholds. Similar to Klos and Stra¨ter (2013), I
use two different methods: a logit model and a simple-error method. I illustrate the esti-
mation procedure of both methods in Figure 1.4. The left panel shows a logistic regression
of the signal θi on the binary decision whether the depositor withdraws early (=1) or late
(=0). The red solid line maps the signal into a probability of early withdrawal based on
the observed withdrawals of a single individual from the sample. Effective decisions are
marked in the graph by hollow points on the bottom (= late withdrawal) and on the top
(= early withdrawal). Decision situations that resulted in a bank run are additionally
marked with an asterisk next to the hollow point. To illustrate potential changes of the
threshold over time I add two additional logistic regression curves for the first ten (dotted
green line) and the last ten (dashed blue line) decision situations. Decision points are
colored analogously. The most likely threshold is now defined as the value θ where the
subject is exactly indifferent between withdrawing early or late, i.e., where the predicted
probability of early (or late) withdrawal is exactly 50%. This value is marked on the
logistic regression curve with a solid dot. In the example given the most likely threshold
lies at θ∗ = 1.89. Measuring only the first ten observations the threshold in this example
would be lower (θ∗p≤10 = 1.76) than in the latter ten observations (θ∗p>10 = 2.01).
Insert Figure 1.4 around here.
The other approach to estimate the most likely threshold is a simple error model as
proposed by Klos and Stra¨ter (2013). In this procedure one iteratively tests every possible
value θˆ in the range of the signals [1.2, 3.1] and counts the number of false withdrawal
decisions assuming that θˆ is the threshold in use. The most likely threshold thus is where
the error rate is the lowest. In most cases the optimal threshold would not be unique
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but rather lie in a range. I therefore approximate the most likely threshold as the middle
point between the first and last signal θ that minimizes the error rate. In the example in
Figure 1.4 the error rate is 5% for a θˆ = 1.70 as a minimum and θˆ = 2.03 as maximum.
The middle point is thus θ∗ = 1.865.
The average of all logistic regression model thresholds is θˆ∗log = 1.869 whereas the mean
simple error model threshold is θˆ∗sem = 1.868. Hence, the chosen threshold strategy differs
strongly from the optimal threshold predicted by global games theory (θ∗ = 2.682 for a
risk neutral agent in the regular BR treatment). This confirms the results by Cabrales
et al. (2007) and Klos and Stra¨ter (2013) who also find large deviations of observed versus
predicted optimal strategies.
I find that 36.9% of all subjects (205 out of 555) employ a “strict” threshold strategy,
i.e., they withdraw their money early if the signal is below a certain fixed value θ∗i and
withdraw late if the signal is above. Another 31.7% employ an “almost strict” threshold
strategy, i.e., they only make one mistake if I were to assume that they use a fixed
threshold value θ∗i . This provides evidence for Theorem I of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
that agents employ unique threshold strategies.
Strikingly, the estimated logit and simple error model thresholds in the bust and noisy
treatments are significantly higher than in the control treatment (p-values of 0.057 and
0.006 based on Student t-tests). On the other hand, depositors in the boom treatment
require a significantly lower signal in order to keep trust in the bank compared to de-
positors in the bust treatment. This is also illustrated in Figure 1.5 where the left panel
shows the development of the estimated threshold values θˆ in the BR game over time and
for different treatment groups. Threshold values are again derived from logistic regression
models of withdrawal decisions. For each estimation, all observations from a subsample
of four periods are taken together. The top graph shows the effect of priming: while the
estimated thresholds of subjects in the boom treatment are consistently low, the thresh-
olds of the control and the bust treatment are higher in almost all cases. On average,
thresholds tend to increase over time. This observation is in line with Heinemann et al.
(2004) who find that repeated interactions allow agents to approach the game theoretic
solution.
Insert Figure 1.5 around here.
In the right panel of Figure 1.5, estimation errors for the derived thresholds from the
left panel are computed for the same treatment groups and periods. It is interesting to
see that estimation errors decrease over time. This may be attributed to a learning effect.
For example, overall estimation errors for thresholds in the bust treatment is below 8%
in the last four periods compared to more than 17% in the first four periods.
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The middle two graphs show the same analysis for the subject groups that either
started the experiment with the GTN treatment or the BR treatment. Depositors that
first played GTN consistently require a larger threshold. This is in line with the expec-
tation that subjects that have been primed with a beauty contest tend to think more
about the potential behavior of their peers and also generate higher order beliefs in the
BR treatment. This difference in thresholds is confirmed in a t-test that rejects the null
hypothesis of identical means at the 5% level of significance.
The final two graphs illustrate the effect of an increase of the noise term on the esti-
mated threshold. This is also in line with theoretical predictions for risk averse individuals.
The absolute difference in the thresholds of 0.07 between subjects in the control and the
noisy treatment is significant at the 1% level.
Panel C of Table 1.5 provides descriptive statistics for the GTN treatment. The first
line corresponds to a randomization check and confirms that GTN treatment allocation
is randomly distributed among the priming treatments. The next six variables cover
the picked numbers in the guess 2/3 stage in the first and second round. On average,
subjects chose a number of 22.38 in the first round and 17.34 in the second round. This
corresponds to k = 3.895 and k = 3.935 iterations in level-k thinking (k was capped at 11).
Overall, 10.3% and 7.9% of all picked numbers correspond to level-∞ strategies. These
observations are marked and controlled for in the regression analysis later on. Estimates
are roughly identical in all but the first round of the bust treatment (guessed average of
19.8).
The last Panel D provides details on how much subjects enjoyed participating in the
experiment and whether they would like to have more classroom experiments of this
sort. Both variables show that intrinsic motivation of students is very high and that
the experiment was a very popular way to learn theory in an applied manner. Payoff
measured in ECU or Chocolate pralines (one praline per 6 ECU) is evenly distributed
across all treatments.
1.5.2 Panel Regression Analysis
In a next step, I try to identify factors that drive the decision whether a subject with-
draws early or late. Obviously, the signal should be the main explanatory variable with
the highest economic significance. With respect to the additional treatments, I expect an
increase (decrease) in the threshold in the boom (bust) treatment compared to the control
treatment. This corresponds to a higher (lower) probability of early withdrawal in the
boom (bust) treatment. Furthermore, subjects that were primed with a beauty contest
are expected to achieve higher levels k when generating beliefs about the behavior of their
peers and thus should exhibit an increased probability of early withdrawal (equivalent to
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a decreased estimated threshold). Finally, theory predicts that risk averse individuals
that receive noisier signals have higher uncertainty about the range of signals other de-
positors receive. This increases the likelihood of early withdrawal near the threshold and
is reflected in a higher threshold.
Table 1.7 presents the results of a panel logit regression. I use the signal together
with other explanatory variables to estimate a random-intercept logistic model on the
binary indicator variable of early withdrawal, i.e., logit{P (yit = 1|Xit, ζi)} where yit is
equal to 1 if depositor i decides to withdraw early in period t, Xit represents the matrix
of regressors, and ζi is the random intercept of agent i.16 The sample is the unbalanced
panel data set of 555 individuals with a total of 11,042 decision situations. Observations
are clustered at the subject level. Coefficients are displayed as conditional odds ratios
(equals the exponentiated logit regression coefficients), i.e., values below (above) 1 reduce
(increase) the conditional odds given an increase in the corresponding regressor.
Insert Table 1.7 around here.
The first model includes the signal (scaled by a factor of 100) and the period of the
decision (integer value of 1–20). The odds ratios coefficient for the signal is exp(β1) =
0.930. This shows that the withdrawal decision is highly sensitive to changes in the
signal: a ceteris paribus increase in the signal of +0.01 multiplies the conditional odds
for a subject by 0.930. Expressed differently, in terms of percentage change in estimated
odds, the conditional odds decrease 7.0%. An increase in the signal of +0.1 would lead
to a multiplication of the conditional odds of 0.93010 = 0.4835, i.e., a percentage change
of 51.65%. The probability of early withdrawal depends positively on the period of the
experiment. Per additional period in the game, the percentage change in estimated odds
increases by 1.2%. This confirms that subjects come closer to the game theoretic solution
over time and with more experience.
Subsequent regression models (2) to (10) test to what extent the withdrawal decision
depends on treatment and subject variables. Model (2) tests whether subjects in the bust
or boom treatment react differently from subjects in the control treatment (this excludes
subjects in the noisy treatment). The results provide evidence that the bust treatment
significantly increases the odds of early withdrawal whereas the boom treatment decreases
the probability although the latter coefficient is not significant. Comparing just the two
groups of the bust and boom treatment (see model (3)) reveals that subjects primed with
a bust have a 47.2% percentage increase in odds to withdraw early.
16A much simpler analysis is regressing all explanatory variables directly on the estimated logit thresh-
olds from section 1.5.1 using OLS. However, the disadvantage of this approach is the loss of time-varying
variables, such as the period, and that regressors are harder to interpret. Results in terms of signs and
significance nevertheless remain qualitatively the same. For details, see supplementary Table A-1 in the
Appendix.
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In models (4) to (6) I analyze the effect of level-k thinking. Individuals that first played
the GTN treatment have a higher likelihood to take possible actions of peer players into
account and might thus generate higher order beliefs. The more iterations k a subject
performs when thinking about what other players believe what other players believe, etc.,
the higher should the optimal threshold be and thus the higher the likelihood for an
early withdrawal. Regression results confirm this intuition. Model (4) shows a positive
change in odds for subjects that played the GTN treatment first. In model (5) I add the
integer estimate for the level k that subjects employed in the second round of the GTN
treatment. This regressor is positive too but not significant. The reason for that may be
that many students picked the number zero, which would correspond to a level k = ∞.
In the analysis, these observations were capped at a value of k = 11. If I exclude these
observations with a filter (see model (6), filter abbreviated by “L-∞”) I find that the
level k has a highly significant and economically meaningful impact on the probability to
withdraw early. Per additional level k the conditional odds to withdraw early increase by
10.2%.
Model (7) uses an indicator variable for subjects that played the BR game with a larger
noise term of  ∈ [−0.3, 0.3] instead of [−0.1, 0.1]. Theory suggests that individuals should
increase their withdrawal threshold. To test this empirically I compare subjects from the
noise treatment with subjects from the control treatment (I filter all observations of the
boom or bust priming treatments). The coefficient is positive as expected and significant
at the 5% level. I find that increased uncertainty about both the individual private signal
as well as the range of signals that other depositors might have received increases the
odds ratio of early withdrawal by 47.4%.
Section 1.4.3 has shown the influence of risk aversion on the theoretical optimal thresh-
old θ∗. The higher the risk aversion the higher the likelihood that a depositor decides to
withdraw early. I elicit risk preferences in the final questionnaire after the experimental
treatments. Model (8) of Table 1.7 presents the corresponding regression results. In-
terestingly, I do not find a positive but rather an insignificant negative influence of risk
aversion.17
Dijk (2015) suggests that the emotion of fear might be a driving force for the proba-
bility of running on the bank. He also finds that women in particular react significantly
stronger to fear induction. Cohn et al. (2015) also conclude that subjects primed with a
bust treatment exhibit significantly higher levels of fear. They suggest that the emotion of
17A possible explanation for this puzzling result might be that the elicitation task in the questionnaire
was not incentivized. Subjects were simply asked to choose between lotteries without any consequence
for their final payoff. An improvement to measure risk preferences would be to endow subjects with a
fixed amount of ECU that generates a return according to a randomly picked lottery from the decision
table.
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fear, in turn, might have an effect on the perception of risk. Lee and Andrade (2011), for
example, study the impact of fearfulness on stock trading. They observe that incidental
fear increases both the risk aversion of the subject as well as the expectation of higher risk
aversion among peers through social projection, i.e., that subjects take their current affec-
tive state as representative for other subjects. Applied to this study this would imply that
subjects primed with a bust scenario exhibit higher risk aversion and higher levels of fear.
This should directly (through risk aversion) and indirectly (through adverse expectations
about the behavior of others) increase the likelihood of an early withdrawal. Although I
find a small insignificant correlation between fearfulness and the bust treatment (results
not reported here), I do not find evidence that fearfulness has a significant effect on the
decision to withdraw money early (see model (9)). This result holds if the variable fear
is interacted with a gender dummy and if control variables for the boom and bust treat-
ments are added. The same applies for the variable that measures affective state. It is
possible that the bust priming in this experiment only has had a small effect to stir up
the emotion of fear. A self-induced fear treatment as in Dijk (2015) might improve the
effect of the priming.
Different from Kiss et al. (2014b) I do find that women are significantly less likely
to panic and thus require a lower signal to decide to withdraw early (see model (10)).
However, I also find that females state more often that they experience the emotion of
fear when participating in the experiment. Nevertheless, if I interact the gender variable
with fear in a regression model, females still have a lower probability to withdraw money
early (results not reported).
The last regression model (11) combines all explanatory variables of the previous
models. The sample consists of all treatments combined and only excludes individuals
that chose a value of zero in the GTN game. The only effects that remains robust in the
overall sample are the variables of the GTN treatment as well as gender. The last column
provides corresponding marginal effects on the estimated odds ratios of model (11) for
changes in corresponding explanatory variables. For the signal, the marginal effect shows
a change of +0.01, for all indicator variables a change from 0 to 1 and all other variables
a change from the first to the third quartile. The strongest effects in the combined full
sample come from the noisy treatment, the GTN treatment and the gender variable.
1.6 Conclusion
Banks increase welfare by writing contracts that generate liquid deposits based on illiquid
assets. This maturity transformation creates multiple equilibria: a good equilibrium that
offers risk sharing for patient agents and a bad equilibrium in which patient agents lose
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trust and run on the bank. This multiple equilibria problem has been solved by global
games theory which is based on the idea that every agent receives a noisy private signal
about the true fundamental state of the bank. Using this signal every agent can infer the
optimal action and employs a threshold strategy: for signals above (below) a certain level
the depositor stays with the bank (runs on the bank).
In this paper I use a simple experimental model of the global games theory and investi-
gate factors that may influence the threshold level. My results contribute to the empirical
analysis of global games models as well as to the understanding of determinants of bank-
ing crises on a micro-data level. I find evidence that depositors in my model use threshold
strategies when deciding whether they want to withdraw early or late. An increase in risk
aversion through a priming treatment positively influences the threshold level and raises
the probability of a bank run. This may trigger a self-reinforcing feedback loop in which
higher risk aversion leads to more bank runs which in turn increase risk aversion even
further.
I find that subjects that do not only take their expectation about the behavior of other
depositors into account but also their belief about the beliefs of other depositors, or even
higher order beliefs, are more prone to produce panic-based runs. Strikingly, the more
rational agents are and the closer they approach the game theoretic predictions the more
likely bank runs become.
Finally, I find that larger uncertainty about the true fundamental state of the economy
also increases the probability of bank runs. This contributes to the discussion of disclosure
quality in the banking industry. More accurate public information decreases the likelihood
of panic-based bank runs.
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Figure 1.1
Utility Differential of a Late Withdrawal. This figure illustrates the utilities of early and late with-
drawal and its differential. We see that utility from early withdrawal is constant as long as the bank has not
declared bankruptcy and decreases with a higher fraction of individuals to withdraw in period 1 towards
u(r1)/r1. The utility from late withdrawal is highest when all patient agents decide to withdraw late and
decreases with a higher fraction of early withdrawals towards 0. Early withdrawal yields the same return as
long as the bank is not bankrupt. Once the bank has gone bankrupt, utility from early withdrawal dimin-
ishes with a higher fraction of early withdrawers. Source: based on Goldstein and Pauzner (2005, p. 1305).
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Figure 1.2
Experiment Treatment Flowchart. This figure illustrates the path through which subjects are di-
rected throughout the experiment. Decision node ”Noisy?” with the ”Noisy Bank Run Treatment” was
added in the sessions 2015 and 2016. Decision node “BR first?” tests whether the Bank Run treatment
is played before the Guess the Number treatment.
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Figure 1.3
Timeline Bank Run Treatment. This figure depicts the timeline of the bank run treatment. At
time t = 0 subjects are randomly assigned to a group of six investors. From these six investors five are
observations of an earlier study of the experiment (see Hegglin (2011)) and thus simulated. Each investor
invests 1 ECU at the bank. At the start of period t = 1 each investor receives a private signal θ with noise
 and decides whether to withdraw the investment or wait until period t = 2. If four or more investors
withdraw early we have the situation of a bank run and the bank declares bankruptcy. In a bankruptcy
case only four of all early withdrawing depositors are paid out. If there are five or six early withdrawing
depositors nature decides which investors receive the promised repayment. If there is no bank run in
t = 1 the bank liquidates what remained invested and distributes the proceedings equally among all late
withdrawers. Source: based on Klos and Stra¨ter (2013, p. 9).
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Figure 1.4
Logit and Simple-Error Model for Early Withdrawal Decision. This figure depicts the estimation
of the most likely threshold chosen by a sample subject in the bank run treatment. The left panel shows
a logit regression with the binary outcome variable withdraw early (=1) or withdraw late (=0) that is
explained solely by the signal θi. The red solid line estimates the withdrawal probability over all 20
periods while the blue dashed (green dotted) curve estimate the withdrawal for the first ten (last ten)
periods. Any decision is depicted by a hollow point on the bottom (for late withdrawal) or the top (for
early withdrawal). Any withdrawal decision that resulted in a bank run is marked with an additional
colored asterisk (blue for the first ten periods, green for the last ten periods). The most likely threshold
is the value of θ where the subject is exactly indifferent between withdrawing early or late, i.e., where
the predicted probability of early (or late) withdrawal is exactly 50%. On the right panel I depict the
estimation of the most likely threshold using a simple error model similar to Klos and Stra¨ter (2013)
where I estimate the fraction of errors that I would observe for any given θˆ. I approximate the most
likely threshold as the middle point between the first and last signal θ that minimizes the error rate.
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Figure 1.5
Threshold Estimation over Time. The left panel of this figure shows the development of the estimated
threshold values θˆ in the Bank Run game over time and for different treatment groups. Thresholds are
derived from logistic regression models of withdrawal decisions (0 = withdraw late, 1 = withdraw early)
on signals θ. For each estimation observations from a subsample within four periods are taken together.
In the right panel estimation errors for the derived thresholds from the left panel are computed for the
same treatment groups and periods.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1
Ex Post Payoffs in the Bank Run Model. This table shows the general theoretical (Panel A) and
the experimentally modelled (Panel B) ex post payments to agents depending on size of n, i.e., agents
that decide to withdraw in t = 1. In Panel A, n represents a fraction of early withdrawers (n ∈ [λ, 1]),
whereas in Panel B, n equals an integer number of agents withdrawing early (n ∈ [0, 6]). The payment
r1 is the promised refund of the bank to early withdrawers (only paid in full if the bank remains solvent)
and R is the realized return of the investment project. Source: based on Goldstein and Pauzner (2005,
p. 1299).
Panel A: General Theoretical Ex Post Payoffs
Withdrawal early (t = 1) late (t = 2)
no bank run (n < 1/r1) r1
{
1−nr1
1−n R : p(θ)
0 : 1− p(θ)
bank run (n ≥ 1/r1)
{
r1 : 1nr1
0 : (1− 1nr1 )
0
Panel B: Modelled Ex Post Payoffs in the Experiment
Withdrawal early (t = 1) late (t = 2)
no bank run (n < 4) r1 = 1.5 R(6− n× 1.5)
bank run (n ≥ 4)
{
r1 = 1.5 : 4/n
0 : (1− 4/n) 0
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Table 1.2
Payoff Table in the Decision Stage of the Bank Run Treatment. This is the payoff table being
presented to investors in the decision stage before they have to decide whether they want to withdraw
their investment early. As an example we have the depicted the case of θ = 2. Source: based on Klos
and Stra¨ter (2013, Online-Appendix, p. 13).
Period 1 Period 2
Number of
early
withdrawers
(withdraw
in t=1)
Number of
late
withdrawers
(withdraw
in t=2)
Number
of satis-
fied early
with-
drawers
Number
of dis-
satisfied
early
with-
drawers
Individual
expected
payment
Number
of satis-
fied late
with-
drawers
Number
of dis-
satisfied
late with-
drawers
Individual
expected
payment
0 6 - - - 6 0 2.00
1 5 1 0 1.50 5 0 1.80
2 4 2 0 1.50 4 0 1.50
3 3 3 0 1.50 3 0 1.00
4 2 4 0 1.50 0 2 0.00
5 1 4 1 1.50 or 0 0 1 0.00
6 0 4 2 1.50 or 0 - - -
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Table 1.4
Number of Subjects per Session and Treatment. This table illustrates the number of subjects
that had randomly been assigned to one of six (eight) possible different treatment orders in Session 1
in March 2014, Session 2 in March 2015, and Session 3 in April 2016. In a first step, the participants
are assigned to either a Boom, a Bust, or to a No Priming treatment. In a second step, they either play
the Bank Run or the Guess the Number treatment first. The Noisy Bank Run treatment has only been
implemented as of 2015 and without priming of a boom or bust treatment. In this treatment the regular
Bank Run treatment was replaced with a Noisy Bank Run treatment where the error term  has a range
of [−0.3, 0.3] instead of [−0.1, 0.1].
2014 2015 2016 Total
No Priming 27 24 25 76
Boom Bank Run GTN 31 26 22 79
Bust 26 30 20 76
No Priming 31 30 17 78
Boom GTN Bank Run 29 22 29 80
Bust 33 25 19 77
No Priming
Noisy Bank Run GTN - 21 24 45
GTN Noisy Bank Run - 25 19 44
162 203 157 555
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Table 1.6
Randomization Check and Treatment Effects. This table provides randomization and comparison
tests for the variables described in Table 1.5. The second column describes the test that has been used to
compare the different groups: The comparison tests are a Pearson χ2-test for binary variables (denoted
by χ2), a Student’s t-test of identical means for continuous variables (tt), and a two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for categorical variables (rs). Results from the tests are presented as
p-values. Values below p < 0.1 are given bold font weight.
No Priming vs Boom vs BR vs
Boom Bust Noisy Bust GTN first
Panel A: Subject Characteristics
Females χ2 0.971 0.843 0.699 0.871 0.367
Age tt 0.126 0.123 0.436 0.800 0.843
BA in B&F χ2 0.358 0.760 0.459 0.542 0.604
BA in BusAdm χ2 0.900 0.693 0.988 0.601 0.805
in 3/4 Semester χ2 0.762 0.595 0.914 0.815 0.788
in 5/6 Semester χ2 0.821 0.580 0.994 0.739 0.982
Risk loving χ2 0.060 0.567 0.104 0.190 0.568
Risk neutral χ2 0.078 0.190 0.371 0.661 0.330
Risk averse χ2 0.615 0.321 0.851 0.618 0.155
Affective State rs . . . 0.198 0.341
Fearfulness rs . . . 0.270 0.079
Dislike Chocolate χ2 0.522 0.220 0.181 0.550 0.328
Panel B: Bank Run Treatment
Fundamental θ tt 0.581 0.535 0.612 0.242 0.994
#Early WD rs 0.372 0.059 0.839 0.010 0.426
#Bank Runs rs 0.982 0.858 0.066 0.825 0.844
Logit Threshold tt 0.693 0.057 0.006 0.026 0.042
SEM Threshold tt 0.544 0.048 0.009 0.014 0.031
Strict TS χ2 0.737 0.430 0.742 0.645 0.013
Know BR χ2 0.302 0.317 0.097 0.982 0.173
Panel C: Guess the Number Treatment
Start with GTN χ2 0.953 0.955 0.856 0.998 .
GTN est #1 tt 0.569 0.021 0.379 0.123 0.398
GTN est #2 tt 0.489 0.477 0.850 0.189 0.765
Level-k est #1 rs 0.308 0.014 0.442 0.226 0.699
Level-k est #2 rs 0.907 0.164 0.796 0.232 0.104
Level-∞ #1 χ2 0.149 0.085 0.836 0.764 0.193
Level-∞ #2 χ2 0.482 0.841 0.522 0.367 0.506
Know GTN χ2 0.986 0.511 0.869 0.497 0.051
Panel D: Overall Experiment Details
Play again rs 0.334 0.422 0.395 0.860 0.026
Exp Liking rs 0.407 0.502 0.354 0.153 0.015
Rev ECU tt 0.305 0.517 0.623 0.737 0.822
Rev Pralines rs 0.328 0.581 0.750 0.689 0.964
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Of store of metals, which we pile,
And merrily greet: ”Good cheer!” the while.
Well-meant the words, believe us, then!
We are the friends of all good men.
The Gnomes
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
2.1 Introduction
Swiss Banks have often been compared to Gnomes, amassing and hoarding underground
fortunes.1 In this paper, we build on Goethe’s description of the Gnomes as “always indus-
trious everywhere,” analyzing the link between Swiss wealth managers’ industriousness
and their performance. While Swiss wealth managers do work in relative secrecy like the
Gnomes, they are required to disclose their “mining” performance, i.e., the yearly amount
of net new money attracted from their customers. This makes Swiss private banking an
ideal object of study.2
Private banks generate revenue by managing assets for wealthy private individuals.
Two of the most important key figures in private banking are assets under management
(AuM) and net new money (NNM). The more assets a private bank manages the larger
is the basis on which the bank may generate fee and commission income. Assets under
management may grow through two channels, either through capital gains or through the
acquisition of new funds, i.e., by attracting new customers or by extending the ‘share of
wallet’ of existing clients. Understanding the determinants of net new money thus is key
to growth and performance in wealth management. The financial sector as a whole is
an important contributor to GDP in many countries (State Secretariat for International
Financial Matters SIF, 2014), with percentage contributions to GDP ranging from 3.6%
(Germany), 6.6% (US), 8.6% (UK), 10.5% (Switzerland) to 11,2% (Singapore). While
much research has been devoted to commercial and investment banking, the world of
private banks and wealth management remains somewhat neglected and thus provides
opportunities for research.
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the creation of net new money for Swiss
private banks. The Swiss private banking market provides an ideal setting for a study
1In the 1960s the “Gnomes of Zurich” were suspected of speculating against the British Pound. In
popular belief, Gnomes are Goblin-like creatures mining and hoarding treasures underground, symbolizing
the unbounded greed of wealth. They were first mentioned by Paracelsus and immortalized by Goethe
in the famous scene on paper money in Faust. The full quotation may be found in the Appendix.
2The term “private banking” is often used as synonymous with wealth management, since originally,
most Swiss wealth managers were in the form of so-called (fully liable) private banks (not denoting the
opposite of public banks).
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of this topic, even though (or precisely because) this market has been eyed critically
for a long time. First, in international comparison, Switzerland has a high density of
private banks and is a large market for cross-border wealth management. As of the
end of 2014, Swiss banks managed approximately CHF 6.7 trillion assets, whereof 51.1
percent are assets from international customers (Swiss Bankers Association, 2015). Swiss
private banks have an approximate market share of 25.0 percent in worldwide offshore
wealth management. Section 2.2 presents a brief history of Swiss banking. Second, while
one of the reasons for the lack of evidence on private banks is the secretive nature of
these banks and the lack of data, Swiss regulation requires its banks3 to report AuM,
the composition of AuM as well as NNM in a standardized form under some conditions.
Third, Swiss banks experienced a prolonged period of international political pressure as
well as extensive cross-sectional variation related to fraudulent business practices and tax
evasion. By exploiting variation in negative media coverage, this affords an opportunity
to investigate the role of reputational risks in wealth management.
For our empirical analysis, we use a unique hand-collected data set of accounting
reports for 87 private banks in Switzerland for the period of 2002 to 2014. Furthermore,
we enlarge our data set with the accounts of 11 banks in the Principality of Liechtenstein.
Private banking in Liechtenstein is very comparable to Switzerland due to its geographical
proximity, identical currency, and similar regulation and reporting standards. In total,
we study 98 private banks.
We begin by identifying banks that are comparatively more efficient in producing
output, i.e. generation of income, given a vector of cost factors like wage costs, adminis-
trative costs, and depreciation while controlling for size. We measure efficiency through
the standard figure cost-income ratio (CIR). Banks that achieve a lower (higher) CIR
than implied by their input factors are more (less) skilled compared to other banks hav-
ing similar input factors. We define the fixed effect component of abnormal CIR as the
skill of a bank. The time-varying component of abnormal CIR captures unusual costs
occurring in a year, for example, due to unusual depreciation (that occurs when a bank
loses goodwill of customers).
In a second step, we then study the determinants of future net new money genera-
tion. We find that our skill factor has strong predictive power for future NNM attraction.
Banks that have abnormally low CIR given their input factors are more successful in
3The Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) sets up the reporting standards for Swiss banks.
Since the end of 2002, all banks in Switzerland that generate more than one-third of their revenues
through commission and fee income over a moving average of three years have to give a structured report
of assets under management and publish their net money flows. In what follows we define banks that
fulfill the SFBC AuM reporting criteria as private banks, thus denoting them with the common term for
banks that generate a larger portion of their income by wealth management services such as financial
investment advisory or managing assets of wealthy customers.
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generating net money flows in the future. We furthermore find that banks with nega-
tive media coverage experience large money outflows in the subsequent year. It is, in
particular, relatively small banks that suffer most from negative media coverage. In our
main specification, a bank below median size in terms of assets under management that
experiences negative media coverage in one year has a 9.5 percentage point lower net new
money growth (and, thus, often experiences net outflows) in the following year. Using
estimates for the profits that banks make on assets under management, we calculate that
this is roughly equivalent to a present value loss of 3.35 times the median annual net
profit of a small bank. For a large bank, the present value of the damage of negative
media coverage is 0.73 times the median annual net profit. Thus, reputational costs can
be substantial.
We identify several other determinants of net new money growth. More employees
(adjusted for the size of AuM) are associated with higher NNM growth, as are higher wages
and bonuses for bank employees. Strikingly, returns on investment on funds managed for
clients does not explain the variation in net new money growth of Swiss private banks.
Our paper is related to (1) the literature on reputational risk and trust in financial
markets, (2) the literature on the role of relationships in banking, (3) the literature on
private banking specifically, and (4) the literature on fund flows in the mutual funds
industry.
First, the basis of wealth management is the clients’ trust in the bank or, from the
bank’s perspective, reputation. Gennaioli et al. (2015) compare investors seeking profes-
sional investment advice to individuals seeing a doctor to get medical advice; investors
may be anxious about investing because they have little knowledge of financial markets
similar to a patient who does not know how to be cured. Investors in their model do not
choose a portfolio manager because of past performance but rather because of trust and
confidence. Our paper allows an empirical investigation of both aspects: the ability of
a bank to attract new funds and customers as a function of trust and past investment
performance.
The importance of generalized trust for stock market participation has been demon-
strated by Guiso et al. (2008), and Giannetti and Wang (2016) document how household
stock market participation decreases after the revelation of corporate fraud. There is a
more limited empirical literature related to reputational risks in the financial industry.
Most studies focus on stock market reactions of commercial banks after operational losses
using event studies. Gillet et al. (2010) conduct an event study and compare stock price
losses with the announcement of an operational loss. They find that operational losses
resulting from internal fraud result in a greater loss of the stock price. They interpret the
difference between the operational loss and the stock price loss as reputational damage.
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Fiordelisi et al. (2013) try to elaborate on the determinants of reputational damage af-
ter operational losses in a similar setting. They find that the probability of reputational
damage is increasing in firm size and profits and reduced by a higher level of capital and
intangible assets. Sturm (2013) also investigates operational losses and their impact on
reputational damage. He finds that stock prices react negatively both to press as well as
settlement announcements of operational losses. Armour et al. (2017) document that a
firm’s “naming” as a wrongdoer by a UK regulator leads to negative stock price reactions
that are substantially larger than the direct penalties imposed.
These studies consider studying the reactions of stock prices of publicly listed compa-
nies, and many focus on the announcement of operational damage. We focus on private
banks that almost without exception are not listed on a stock exchange, and our in-
terest lies in reputational damage occurring neither not operational losses, but through
fraudulent practices associated with tax evasion.
Second, the term relationship banking often refers to a bank’s ability to obtain lender-
specific information over multiple interactions. A rich literature investigates the char-
acteristics of the lender-borrower relationship. For extensive surveys, see Degryse et al.
(2009) and Kysucky and Norden (2016). However, very little is known about the rela-
tionship of wealthy bank clients to their (private) banks. Our paper thus extends the
existing literature by providing evidence on the relative importance of factors such as the
reputation and performance of banks.
Third, there is only very limited empirical research on private banking.4 Delaloye
et al. (2012) conduct an event study to investigate the importance of banking secrecy for
Swiss private banks. Other streams of literature focus on specific wealth management and
banking topics. Foehn (2004) conducts a case study to determine the client value of private
banking clients in Switzerland. Burgstaller and Cocca (2011) study the efficiency of
private banking institutions in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Cocca (2008) considers size
effects and integrated business models in private banking in Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
Horn and Rudolf (2012) investigate the determinants of service quality and its effects on
private banks. Horn and Rudolf (2011) document that financial security affects customer
loyalty more than service quality and they provide a first indication that banks outside
Germany benefit more from their reputation for security.
Fourth, broadly speaking, our paper is also related to the mutual funds literature,
which has investigated determinants of fund flows (e.g., Agarwal et al. (2009)). Kos-
tovetsky (2016) demonstrates that following management-company ownership changes, a
substantial decline of flows occurs. While there are some similarities, there are many dif-
ferences between mutual funds and private banks, and a transfer of results obtained from
4Hens and Bachmann (2009), as well as Maude (2006), provide overviews of private banking in general.
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one to the other is impossible. Kostovetsky (2016) cites a 2013 CFA Institute Edelman
survey that found that 75% of investors believe the most important attribute for choosing
an investment manager is trust (or ethics), whereas only 17% believe it is the ability to
generate high returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents some historical
background of Swiss private banking. Section 2.3 provides the theoretical background of
private banking for which section 2.4 presents the hypotheses and the empirical strategy.
Section 2.5 describes the data. Section 2.6 presents the results, while section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Swiss Private Banking: Historical Perspective
Switzerland was an early-bird in the Industrial Revolution,5 but a laggard in banking.
While local savings banks developed steadily from about 1830, the first decades of indus-
trialization, until the 1860s, could mainly be financed from private savings. Yet, Swiss
financial advisors had already offered their services internationally more than a century
before the country even saw its first banks.
After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685,6 numerous Huguenots (French
protestants) found refuge in Switzerland, particularly in Geneva. In an attempt to rescue
some of their funds left in France, they acquired financial practice and founded financial
institutions. Most French banks, therefore, were of Swiss origin, among them the Banque
de France (Luthy, 1963). Jean-Fre´de´ric Perregaux, from Neuchaˆtel, financed the Napoleon
Bonaparte’s coup d’e´tat of 1799; in exchange, he got the permission to create the Banque
de France of which he became the first “regent” (Szramkiewicz, 1974).7 Around the same
time, two sons of Geneva – Jacques Necker (in 1777) and Albert Gallatin (in 1801) –
became the equivalent of finance ministers in France and the US, respectively.
After the Versailles treaty, neutral Switzerland acquired the reputation of a financially
safe haven. By the early twentieth century, both, the big banks and a number of mainly
smaller full liability banks offered specialized service in wealth management. By that
time, in several European countries, most notably France, increased taxation had replaced
religious prosecution as a motive to move funds into Switzerland. Swiss banks were known
for a strong secrecy culture (still based on civil law), and they openly advertised their
assistance in tax protection abroad (Guex, 2000). During the First World War, foreign
funds poured into Switzerland thanks to political neutrality, the stable currency, free
movement of capital, mild taxation and, last but not least, bank secrecy (see Guex,
5Thanks, among else, to the ubiquity of water power.
6The revocation of the Edict ended religious tolerance and led to the emigration of many (protestant)
Huguenots.
7The title Governor was only introduced a few years later.
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2000). The strong position of Switzerland as a financial center was symbolized by the
choice of Basel as the domicile of the Bank for International Settlements established in
1930.
In 1934, reacting to foreign pressure against its safe-haven policy, Switzerland made
violations of bank secrecy a violation of the penal code in Article 47 of the Banking Act.
A further feature of Swiss bank secrecy attractive for tax-shy international clients was the
distinction between tax avoidance and tax fraud. Since only the latter is prosecuted under
the penal code (avoidance only being punished by administrative fines), Swiss authorities
cannot provide international legal assistance in tax avoidance cases.
Given this favorable framework, Swiss banks became leading wealth managers after
the Second World War.8 Swiss banking secrecy became a legend entering many books
and movies. An initiative launched by the Social Democrats, calling, among else,9 for
the demise of bank secrecy, was rejected by a wide margin in 1984. In the late 1990s,
Switzerland came under international pressure from groups representing, mainly Jewish,
victims of the Holocaust (and their heirs), whose funds had become dormant in Swiss
banks. In the following years, the issue was settled in several agreements; yet, Swiss
banking secrecy has been somewhat tarnished since. About simultaneously to the 2007-
2008 international Financial Crisis, Swiss banking took another hit: Pressure from several
important countries led Switzerland to accept the so-called automatic exchange of infor-
mation as an international standard, thereby putting an end to bank secrecy in matters
of taxes for non-residents. As a consequence of the financial crisis and the shift of focus to
tax compliant customers, assets under management stagnated from 2008-2013. They have
started to grow again, and Swiss banks still are the leading wealth managers worldwide
managing foreign funds of, roughly, USD 2.5 trillion.
2.3 Theoretical Background
To fix ideas and as a basis for our empirical hypotheses, we provide a simple formalization
of a private bank’s choice problem. A competitive bank offers advisory services on its
assets under management. For each period t, the bank maximizes profit
P = A ·m− C, (2.1)
where A denotes assets under management (AuM), m the gross profit margin, and C
cost. The bank is a price taker in the AuM market, i.e., m is given exogenously. At the
beginning of period t + 1, the bank has a stock of assets under management, At. The
8Disclosure of funds under management and net new money only became mandatory as of 2003-2004.
9Another item was the introduction of government deposit insurance
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bank can influence AuM growth and cost, however, via decision variables like the number
of employees, wage per employee, and others. Decision variables have a lagged influence
on AuM and cost. For example, a decision to increase staff only becomes effective in the
following period. The maximization problem, based on Equation (2.1), therefore reads:
max
Xt
Pt+1 = (At + ∆At+1 (Xt))mt+1 − Ct+1 (Xt) (2.2)
where X represents a vectors of decision variables affecting AuM and cost.
One difficulty of studying private banks’ behavior in the data is that the overall vari-
able of interest, P , is not observable: Some Swiss private banks do not disclose profit
figures, while others publish profit figures post window-dressing. Assets under manage-
ment (AuM) are, however, published and are comparable across banks, thus providing the
basis for a performance measure. A complication arises here, too, in that an increase in
AuM may either indicate true inflows of assets to be managed by the bank or just a higher
value of assets already managed by the bank. In particular, swings in asset values may
be due to the stock market, to changes in the interest rate and to changes in exchange
rates, a factor that is quite important in a small country with its own currency.
We are interested in what banks can do to influence the actual in- and outflows. Thus,
to exclude effects due to changes in valuation, we will use figures net of valuation effects,
namely, Net new money (NNM). In our empirical analysis, we normalize NNM by the
stock of assets under management.
Thus, the bank’s maximization problem becomes:
max
Xt
NNMt+1 (Xt)mt+1 − Ct+1 (Xt) (2.3)
In an individual bank’s profit maximum, it equalizes the marginal benefit and marginal
costs of the elements of X. When regressing P (or NNM) on X for an individual bank,
a non-zero coefficient on an element of X would suggest that the bank does not use the
optimal amount of the respective input. In an empirical estimation of P (or NNM) across
heterogeneous banks, though, one would not expect the coefficients of the elements of X to
be zero. Banks using more of one particular input may be more profitable than those using
less, even though individually they all operate at their optimum. Non-zero coefficients in
our estimation may, therefore, reflect two different things: (i) a non-optimal factor mix
at individual banks and/or (ii) profit-relevant heterogeneity of factor combinations across
banks.
A bank’s non-optimal factor mix in the sense of (i) may be due to the use of factors
coming in discrete or even exogenous quantities. We will consider two such factors. The
first is a variable we call “skill,” a bank-specific parameter of cost efficiency, comparable
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to total factor productivity in a Cobb-Douglas production function. It reflects a bank’s
ability to optimally combine the input factors. A second profit-relevant variable is the
reputation of a bank. The next section details our hypotheses regarding these factors and
discusses their measurement.
2.4 Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
We test two primary hypotheses as well as a number of secondary conjectures.
2.4.1 Efficiency and Skill
The first main hypothesis is that the performance of a bank in attracting new money
depends positively on the bank management’s “skill.” Skill itself is unobservable. However,
we can estimate, from the data, how efficiently a bank has been operating, relative to its
peers, and this efficiency provides a measure of skill. Specifically, we expect that banks
that are relatively more efficient than predicted by our model also perform better in
attracting net new money. We use the cost-income ratio, the total operating expenses,
and depreciation per unit of net operating profit, as an indication of a bank’s efficiency.
(This measure is also widely considered in practice.)
Concretely, as a first step, we estimate a regression model of the cost-income ratio using
a set of input factors that describe the cost structure and the income structure of the bank.
This allows us to identify both a bank-specific abnormal efficiency and a bank-year-specific
yearly abnormal efficiency by predicting the idiosyncratic (time-varying) residuals.
Let c(X) = C/(A ∗m) denote the cost-income ratio (CIR). Splitting the cost-income
ratio cit(X) of bank i in year t into a constant bank-specific component, c¯i, and the bank’s
yearly component eit yields:
cit(X) = c(X) + c¯i + eit. (2.4)
Our econometric methodology to measure c¯i, the bank-specific abnormal efficiency
and the bank-year-specific abnormal yearly efficiency, eit, as indicated in Equation (2.4)
is to estimate a variance-components model of the cost-income ratio (CIR) over banks
and time.
We thus estimate the following CIRit model as an explicit version of Equation (2.4):
CIRit = α0 + α1x1it + · · ·+ αpxpit + (ζi + it) (2.5)
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where Xi contains capturing the (1) cost structure (e.g., the fraction of personnel expenses
over total costs) and (2) income structure (e.g., the fraction of fee & commission income
over total income), as well as the size of the bank. Denote the bank fixed effects by ζˆi
and the time-varying residuals by ˆit. Positive ζˆi means that the bank has, on average, a
higher CIR than predicted by our model. Banks with a positive (negative) ζˆi are relatively
less (more) skilled.
In a second step, we estimate net new money as:
NNMit = β0 + β1ζˆi + β2ˆi,t−1 + β3z1i,t−1 + · · ·+ βqzqi,t−1 + νit (2.6)
where Zi contains other variables that potentially explain the NNMit. We expect β1, the
coefficient on the bank fixed effect, which indicates an abnormally inefficient bank, to be
smaller than zero. In addition, we on purpose include the lagged year-specific residual.
For β2 we do not have a clear expectation. A positive value in a given year t may be the
result of extraordinary investment in marketing (also after bad media coverage) and most
likely produce higher money inflows in the coming year, while a positive value may also be
the result of high costs due to depreciation of intangible assets such as value adjustments
on client relationships and result in lower money inflows in the year after.
2.4.2 Reputation and Trust
The second main hypothesis is motivated by the idea, so far evidenced mostly anecdotally,
that private banking is a relationship-driven business that is based on the central pillars
confidentiality, security, trust, and the perceived level of client advisory service. The idea
that client trust is a key source of revenue for “money doctors” is analyzed theoretically in
Gennaioli et al. (2015). In recent years all these pillars have been seriously influenced by
a series of negative outcomes; be it theft of bank clients’ data, tax evasion scandals, or the
abolishment of the banking secrecy. We hypothesize that banks incurring negative press
coverage related to fraudulent business practices related to tax evasion find it harder to
attract new money and may even experience money outflows. Even though, in the longer
run, such reports may be endogenous to the bank’s past decisions, the occurrence and
timing of media reports are quite exogenous in the short run. We expect that the effect
of negative media coverage is especially strong for smaller banks that are less diversified,
and do not have access to other markets or other products to cover potential reputation
damages.
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2.4.3 Additional Conjectures
Third, we will consider a number of additional conjectures. Related to the creation of
strong relationships with clients, we hypothesize that banks focussing on service charac-
teristics such as a large number of bank employees per million in AuM, high incentives
for employees as measured by wage costs per employee, and growth in the number of
employees are positive performance drivers.
We also note that the goal of wealthy banking clients is to grow or at least maintain
their wealth. This is why we expect that banks providing a high return on invested
funds perform better in attracting new funds. We are especially interested in whether
investment performance or reputation is more important for attracting new funds.
Moreover, we expect that banks offering asset management services and creating own
funds profit from spill-over effects compared to banks focusing on relatively insensitive
clients in management mandates. Finally, we expect that larger banks that potentially
have access to various markets and other business segments attract more new funds.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 Sample
The empirical analysis relies on a unique hand-collected panel data set of private banks
domiciled in Switzerland or the Principality of Liechtenstein (abbreviated as FL), drawing
on data described in Birchler et al. (2015).
We combine Swiss with Liechtenstein banks since the two countries are very compara-
ble in market structure due to geographical proximity, identical currency, and very similar
regulation and reporting standards.
We start with all banks in Switzerland and Liechtenstein that use Swiss GAAP FER
or the comparable Liechtenstein reporting standard. Then, we exclude banks that do not
fulfill two additional criteria: (1) availability of audited data at least once in the sample
period 2002-2014, and (2) reporting fee and commission income always above one-third
of total revenues in a moving average of three years.10 Criterion (1) leads to missing
observations, mostly in the early years of the sample period. As for criterion (2), some
banks do not fulfill the one-third rule only temporarily (because of strong performance in
other bank-related areas). We only include banks focussing on financial and investment
10Per the rules of the Swiss Banking Authority, banks in Switzerland fulfilling this criterion have to
hand in ‘Table Q’ to the supervisor (SFBC-Circ. 08/2, Rz 198a/b). Table Q lists six items: (i) assets
in collective investment schemes managed by the bank, (ii) assets under discretionary asset management
agreements, (iii) other managed assets, (iv) total managed assets (including double-counting), (v) double-
counted items, and (vi) net new money inflow/outflow (including double counting)
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advisory services for wealthy clients. This leaves us with a sample of 98 banks (87 banks
in Switzerland and 11 banks headquartered in Liechtenstein). A sample attrition overview
may be found in Table 2.1.
Insert Table 2.1 around here.
Insert Figure 2.1 around here.
For Switzerland, our sample of private banks corresponds to roughly one-third of all
regulated banks and roughly one-fifth of all assets under management in Switzerland.
We illustrate the composition of the sample in Figure 2.1. We have data of Swiss banks
covering roughly CHF 4.7 trillion in assets under management. Out of this, our study
does not include the very largest wealth managers, UBS and Credit Suisse, which together
alone make up for about half of the overall assets. Like, for example, Julius Baer, they
report under IFRS/US GAAP (instead of under the Swiss standard). Next, some banks
cannot be included because they are true private banks that do not publish reports. A
prime example of this category is Pictet (who published a report for the first time in 2015).
(The 2012 assets under management here are estimated by Birchler et al. (2015).) The
sample covered roughly accounts for CHF 1 trillion in assets. Figure 2.1 also illustrates
the distribution of size in the sample of 2012. Two banks have around CHF 100 billion in
assets under management, and the remainder is smaller, with the smallest banks somewhat
below CHF 1 billion in assets under management. For Liechtenstein, almost two-thirds
of all banks are in the sample.11 Banks in Switzerland and Liechtenstein are required to
publicly disclose their annual reports. (A challenge does arise, however, in that public
disclosure does not necessarily mean that the reports are made available, for example, on
a website. In some cases, as the data were built up over the years, the authors had to
contact banks directly to obtain the reports.) Only 2 of the 98 banks in our sample are
listed at a stock exchange.
Our sample period ranges from 2002 to 2014. We start in 2002 since this is when
the Swiss Banking Authority implemented the new disclosure rules regarding assets un-
der management and net new money. The panel is unbalanced due to changes in the
availability of annual reports, due to mergers and acquisitions, or other status changes.
During the sample period, 16 banks were dissolved, liquidated, or acquired by a competi-
tor while six banks were newly founded or (re)started to publish their reports and were
thus included newly(again) in the sample.
11For example, for the year 2014, there are 17 banks in Liechtenstein. Eleven banks fulfill our sample
selection criteria.
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2.5.2 Dependent Variables
Our main variables of interest are the cost-income ratio (CIR) and net new money (NNM),
which equals the net amount of assets under management (AuM) of new and existing
clients less the amount of assets withdrawn.
The cost-income ratio is total operating expenses and depreciation per unit of net
operating profit. We include depreciation in the calculation of the cost-income ratio to
account for the fact that banks can either buy or lease tangible assets. Consequently,
leasing expenses are considered as operational costs and are incorporated in total admin-
istrative expenses. CIR is thus calculated as the sum of personnel expenses, material
costs, and depreciation divided by the sum of interest income, fee & commission income,
trading income, and other income.
Turning to net new money, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC)12 defines
AuM to encompass all assets in self-managed collective investment instruments, assets
from investors and clients in a wealth management contract. Additionally, AuM include
assets in self-managed funds and assets with an investment advisory and/or investment
service mandate.13 “Custody-Assets” - assets that are held exclusively for safekeeping,
custody or transaction purposes - are not considered as AuM as the bank does not provide
any consultancy service.14 The disclosure rules do not require separating inflows and
outflows in the presentation of NNM figures.
Importantly, interest and dividend income, as well as market and currency movements
on clients’ assets, are excluded from this calculation. Thus, a positive NNM figure implies
that the aggregated net asset inflow is higher than the aggregated amount that clients
withdrew in the same period.
We standardize NNM figures by the average AuM holdings in the previous and current
period to generate NNM/AvAuM , our main dependent variable.
2.5.3 Main Explanatory Variables
2.5.3.1 Cost-income Ratio (CIR) Regression Model
For the CIR regression model, we use variables that describe the business model and
structural set-up of a bank in order to have high explanatory power for predicting the
cost-income ratio for a bank for any given input factors. We use explanatory variables
12See SFBC Circular 24 (2002), Circular 38 (2006) and Circular 2 (2008).
13In particular, AuM include liabilities towards customers such as savings and deposits, time deposits,
fiduciary deposits, and all portfolio assets. However, the statement is a non-exhaustive list and further
details of inclusion have to be derived from the investment purpose.
14As reporting institutions are required to disclose the detailed criteria concerning the classification of
custody assets, there could arise potential data limitations.
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of three sources to describe the business model: (1) cost structure, (2) income structure,
and (3) size.
We describe the cost structure by two different variables: (i) personnel costs and (ii)
depreciation costs as a fraction of overall costs. Personnel costs are the sum of salaries,
social security contributions, pension contributions, and other personnel-related expenses.
Depreciation costs include depreciation of fixed assets and more importantly, intangible
assets but exclude extraordinary value adjustments. We model the cost structure by
dividing personnel costs and depreciation costs by overall costs which sum up personnel,
material and depreciation costs.
Private banking costs are mainly driven by personnel costs which make up approxi-
mately 60% of all costs. The more a bank is focused on tailor-made wealth management
(as, e.g. compared to interest-bearing activities or custodian business) the larger is the
fraction of personnel costs in total costs, the larger are margins, and the lower is the
cost to income ratio. A bank with high depreciation costs either has a high stock of
tangible assets or extraordinarily writes off intangible assets due to bad circumstances.
Balancing the two cost factors we expect that high personnel costs (and vice-versa low
material and depreciation costs) reflect a lower cost-income ratio while high depreciation
costs contrariwise reflect a higher cost-income ratio.
For the income structure, we distinguish two different income sources: (i) fees and
commissions and (ii) trading income. Fees and commissions income is the net result
from financial advisory and other services provided to clients. It captures the degree of
specialization and is considered to proxy private banking knowledge. A focus on wealth
management services leads to a higher fraction of income coming from fees and commis-
sions. Trading income captures the net result from trading operations on foreign exchange
and other securities trading. Operating revenue sums up fee & commission, interest, trad-
ing, and other income. We describe the income structure by dividing its components by
operating revenue.
The last variable we use in the cost-income ratio regression is size. We expect that
there are economies of scale in cost efficiency and hypothesize a smaller cost-income ratio
for larger banks.
2.5.3.2 Net New Money Regression Model
For the NNM regression model we use the predicted level-1 and level-2 regression residuals
ζˆi and ˆi,t−1, that is, the bank-specific abnormal cost-income ratio and the abnormal bank-
year-specific cost-income ratio, as shown in equation 2.5. An abnormally high value of
ζˆi indicates a bank with a constantly higher CIR than estimated by the model. An
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abnormally high value of ˆi,t−1 indicates a bank with a higher CIR than estimated by the
model for the bank i in year t− 1.
Furthermore, we introduce the negative media dummy, our second main variable of
interest. Negative media is a binary indicator variable that equals one if a private bank
received a negative media mention in a given year. In order to evaluate media coverage,
we conduct a content analysis of the most influential and popular opinion-forming general
and business newspapers in Switzerland.
For the media analysis, we assume that relevant news and bulletins affecting the
Swiss financial center and the individual private bank are published and reported in the
Swiss home media first and are afterward translated to international media agencies and
broadcasted by international newswires. We conduct a content analysis using LexisNexis
Academic International News and Wire database. For each year and institution, we search
for articles that cover the bank in combination with reportings about tax scandals, banking
secrecy, data theft or double taxation agreements. In a second step, we classify each article
manually to have either positive or negative content. Further details concerning the use
of specific search terms and the inspected newspapers and additional information on the
media coverage in Switzerland and Germany can be found in the Appendix in Table B-1.
If financial security is a signal of stability demanded by aﬄuent clients, we expect
that banks with a higher equity ratio attract larger money inflows than banks with a high
level of leverage. Equity ratio is the unweighted proportion of shareholders’ equity to
total assets and is a measure of the bank’s capital strength. In recent years, high leverage
has been tantamount to increased aggressiveness of the business model and managerial
attitudes. Thus, a higher equity ratio may predict smaller net new money flows.
Since private banking is a pure service industry (Chase, 1981) predominantly deter-
mined by characteristics such as interaction quality (competence, investment proposal),
service product quality (performance, product, and service range) and service environ-
ment quality (financial security and corporate identity).15 Service quality per se is not
directly measurable. We thus capture service quality indirectly through the total number
of employees standardized by average AuM. We expect that the more employees a bank
allocates to AuM, the better becomes the service quality. Two other ways to increase the
service quality are to either increase the number of employees or to provide employees
stronger incentives to attract new funds. We thus use the Growth of Number of Employ-
ees and the Wage Costs per Employee as further explanatory variables for service quality.
Wage costs per employee is clearly a highly noisy measure of incentives. It is motivated
by (a) the fact that the companies we study are in the same industry and should thus
15For example, Horn and Rudolf (2011) found that an improvement of service quality leads to higher
growth of assets under management.
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be competitive to each other with respect to pay practices and (b) the notion of basic
economic theory that risk-averse agents receiving higher-powered incentives receive higher
pay.
Finally, we assume that the goal of private banking clients is to grow or at least
maintain their wealth. Clients are aware of a private bank’s past performance to assess
credibility and competence, similar to what clients of investment banks may do (Chemma-
nur and Fulghieri, 1994). Therefore, we posit that better past performance in the sense of
greater client value created is positively associated with NNM growth.16 We approximate
Client Value by measuring the growth of AuM over one year, subtracting out the growth
of the asset base through net clients’ fund flows in the same period.
2.5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Because little is known so far about wealth management banks, we begin by offering some
detail on the descriptive statistics of key variables of interest; see Tables 2.2 and 2.3.17
Figure 2.2 shows the development over time of the two major dependent variables, the
cost-income ratio (CIR) and net new money (NNM).
Insert Tables 2.2 and 2.3 around here.
Insert Figure 2.2 around here.
The banks in our sample exhibit an average CIR of 77.9% with a standard deviation
of 22.0%. As seen in Figure 2.2, the average CIR has increased substantially over the
years, with a structural break in 2008 (which makes it important to include year fixed
effects in the analysis). This reflects challenges Swiss banks have experienced in the wake
of increasing regulation, and increasing international competition (and, thus, declining
revenues) as Swiss banking secrecy has come under attack.
In the cost structure, we observe that as expected the largest cost position belongs
to personnel expenses with 60.1%, material costs equal approximately one third of the
costs while depreciation plays a minor role (on average 6.8%) but fluctuates relatively
strongly (standard deviation for depreciation cost is 6.9% while the much larger position
of personnel expenses exhibits an only slightly larger standard deviation of 8.4%).
Also, as expected, the largest income source is from fees & commissions with almost
two-thirds of operating revenues. Trading income represents 11.5% of operating revenues
16Note that a full test of this hypothesis should also consider the risks with which a given performance
was achieved. However, this information is not available to us, clearly presenting a limitation of our
analysis.
17We provide correlation matrices for all variables that are used in the regressions in the Appendix in
Tables B-2 and B-3.
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and thus plays a marginal role. Most private banks also offer Lombard credits and thus
generate some interest income. Compared to credit institutions, the fraction (20.8%)
remains relatively low. Other income plays a minor role for most private banks.
Describing the bank business model, we observe that 23.3% of the banks in our sample
provide corporate finance or tax advisory services, 44.0% provide custodian and/or trading
services to third-party independent asset managers, 37.4% provide financial and advisory
services to institutional clients such as asset funds or pension funds, and 15.9% have
specialized teams focussing on services specifically for single wealthy families. 14.2% of the
banks have representative offices or branches in other countries within Europe (excluding
Switzerland and Liechtenstein) and 25.1% in other countries outside Europe. Roughly
one-seventh of all observations are from banks that are domiciled in Liechtenstein.
Turning to Table 2.3, we observe a large heterogeneity for net new money as well
as assets under management. On average banks in our sample generated NNM of CHF
364.7 million (approximately USD 366.8 million at the end-of-2014 exchange rate) with
a large range from a minimum of CHF -2,197.0 million to a maximum of CHF +6,485.7
million. Figures of assets under management are strongly positively skewed with a median
of CHF 4,071.2 million and an average of CHF 13,674.4 million. The smallest bank-year
observation in the sample displays CHF 339.2 million while the largest exhibits CHF
92,714.7 million. Our main variable of interest NNM/AvAuM is 2.7% on average with
a considerably large standard deviation of 11.1%. The largest observed net outflow is
-22.4%, while the highest net inflow equals +33.9%. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, the
average NNM/AvAuM was around 5% in the early sample years, came down to around
0% from 2009 to 2013 and has recently increased again.
For roughly 28.9% of all bank-year observations, we identified press articles that match
our search terms (we have a total of 4,380 articles for the 98 banks). 9.7% of all bank-year
combinations exhibit negative media coverage.
Our control variables show that on average our banks exhibit an unweighted equity
ratio of 16.6%, dedicate 0.024 bank employees per million in assets under management
(i.e., on average a bank employee manages CHF 41.6 million AuM), pay an average salary
of CHF 177,000 p.a., and have an average employee growth rate of 2.7%. The performance
on funds invested equals +0.6% p.a. with a large standard deviation of 13.4%. On average,
5.8% of AuM are invested in funds created by the banks’ own funds management division
and 23.7% are assigned to dedicated management mandates.
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2.6 Results
Table 2.4 provides the results from the cost-income ratio (CIR) estimation. We estimate
five different fixed effects model specifications. The dependent variable is the cost-income
ratio including depreciation costs. In the first four models we estimate CIR using different
combinations of cost and income structures. Since both the fractions of personnel costs
and depreciation costs as well as the fractions of fee and commissions income and trading
income are by definition collinear respectively, we prefer one of the first four models (1-4)
to avoid biased estimators. We employ Model (5) in a check to see whether results remain
robust when combining all covariates. We employ year fixed effects and cluster standard
errors on the bank level.
We find that banks with relatively high personnel costs as a fraction of total costs and
low depreciation costs have a lower CIR. This makes sense as banks with a high fraction
of their costs coming from personal costs tend to be banks strongly involved in private
banking, and this is where margins are higher (and, therefore, the cost-income ratio is
lower). Furthermore, banks that are specialized in wealth management and thus generate
a larger fraction of income through fees and commissions income relative to trading income
have a larger CIR. This is plausible, too, as the fees and commissions business is relatively
cost-intensive.
Our models explain between 13 and 18 percent of inherent variability. The unexplained
variability is separated into the two estimated level-1 and level-2 residuals, the fixed effect
ζˆi and the year-specific residual ˆi,t−1, for each cluster i. For model (1) we get a between-
cluster standard deviations of θˆ = 0.332 for ζˆi and a within-cluster standard deviation of
ψˆ = 0.107 for ˆi,t (both mean values are 0 since E(it|ζi) = 0 and E(ζi) = 0 by definition).
This shows that variation in the unexplained part of the cost-income ratio remains sizeable
and that a considerable part can be explained in the variation across banks.
Insert Table 2.4 around here.
For the estimation of NNM, we use the estimated fixed effects and residuals of the
CIR estimation. From Table 2.4, we use the first model specification. In what follows, the
bank fixed effect from that regression is denoted abnormal CIR. The year-specific residual
from that regression is denoted abnormal CIR year.18
In Table 2.5, we present the results of the random effects estimation.19 We also employ
year fixed effects and cluster standard errors on banks.
18In variations, we estimated NNM also with the other four CIR models. We find similar results.
Table B-4 shows the estimation results for the richest CIR model specification. Most coefficients remain
almost identical to Table 2.5.
19Table B-5 shows the results for a fixed-effects estimation dropping all cluster-level covariates.
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Insert Table 2.5 around here.
We find strong support for both our primary hypotheses. First, banks that are rel-
atively more efficient (displaying negative abnormal CIR) are also more efficient in at-
tracting new money. The coefficient for abnormal CIR is, as hypothesized, negative and
significant. In sum, we find strong evidence for the role of skill of a bank as a determinant
of NNM growth.
We also find that the coefficient for the bank-year-specific efficiency is negative and in
most specifications highly significant. Thus, extraordinary costs such as value adjustments
on client relationships in one year also predict bad things for the future.
Our second main variable of interest, negative media coverage, shows a strong negative
and highly significant impact on NNM. In model (1), we find that negative media leads to
a change of −9.5 percentage points in NNM growth. This negative impact diminishes by
+5.9 percentage points to −3.6 percentage points if the bank is large, i.e., with AuM above
the median. These results for negative media coverage are in line with our hypotheses
regarding the impact of reputational damage.
Negative media coverage has a significant economic effect on long-term profits. In
Table 2.6, we derive the perpetuity loss a bank incurs with negative media coverage.
Since large banks are able to cushion shocks more easily due to diversification, the effect
is more pronounced for small banks. In expectation, a small bank loses CHF 7.1mn which
equals 3.35 times net profit. Large banks, with AuM above the median, lose CHF 16.6m,
the equivalent of 0.73 times net profit.
Next, we estimate several further models to expand our analysis to additional variables
of interest. In model (2) we add the equity ratio as a regressor and find a slightly significant
negative impact.20
In models (3) and (4) we test our hypotheses regarding the service characteristics of
a bank. We find that private banks employing more relationship managers per million in
AuM generate significantly more net new money. Similarly, banks expending more per
employee (e.g., through incentives) achieve somewhat higher net new money, though the
effect is not statistically significant. Pure growth of the number of employees is even less
significantly positive.
Strikingly, we find that banks displaying higher returns on investment of funds man-
aged for clients do not explain future net new money growth. The corresponding coef-
ficient ‘client value’ in model (5) is insignificant. Overall, these results provide support
20Anecdotally, many bank representatives claim that a high equity ratio signals of financial stability
and thereby attracts new clients. We find that a high equity ratio is not a positive driver for NNM. One
interpretation is that a high equity ratio is a sign that a bank is pursuing a fairly conservative business
model in general; thus, a high equity ratio may indicate a somewhat muted degree of aggressiveness in
pursuing opportunities to attract NNM. On the other hand, a high equity ratio may be the result of high
regulatory requirements to hold capital as a cushion for an already risky balance sheet structure.
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for the theory, put forward in Gennaioli et al. (2015), that “money doctors” primarily
benefit from the trust that clients put into them, but not from the actual performance
they deliver.
In the last model (6) we combine all covariates and find that the coefficients remain
robust and significant. Additionally, we add control variables testing whether a focus on
the asset management and funds business, family offices as well as regional differences also
explain future money flows. We find that banks that have a higher fraction of their funds
in their own created funds attract more funds in the future. Furthermore, we observe
that banks domiciled in Liechtenstein attract 7.1 percentage points more net new money
per year than banks in Switzerland.
2.7 Conclusion
Private banking and wealth management have so far received scant attention in the lit-
erature, partially because of the difficulty of obtaining data. Attempting to fill this gap,
this paper explores a unique panel dataset of the perhaps most developed wealth man-
agement industry worldwide, the Swiss and Liechtenstein private banking industry. Our
panel allows us to provide a range of novel descriptive results regarding the cross-sectional
and time-series variation of assets under management of Swiss and Liechtenstein private
banks and their cost structure.
We obtain two key results. First, skill matters: those banks that operate more effi-
ciently than expected from the inputs which they use also tend to be the ones who attract
the most net new money. Second, reputation matters: banks appearing in negative media
coverage (in particular in the context of tax evasion) experience sharply declining assets
under management. The latter result, in particular, holds for small banks. Strikingly,
flattering clients (measured by personnel expenditures) and upholding a high reputation
seem to be still more important than performance in wealth management.
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Figure 2.1
Coverage of Swiss Banks in the Sample. This figure illustrates the composition and coverage of
our main sample of Swiss banks for one of the sample years, 2012. In that year, we have data of Swiss
banks covering roughly CHF 4.7 trillion in assets under management. UBS, Credit Suisse, and Julius
Baer report under IFRS/US GAAP instead of under the Swiss standard and are, therefore, not part of
the sample. Some banks, such as Pictet, are not included because they do not publish reports. (Their
2012 assets under management reported here are estimated by Birchler et al. (2015).) After excluding
these and related cases, the sample covered by this study roughly accounts for CHF 1 trillion in assets
under management of Swiss banks in 2012.
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Figure 2.2
Time Series of Cost-Income Ratio and Net New Money. This figure shows the time series of the
mean (and surrounding 95% interval) of the cost-income-ratio as solid blue line (left y-axis) and net new
money scaled by average assets under management as dashed red line (right y-axis).
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1
Sample Attrition Table. This table shows a derivation of the sample used in this paper. We start with
all banks in Switzerland and Liechtenstein that use Swiss GAAP FER or the comparable Liechtenstein
reporting standard. Then, we exclude banks that do not fulfill two additional criteria: (1) availability
of audited data at least once in the sample period 2002-2014, and (2) reporting at least one third of
revenues from fee & commissions (f&c) income. Criterion (1) leads to missing observations mostly in
the early years of the sample period. As for criterion (2) some banks do not fulfill the one third rule
only temporarily (because of strong performance in other bank-related areas). Next, observations are
dropped because of missing figures for our main variables AuM or NNM (this is especially true for banks
in Liechtenstein where the publication of NNM is not mandatory). Depending on the regression model
we use lagged or averaged variables. This may decrease the number of observations used in the regression
models displayed in the estimation result tables.
2002 – 2014
N %
Total bank-year combinations 1,274 100%
excluded due to missing audited data (criterion 1) 436 34.2%
excluded due to temporary f&c income < 1/3 (criterion 2) 29 2.3%
Banks fulfilling criteria (1) & (2) 809 100.0%
missing Assets under Management (AuM) figures 31 3.8%
missing Net New Money (NNM) figures 99 12.2%
excluded due to missing any of AuM and/or NNM 100 12.4%
Bank-year observations 709
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Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics I. This table presents descriptive statics for the dependent and independent vari-
ables of the CIR regressions. Observations are for 98 banks, sample period is 2002-2014. The Cost-income
ratio is our main efficiency measure and is derived as (Operational Costs + Depreciation) / Operational
Revenue. Personnel Costs are the sum of salaries, social security contributions, pension contributions
and other personnel related expenses. Material Costs covers all operative costs that are not personnel
related like occupancy expenses, IT costs, communication and marketing expenses, etc. Depreciation
Costs include depreciation of fixed assets as well as intangible assets but exclude extraordinary value ad-
justments. Total Costs sum up personnel, material and depreciation costs. Fee & Commissions Income
is the net result from commissions and fee income from financial advisory and other services provided to
clients. Interest Income is the net result from interest activities. Trading Income is the net result from
trading operations on foreign exchange and other securities trading. Other Income is the net result of any
remaining income like results from the sale of financial investment, income from participations, or other
ordinary income. Operating Revenue sums up fee & commission, interest, trading, and other income.
Bank domiciled in FL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in the Principality of
Liechtenstein. Services Corporate Clients is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank provides services
for corporate clients like corporate finance advisory, merger and acquisitions advisory, tax advisory. Ser-
vices IAMs is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank provides custodian and / or trading services for
third-party independent asset managers. Services Institutional Clients is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the bank provides advisory, trading, financial products services to institutional clients like asset funds or
pension funds. Services Family Offices is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a specialized team
that provides financial and advisory services specifically to single wealthy families. Offices / Locations
in Europe (excluding Switzerland) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has representative offices
or branches in Europe excluding Switzerland and Liechtenstein (FL). Offices / Locations Worldwide (ex-
cluding Europe) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has representative offices or branches in other
countries excluding Europe. The data are winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
Mean Std.
Dev
25th
Per-
centile
Median 75th
Per-
centile
Min Max Obs
Efficiency Measure
Cost-income ratio (incl. dep.) 0.779 0.220 0.624 0.742 0.880 0.443 1.526 709
Cost Structure
Personnel Costs / Tot. Costs 0.601 0.084 0.546 0.612 0.663 0.398 0.756 709
Depreciation / Tot. Costs 0.068 0.069 0.029 0.053 0.086 0.000 0.555 709
Material Costs / Tot. Costs 0.330 0.082 0.270 0.320 0.382 0.190 0.520 709
Income Structure
Fee&Com. Income / Op. Rev. 0.634 0.135 0.529 0.647 0.744 0.312 0.874 709
Trading Income / Op. Rev. 0.115 0.060 0.080 0.108 0.141 -0.004 0.319 709
Interest Income / Op. Rev. 0.208 0.125 0.113 0.176 0.282 0.036 0.577 709
Other Income / Op. Rev. 0.044 0.073 0.002 0.015 0.052 -0.034 0.304 709
Bank Business Model
Services Corporate Clients 0.233 0.423 0 0 0 0 1 709
Services IAMs 0.440 0.497 0 0 1 0 1 709
Services Institutional Clients 0.374 0.484 0 0 1 0 1 709
Services Family Offices 0.159 0.366 0 0 0 0 1 709
Offices/Loc. in Europe 0.142 0.350 0 0 0 0 1 709
Offices/Loc. Worldwide 0.251 0.434 0 0 1 0 1 709
Bank domiciled in FL 0.093 0.291 0 0 0 0 1 709
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Table 2.3
Descriptive Statistics II. This table presents descriptive statics for the dependent and independent
variables of the both the CIR and the NNM regressions. Observations are for 98 banks, the sample period
is 2002-2014. Net New Money is the net Swiss franc amount of assets under management of new and
existing clients less the amount of assets withdrawn. Assets under Management is the Swiss franc amount
of assets under management in millions. Net New Money / Average AuM captures the aggregated net
amount of assets under management acquired from new and existing clients standardized by the level
of previous years AuM , NNMt divided by the average of AuMt and AuMt−1. Overall Media Coverage
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bank was covered in the media in the corresponding year.
Negative Media Coverage is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank exhibits negative media coverage
in the corresponding year. The Equity Ratio is the ratio of shareholders’ equity to unweighted total
assets. Service captures the proportion of the number of total employees to total AuM expressed in
million of Swiss francs. Wage Costs per Employee divides the sum of salaries and bonuses over average
number of employees during the corresponding year. Growth of Number of Employees measures the
net change in the number of employees during a reporting year. Client V alue captures the growth of
Assets under Management over one year’s period less the growth of the asset base through net clients
funds in the same period. Own Funds/AvAuM captures the ratio of AuM allocated in own funds while
Mgmt Mandates/AvAuM measures the ratio of AuM in separated management mandates. The data
are winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
Mean Std.
Dev
25th
Per-
centile
Median 75th
Per-
centile
Min Max Obs
Performance Measures
Net New Money 364.7 1450.6 -119.8 51.0 392.2 -2197.0 6485.7 709
Assets under Management 13,674.4 22,488.4 1,546.9 4,071.2 11,993.0 339.2 92,714.7 709
Log(AuM) 8.457 1.474 7.345 8.312 3.392 5.830 11.437 709
Net New Money / AvAuM 0.027 0.111 -0.032 0.021 0.076 -0.224 0.339 709
Media Coverage
Overall Media Coverage 0.289 0.454 0 0 1 0 1 709
Negative Media Coverage 0.097 0.297 0 0 0 0 1 709
Other Vars
Equity Ratio 0.166 0.101 0.093 0.136 0.214 0.048 0.488 709
Service 0.024 0.011 0.017 0.023 0.030 0.001 0.093 709
Wage Costs per Employee 0.177 0.047 0.146 0.170 0.199 0.079 0.428 709
Growth in No of Employees 0.027 0.129 -0.034 0.013 0.077 -0.262 0.434 652
Client Value 0.006 0.134 -0.063 0.022 0.076 -0.297 0.386 637
Own Funds / AvAuM 0.058 0.084 0 0.012 0.090 0 0.308 709
Mgmt Mandates / AvAuM 0.237 0.166 0.118 0.198 0.328 0.006 0.684 709
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Table 2.4
Estimation of Cost-Income-Ratio. This table presents panel regression results for five different fixed
effects models to estimate the cost-income ratio (CIR). The dependent variable is the cost-income ratio
including depreciation costs. All regressors definitions are identical to the descriptive statistics Tables 2.2
and 2.3. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered on banks are reported in parentheses. ***
indicate statistical significance at p < 0.01, ** at p < 0.05, and * at p < 0.1.
Models
Cost-Income Ratio (incl. dep.) Hyp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personnel Costs / Total Costs (–) -1.475*** -1.461*** -1.102***
(-7.30) (-8.04) (-6.16)
Depreciation Costs / Total Costs (+) 1.701*** 1.628*** 0.774***
(5.61) (5.38) (2.90)
Fee & Commissions Income / Op. Rev. (+/–) 0.556*** 0.623*** 0.538***
(4.35) (5.02) (3.70)
Trading Income / Op. Rev. (+/–) -0.470* -0.541** -0.194
(-1.96) (-2.17) (-0.76)
Log(Assets under Management) (–) -0.205*** -0.191*** -0.231*** -0.216*** -0.212***
(-4.87) (-4.73) (-5.46) (-5.28) (-5.21)
Constant 2.912*** 3.216*** 2.092*** 2.451*** 2.730***
(8.11) (9.22) (6.08) (7.18) (7.60)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 709 709 709 709 709
Number of Banks 98 98 98 98 98
R2within 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.60
R2between 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.09
R2overall 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.18
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Table 2.5
Estimation of Net New Money / AuM. This table presents random effects panel regression results for
six different models to estimate the performance of a private bank as measured by net new money flows.
The dependent variable is the Net New Money scaled by AvAuM. All explanatory variables are lagged by
one year. The bank-specific abnormal cost-income ratio (ζi) as well as the bank-year-specific cost-income
ratio (it) are predicted from model (1) in Table 2.4. All other regressors definitions are identical to the
descriptive statics Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered on banks are
reported in parentheses. *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.01, ** at p < 0.05, and * at p < 0.1.
Models
Net New Money / AvAuM Hyp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abnormal CIR (ζi) (–) -0.076*** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.115*** -0.074*** -0.084**
(-2.73) (-2.99) (-3.18) (-3.52) (-2.61) (-2.44)
Abnormal CIR Year (it) (+/–) -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.135*** -0.120*** -0.099** -0.113**
(-2.70) (-2.67) (-3.21) (-2.72) (-2.07) (-2.41)
Negative Media Coverage (–) -0.095*** -0.101*** -0.094*** -0.107*** -0.099*** -0.106***
(-3.63) (-3.69) (-3.41) (-3.47) (-3.53) (-3.68)
NegMedCov X [AuM > Med] (+) 0.059** 0.067** 0.058** 0.074** 0.060** 0.075**
(2.09) (2.30) (1.97) (2.30) (2.00) (2.45)
AuM Above Median (+) 0.036** 0.034* 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.041** 0.042**
(2.13) (1.96) (3.15) (2.87) (2.42) (2.52)
Equity Ratio (+/–) -0.123* -0.207*** -0.213***
(-1.79) (-2.94) (-3.04)
Service Quality (+) 2.315*** 1.818** 2.255***
(2.72) (2.20) (2.71)
Wage Costs per Employee (+) 0.201 0.210 0.285*
(1.34) (1.33) (1.79)
Growth of Number of Emp. (+) 0.041 0.025
(1.18) (0.73)
Client Value (+) 0.028 0.013
(0.64) (0.30)
Own Funds / AvAuM (+) 0.142**
(2.13)
Mgmt Mandates / AvAuM (–) 0.051
(1.33)
Bank domiciled in FL (+/–) 0.071***
(3.16)
Constant 0.064*** 0.091*** -0.037 -0.010 0.034*** -0.054
(3.55) (3.79) (-0.80) (-0.24) (2.70) (-1.18)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 607 607 607 551 536 536
Number of Banks 96 96 96 92 92 92
R2within 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.17
R2between 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.13
R2overall 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.17
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Table 2.6
Loss Due Negative Media Coverage. This table shows an approximation of the loss incurred due to
negative media coverage separated by size. We distinguish small banks (Assets under Management below
the median) from large banks (above median). A shock through negative media coverage reduces the
AuM growth rate by 9.50 percentage points for small banks, and 3.60 percentage points for large banks.
We estimate fees & commissions income by multiplying the AuM post media dummy with the median
adjusted gross margins. Using a relatively conservative perpetuity yield of 15% we are able to estimate
the loss incurred due to negative media coverage. Small banks lose CHF 7.1mn what equals 3.35 times
the median net profit while large banks loose CHF 16.6mn what equals 0.73 times the median net profit.
Small banks Large banks
w/o shock with shock w/o shock with shock
AuM pre Media Dummy [in mio] 1,510 1,510 10,796 10,796
AuM Shock: change in AuM growth 0% -9.50% 0% -3.60%
AuM post Media Dummy [in mio] 1,510 1,367 10,796 10,407
Adjusted Gross Margin on AuM [%] 0.74% 0.74% 0.64% 0.64%
Fees & Commission Income [in mio] 11.2 10.2 69.0 66.5
Present Value of FCI [perpetuity yield 15%] 74.9 67.8 460.1 443.5
Loss due to Neg Media Dummy [in mio] 7.1 16.6
Median Net Profit [in mio] 2.1 22.7
# Net Profits Lost due to Neg Media Dummy 3.35 0.73
3 The ECB’s Three-Year Bank-Refinancing
Operations and Eurozone Bank Equity
Joint with Jiri Woschitz
3.1 Introduction
As of October 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) uses different types of uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures as a response to the financial and – later on – the
European sovereign debt crisis. Among other measures, the ECB offers repeatedly sup-
plementary repurchase agreements (repos) to Eurozone banks with durations exceeding
those of conventional one-week and three-month repos. From 2008 to 2012 the ECB offers
20 six-month, four one-year, and two three-year operations in addition to the conventional
operations.1 Until today, the three-year operations have been the largest bank-refinancing
operations between the ECB and Eurozone banks.
This paper studies the impact of these three-year central bank repos on stock prices
of Eurozone banks. Under the efficient market hypothesis, abnormal returns on Eurozone
bank stocks should reflect the market’s opinion of actual values. Compared to other
studies, this paper is narrow in the sense that we exclusively focus on the three-year
operations and bank equity to distinguish between the effects in two ways. First, we
differentiate between two “shocks” that the three-year repos entail. The first shock is
the announcement of the extraordinarily long-dated duration of three years. The second
shock is represented by the large liquidity uptake by banks in the aggregate.2 Therefore,
we separate the effects of the announcement from those of the cash settlements. The
announcement and the large uptake in the first three-year transaction are expected to
shock the stock market while the large uptake in the second operation – more than two
1Woschitz (2017) studies these operations in the context of bank rollover risks and provides a detailed
overview of all such supplementary operations, which he denotes as “extraordinary LTROs”.
2In standard three-month transactions roughly 100 to 300 banks bid for aggregate amounts between
EUR 15 and 70 billion. In the two three-year operations, at least 800 counterparties bid for an aggregate
amount of, in total, more than EUR 1,000 billion (these numbers are from Woschitz, 2017, Table 1).
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months after the first cash settlement – should at this point be incorporated into the
banks’ stock prices.
Second, we analyze bank stock reactions in depth across Eurozone countries. Nyborg
(2017) argues that the three-year operations served as an indirect bailout of financially
weaker banks and sovereigns. Crosignani, Faria-e Castro, and Fonseca (2017) show that
Portuguese banks use the liquidity uptake from the first three-year operation to buy
high-yielding Portuguese short-term government debt. In the second three-year repo they
receive even more liquidity by pledging these bonds as collateral with the ECB. This type
of “collateral trade” suggests that the three-year funds flow from financially weak banks
to financially weak sovereigns which is in line with Nyborg (2017).3 Nyborg’s argument,
however, would also suggest that the three-year operations have higher positive abnormal
effects on bank equity in financially weaker countries. Therefore, we examine the impact
of the three-year repos separately for each of the 12 Eurozone countries in our sample.
Notice that relatively higher abnormal bank equity returns in weaker countries are not
in line with the “moral suasion” argument (see, e.g., Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli,
2014; De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2015), claiming that
banks are coaxed by the governments to use the liquidity uptake to purchase domestic
sovereign debt. If a bank – as a profit maximizer – buys government debt because the
government urges it but not out of its own accord, strictly speaking, it destroys equity
value. Correspondingly, if the market thinks moral suasion is at work, the bank’s equity
price should fall.
The data for the event study is downloaded from Thomson Reuters Datastream. In
our main setup, we estimate abnormal returns for 89 listed Eurozone banks across 12
different countries using a standard market model as described in MacKinlay (1997) and
country-level total market return indices. Abnormal returns are then combined into cu-
mulative abnormal returns over a variety of different event windows and averaged across
banks within a country. To assess statistical significance, we use different test statistics
(Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991; Brown and Warner, 1980; Kolari and Pynno¨nen,
2010) which enable us to better understand the abnormal return correlation structure.4
3In this vein, Acharya and Steffen (2015) provide evidence that Eurozone bank risks in the period
from 2007 to 2013 exhibit patterns similar to a large-scale bank carry trade behavior because bank equity
returns load positively (negatively) on bond returns of peripheral countries (German government bond
returns). The authors find that this carry trade behavior is stronger for banks with low capital ratios
and high risk-weighted assets, which supports the risk-shifting hypothesis (see, e.g., Diamond and Rajan,
2011).
4As pointed out by Aı¨t-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, and Tamirisa (2012), using event studies
has a number of advantages. The estimation is relatively simple, gives an immediate response on a
short-horizon estimate for the market reaction, and avoids specification issues in the underlying model.
However, disadvantageous is that the estimated effects do not necessarily measure direct causality. Fur-
thermore, there is an apparent trade-off between narrow and wide windows. Narrow windows exclude
potential colluding effects but might miss potentially delayed or anticipated reactions of market par-
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The main findings are as follows. We observe statistically significant cumulative ab-
normal returns, at the level of 10%, over different event windows of 4.0% in Italy up to
15.3% in Spain when we use the test statistic developed by Brown and Warner (1980).
This test statistic essentially builds an equally-weighted portfolio across banks within a
country and evaluates the statistical significance of these equally-weighted portfolio re-
turns. In comparison, cumulative abnormal returns statistically different from zero in
non-peripheral countries range from −4.9% in Austria to −3.1% in the Netherlands. Us-
ing the more conservative test statistic developed by Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010), which
explicitly controls for cross-correlation of bank stocks, leaves one cumulative abnormal
return, 11.7% in Spain, in peripheral countries statistically significant at the level of 10%.
However, cumulative abnormal returns of 4.0%, 6.3%, and 9.6% in Italy over different
event windows have p-values of 11.3%, 11.4%, and 12.9%, respectively. The correspond-
ing statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns for non-peripheral countries lie
between −4.9% in Austria and 5.4% in Germany. Estimates of country-level liquidity up-
take reveal that the largest and second-largest uptakes, on a country-level, were made by
Spanish and Italian banks, respectively.5 For instance, we estimate the liquidity uptake
of Spanish banks to be more than four times larger than the one by German banks. This
is in line with the argument that the three-year operations served as an indirect bailout
for banks in financially weaker countries (Nyborg, 2017).
Similarly, over the first cash settlement (using the test statistic proposed by Brown
and Warner, 1980), in peripheral countries statistically significant cumulative abnormal
returns, at the 10% level, lie between 4.4% in Italy and 16.0% in Portugal across dif-
ferent windows. In non-peripheral countries, Belgium is the only country with at least
one cumulative abnormal return (6.5%) statistically different from zero. Using the more
conservative test statistic in the peripheral countries leaves one cumulative abnormal re-
turn, 2.3% in Spain, statistically different from zero at the level of 10%. One cumulative
abnormal return, 16.0% in Portugal, however, has a p-value of 12.0%. Correspondingly
for non-peripheral countries, this test statistic leaves only one cumulative abnormal re-
turn, 1.9% in Finland, statistically significant (at the 5% level). Crosignani et al. (2017)
show that Portuguese banks ran “collateral trades” on high-yielding Portuguese sovereign
bonds using the three-year liquidity uptake. The high abnormal returns on Portuguese
banks’ equity combined with Crosignani et al. (2017)’s finding provides, again, evidence
for the indirect bailout argument made by Nyborg (2017).
ticipants. The latter we address by calculating cumulative abnormal returns over a variety of different
windows.
5The data is collected from Bruegel (see Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012) and the webpages of the
Eurosystem’s national central banks.
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Overall, these findings provide evidence that banks in peripheral countries profit dis-
proportionately more over the announcement and the first cash settlement of the three-
year operations in terms of equity price increases than banks in non-peripheral countries.
Over the second cash settlement, we find – not surprisingly – mixed results. The large
liquidity uptake in the first operation might have been unexpected by the market. The
large uptake in the second operation – more than two months after the first operation –
likely was not a surprise to the market anymore.
We do a variety of robustness checks along the lines of Nyborg (2017) which confirm
these findings. First, we use equally-weighted bank stock returns per country instead of
the bank stock returns themselves. Second, we replace each country-level market index
by the “STOXX Europe 600”. Also, third, we replace the equally-weighted portfolios or
bank stock-level returns by country-level bank indices. The findings remain qualitatively
the same.
Our paper relates to literature that examines the impact of unconventional monetary
policy measures on the equity prices of banks. Close to our study, Nyborg (2017) in-
vestigates the influence of the announcement of the large-scale asset purchase programs
(September 4, 2014) on bank equity across Eurozone countries. He finds that especially
banks in peripheral Eurozone countries profit from positive abnormal equity returns. Our
analysis distinguishes itself from that of Nyborg (2017) by assessing the three-year oper-
ations instead of the asset purchase program. Fiordelisi et al. (2014) analyze the effects
of both conventional and unconventional policy actions on the interbank credit market,
the stock market, and the banking sector. While conventional measures tend to be more
effective on the interbank market, unconventional measures have a larger impact on the
stock market. Ricci (2015) studies the impact of ECB announcements in general on a
sample of 28 European banks from 2007 to 2013. She finds that unconventional measures
have a stronger impact than conventional actions and that especially risky banks with
low capitalization react most sensitively to policy interventions.
Other event studies investigate the impact of unconventional (and conventional) cen-
tral bank measures in a broader spectrum. Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2012) categorize several
different policy actions in the US, UK, Eurozone, and Japan from 2007 to 2009 and ex-
amine their individual effects on interbank risk premia. They find that interest rate cuts
and bank recapitalizations are strong drivers for positive market responses but do not
find strong evidence that liquidity support relieved pressure on the interbank market.
Lambert and Ueda (2014) determine the effect of unconventional central bank policies
on announcement dates between 2000 and 2012 on changes in yield spreads and on bank
stock returns in the US, Euro area, and the UK. Using one-year-ahead futures of the
three-month Eurodollar and Euribor rates as measures of the surprise element of mone-
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tary policies (see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) for the US and the Euro area, respectively,
they find no significant effect for bank stock returns in the US but a positive effect in the
Euro area after September 2008. Haitsma, Unalmis, and de Haan (2016) test the reaction
of stock markets to policies of the ECB from 1999 to 2015 and find that in particular un-
conventional monetary policy actions affect stock prices. Furthermore, they find evidence
of a credit channel, especially in the crisis period, to which highly levered firms are most
sensitive. Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) identify more than 50 unconventional monetary
policy events by the ECB and investigate their effect on sovereign spreads of peripheral
countries relative to Germany from 2008 to 2012. They find that the unconventional mea-
sures reduced long-term government bond yields in all peripheral countries except Greece
whereby events in the period 2010 to 2012, the Securities Markets Programme, and the
Outright Monetary Transactions had a strong impact.
Different methodologies are used to assess unconventional policy measures. Rigobon
and Sack (2004) address the problem of endogeneity when estimating the impact of mon-
etary policy on different asset prices and propose to use a heteroskedasticity estimator
for variance increases. Kholodilin, Montagnoli, Napolitano, and Siliverstovs (2009) apply
the heteroskedasticity approach by Rigobon and Sack (2004) and show that the monetary
policy of the ECB has differential effects on sectoral stock markets in the Eurozone. Eser
and Schwaab (2016) use a time series panel regression model to estimate the yield impact
of the Securities Markets Programme in five Eurozone sovereign bond markets. The au-
thors show that bond yield volatility and tail risk reduce on intervention days. Pelizzon,
Subrahmanyam, Tomio, and Uno (2016) investigate the market liquidity depending on
credit risk in the European sovereign debt markets using a vector autoregression setting.
They argue that sovereign credit risk dynamically drives market liquidity. This link of
market makers’ liquidity provision to credit risk weakens with the three-year repo an-
nouncement in December 2011. Interestingly, their model estimates that the most likely
structural break date is December 21, 2011, which represents the auction date of the first
three-year transaction studied in this paper. Saka, Fuertes, and Kalotychou (2015) study
Eurozone fragility by analyzing Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” speech. The authors
use principal component and event study methodology to show that after the speech, the
perceived default risk commonality has increased among peripheral and core Eurozone
sovereigns.
Most event studies on monetary policy actions focus on the US. For example, Yin and
Yang (2013) find that on the US market large and poorly capitalized banks as well as
banks relying more on interbank liquidity react more strongly to unexpected interest rate
changes. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use a technique proposed by Kuttner (2001) to
distinguish expected from unexpected policy actions based on changes in Federal funds
84 ECB’s Three-Year Bank-Refinancing Operations and Eurozone Bank Equity
futures. They show that an unexpected 25bp cut in the Federal funds rate increases
broad stock indices by 1%. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) study large-scale
asset purchases in the US and provide evidence that these led to long-lasting reductions
in longer-term interest rates not only on securities bought in the purchase programs.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) apply an event study to evaluate the effect
of the Fed’s Quantitative Easing programs QE1 and QE2 on interest rates. They identify
and separate different channels through which the bond purchase programs affect interest
rates. Swanson (2011) studies the effect of Operation Twist in the context of QE2 on
long-term interest rates. The author finds that the effects on longer-term treasury yields
are about 15 basis points, while the effects on longer-term agency and corporate bonds are
smaller. Glick and Leduc (2012) study large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England since 2008 and find that announcements about purchases lowered
long-term interest rates through a signaling channel about future growth. Kontonikas,
MacDonald, and Saggu (2013) examine US stock returns after changes in Federal funds
futures between 1989 and 2012. They show that in contrast to the crisis period, where
stocks do not react to Federal funds rate cuts, they positively respond in the non-crisis
period.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the three-year
operations in the context of the ECB’s monetary policy. Section 3.3 presents the data
and summary statistics. Section 3.4 presents the technicalities of the estimation approach.
Section 3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Overview of the Institutional Setting
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the ECB’s monetary policy tools relevant to
the study and the modalities of the three-year operations, including estimates of country-
level liquidity uptake.
3.2.1 The ECB’s Monetary Policy
Conventional liquidity-injecting monetary operations of the ECB are divided into open
market operations and a standing facility (ECB, 2011). Table 3.1 offers an overview of
the ECB operational framework. Main refinancing operations (MROs) and longer-term
refinancing operations (LTROs) are the two main types of open market operations that
allow the ECB to inject liquidity against collateral provided by the counterparty. MROs
and LTROs are implemented on a recurring basis (MROs weekly, LTROs monthly) for a
pre-specified duration (MROs one week, LTROs traditionally three months) in the form
of reverse transactions.
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Insert Table 3.1 around here.
Before October 7, 2008, when a bank applied for an MRO or LTRO loan it participated
in an auction with the ECB by stating the interest rate that it is willing to pay for a certain
amount of liquidity (variable-rate tender). The aggregate amount that the ECB offered
to Eurozone banks was restricted (“liquidity neutral period,” see Fecht, Nyborg, and
Rocholl, 2011; Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev, 2002) to what banks, in the aggregate,
need to fulfill reserve requirements.6
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse on 15 September 2008 the money
markets started to dry up, banks hoarded money because of fear of adverse selection on the
interbank market, and short-term interest rate spreads rose. To avert an intensification of
the crisis and to avoid increased credit rates for households and firms, many major central
banks had to reduce policy interest rates.7 Within seven months, the ECB iteratively
reduced its key interest rate on MRO loans by a total of 325 basis points down to 1.00%
(ECB, 2010). Eventually, on 15 October 2008, the ECB started a series of unconventional
monetary policy measures which was later referred to as the enhanced credit support
program. The new policy measures can be summarized into three main components:
(i) fixed-rate full allotment procedure, (ii) eligible collateral list, (iii) additional LTROs
of longer maturity.
The first component targets the variable-rate fixed amount LTROs that are usually
auctioned off on a monthly basis. Using the fixed-rate full allotment tender procedure,
the ECB started to offer any eligible counterparty to demand (a) unlimited central bank
liquidity against adequate collateral for (b) a pre-determined fixed interest rate (at the
time equal to the main refinancing rate of 1.00%). Secondly, the ECB enlarged both
the list of eligible collateral being accepted for refinancing operations as well as the list
of counterparties that may apply for fine-tuning operations (from 140 to approximately
2,000 counterparties). Thirdly, the ECB introduced new LTROs with longer maturities
of up to six months (previously standard LTROs had a duration of one to three months).
Table 3.2 lists the number of MRO and LTRO transactions per year, the average number
of bidders per transaction, and the average allotted amounts per transaction for the period
2000 – 2013.
Insert Table 3.2 around here.
These non-standard measures were intended to back the short-term funding needs of
counterparties, ease the banks’ liquidity position, reduce the money market spreads, keep
6As explained by European Central Bank (2002), other autonomous factors can also play a role in
determining the allotment size.
7In a concerted and joint statement the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank announced policy rate
reductions on 8 October 2008. The ECB key interest rate was reduced by 50 basis points on this day.
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short-term interest rates at low levels, and preserve and improve the availability of credit to
households and firms (ECB, 2010). As part of the credit enhancement program, the ECB
again loosened the conditions for its LTRO liquidity-providing mechanism in June 2009.
This time the ECB announced a fixed-rate full allotment extraordinary LTRO with a
maturity of one year (instead of six months). The interest of counterparties was very high.
As illustrated in Table 3.2, before the crisis, the average number of ECB counterparties
participating in 3m-LTROs ranged from roughly 130 to 270. This number reached a new
high with over 640 bidding banks on average (maximum of 1,121 counterparties on June
25, 2009) for the three 1y-LTRO allotments in 2009 providing average amounts of over
EUR 200bn per transaction (with a maximum of EUR 442bn on June 25, 2009).
In the coming months markets started to stabilize, money market spreads declined,
bond and stock markets recovered while loans to households started to grow and the
survey of euro area banks on bank lending indicated less tightened credit standards on
loans to firms (ECB, 2010). This led the ECB to announce a phasing-out of the non-
standard measures in December 2009, i.e., the ECB declared that the LTRO allotment of
December 2009 would be the last fixed-rate full allotment 1y-LTRO and that subsequent
auctions would revert to the variable-rate tender procedure as used prior to the crisis.
Government bonds spreads of many large European peripheral countries such as Italy,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain started to rise compared to the German Bund in early 2010
marking the start of the European sovereign debt crisis. The ECB reacted on 9 May 2010
by launching the Securities Market Programme (SMP) to restore depth and liquidity in
debt securities markets (ECB, 2010). Additionally, the ECB reintroduced the fixed-rate
full allotment procedure for three and six-month LTROs.
3.2.2 The Three-Year LTROs and Liquidity Uptake
Since markets did not improve, ECB announces the three-year LTROs on December 8,
2011, officially as a measure to “support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money
market.”8 However, on December 1, 2011, a few days before the official press release, the
ECB’s President, Mario Draghi, gives a speech to the European Parliament where one of
his key points is the ECB’s awareness of banks’ maturity mismatches and stressed bank
funding.9 On that day an article in the Financial Times states that Draghi’s speech is
interpreted by the markets as an indication of the ECB to expand the Securities Markets
8See ECB press release, December 8, 2011: “ECB announces measures to support bank lending and
money market activity,” ecb.europa.eu.
9See FT Alphaville article by Izabella Kaminska, December 1, 2011: “Draghi: ‘We are aware of the
scarcity of eligible collateral’,” ftalphaville.ft.com.
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Programme or to announce three-year ECB loans.10 In the event study, we take this
pre-announcement into account by widening the event window up to [−7, 7] days where,
in trading days, the −5 represents December 1, 2011.
The modalities of the three-year LTROs are the same for all banks with access to
Eurosystem liquidity operations. Interest is to be paid at maturity. The rate is fixed at
the MROs’ retrospective average rate over the respective period (three years). On the
announcement day, the MRO rate was at 1%. The three-year LTROs include an option for
early repayment after one year. Furthermore, after the first year and if the counterparties
inform the respective national central bank one week ahead, they are allowed to repay
(fully or partly) the allotted amounts on days coinciding with MRO settlements (every
week). Counterparties are also allowed to transfer the outstanding amounts from the
earlier conducted one-year LTRO (October 2011) into the first three-year LTRO.
The liquidity uptake is extraordinarily large in the three-year LTROs (see Crosig-
nani et al., 2017). Table 3.3 lists the details of the extraordinary LTROs announced on
December 8, 2011, and lists the uptakes and changes on outstanding OMO transactions.
Insert Table 3.3 around here.
Panel A in Table 3.3 lists the allotment, settlement, and redemption dates as well as
the resulting maturity of the extraordinary LTROs. Liquidity uptake in the October 1y-
LTRO was not unusually large. This was probably due to the low availability of eligible
collateral. When markets turned worse, the ECB eventually announced the 3y-LTRO
on December 8 with eased collateral requirements and a lower interest rate and replaced
the originally planned second 1y-LTRO. The first settlement on December 22 amounted
to 489.19bn Euro for 523 counterparties while the second settlement (March 1, 2012)
equaled to 529.53bn Euro allotted to 800 counterparties. Panel B lists the outstanding
amounts in MRO and LTRO financing in the week preceding the respective transaction.
Eurozone banks did not only take up a lot of extraordinary LTRO money but also replaced
a significant part of MRO, substantially prolonging the average maturity of their funding
leg. This can be seen in Panel C: In the first 3y-LTRO settlement a total of 489.16bn was
settled; in the same week the outstanding amount of MRO funding reduced by 122.61bn
while the net amount of LTRO funding increased by 335.29bn. 153.91bn were thus used
for substitution of existing ECB funding.
Insert Figure 3.1 around here.
Figure 3.1 displays the liquidity uptake over the period from 2006 to 2015. We observe
that the settlement dates of LTROs led to a sharp increase in the LTRO position on
10See Financial Times article by Ralph Atkins, December 1, 2011: “Draghi hints at eurozone aid plan,”
ft.com (see also Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2015).
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ECB’s balance sheet. The total lending (MRO and LTRO combined) to euro area credit
institutions increased by EUR 214.12bn to EUR 879.13bn (first settlement in 2011, marked
as (2)), and by EUR 310.67bn to 1130.35bn (second settlement in 2012, marked as (3)).
The large LTRO uptakes are partly compensated by reductions in the relatively shorter-
term MROs. In 2011/2012 the combined net LTRO increase was +783bn while the MRO
reduction amounted to -260bn. The lower panel of Figure 3.1 shows that the importance
of main refinancing operations (MRO) decreased relatively to LTRO after the emergence
of the crisis in 2007 and with settlements of the extraordinary LTRO allotments.11
Insert Figure 3.2 around here.
In Figure 3.2, we depict in the upper Panel A the weighted average remaining matu-
rity of outstanding MRO and LTRO liquidity in days. We observe that mainly the three
settlements of June 2009, December 2011 and March 2012 increased the remaining ma-
turity of outstanding MRO and LTRO liquidity. The increases are very sharp and large
due to the large size, longer maturity of the LTROs and the substitution of relatively
shorter-term MRO liquidity.
Uptake in the three-year LTROs is unfortunately not publicly available on a country-
level basis. However, some of the Eurosystem’s national central banks provide statistics
on MRO and LTRO liquidity outstanding on a monthly basis as collected by Bruegel (see
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012). The position “LTRO” includes both standard outstanding
three-month and extraordinary three-year liquidity. Unfortunately, the national central
banks provide these figures in different formats (see Woschitz, 2017, for details). To
provide estimates on LTRO liquidity uptake, we proceed as Woschitz (2017) and calculate
a monthly average of outstanding MRO and LTRO liquidity for each country for which the
national central bank provides these statistics separated into MRO and LTRO outstanding
liquidity.12 A monthly estimate of liquidity uptake from month m to month m + 1 can
then be calculated by subtracting average outstanding liquidity in month m from that in
month m+ 1.
Table 3.4 estimates net liquidity uptake in MROs, LTROs, and in total over the two
cash settlements of the three-year LTROs for those countries providing the respective fig-
ures separately. Panel A provides outstanding liquidity end of October 2011 and liquidity
uptake from the beginning of November 2011 to the end of January 2012 as well as from
the beginning of February to the end of April 2012, two periods which span over the
first and second three-year LTRO cash settlements, respectively. Numbers are in million
11Fine-Tuning Operations, as well as the Marginal Lending Facility played only minor roles in terms
of relative liquidity provided.
12For the Netherlands, Cyprus, and Malta, only total outstanding liquidity is publicly available. The
total position is not separated into MRO and LTRO liquidity outstanding.
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EUR. Countries are sorted according to LTRO uptake over the first cash settlement (in
the period November 2011 to January 2012). Panel B calculates the percentage changes
on outstanding liquidity end of October 2011 and January 2012.
Insert Table 3.4 around here.
Panel A shows that in most countries, banks substitute MRO by LTRO liquidity. Two
exceptional cases, Ireland and Greece, actually reduce LTRO and even total borrowing
over the cash settlements of both three-year LTROs. The largest uptakes over the first
cash settlement period are taken by banks in Spain (EUR 112.0 bn), Italy (EUR 94.2 bn),
France (EUR 68.6 bn), and Germany (EUR 24.2 bn). Notice that the aggregate uptake
in Spain is more than four times larger than the one in Germany. The order of net uptake
in MROs and LTROs for the four largest economies is the same over the second cash
settlement with net uptake of EUR 160.2 bn in Spain, EUR 112.6 bn in Italy, EUR 36.6
bn in France, and EUR 30.3 bn in Germany.
Panel B shows that in relative terms, banks in Austria and Belgium increase their
LTRO position by 125.8% and 169.2%, respectively. Relatively speaking this is more than
what French banks take in the aggregate (107.3%). However, both Austrian and Belgium
banks have with EUR 3.1 and 6.7 bn relatively little outstanding LTRO liquidity end of
October 2011 (see Panel A). Portuguese banks increase LTRO liquidity only by 16.6% and
34.2% throughout the first and second cash settlements, respectively. Portuguese banks
in the aggregate, however, have EUR 32.8 bn outstanding LTRO liquidity end of October
2011, which is roughly 1.7 times as much as the aggregate of German banks. Relatively
speaking Finland shows the largest uptake of 2,096.2% over the first cash settlement,
which results from the small EUR 0.1 bn outstanding LTRO liquidity end of October
2011.
Overall, these numbers provide evidence that – if one controls for the size of the
economy of a country and outstanding liquidity end of October 2011 – in particular, the
peripheral Eurozone countries make use of the three-year LTROs. This is in line with
Nyborg (2017) who argues that the ECB provides an indirect bailout to these financially
weaker countries and banks by offering the three-year liquidity.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
We use daily equity returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The unfiltered data
covers 130 banks from 15 out of the 19 Eurozone countries: Austria (4 banks), Belgium
(4), Finland (7), France (32), Germany (23), Luxembourg (1), Malta (3), Netherlands
(6), Greece (4), Ireland (1), Italy (28), Portugal (4), Slovenia (1), Spain (11), and Cyprus
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(1).13 We only keep banks if the full return series from –192 business days before the
announcement of the three-year LTROs (December 8, 2011) to 7 business days after the
second cash settlement (March 1, 2012) is available. This covers the period from March
15, 2011, to March 12, 2012 (260 business days). We lose 2 Spanish banks because their
time-series start only as of July 20 and 21, 2011. Furthermore, we drop banks with
more than 35 zero return days (≈ 13.5% of the 260 total business days) in an attempt
to balance the loss of banks versus keeping too many whose equity does not trade.14
Due to this filter we lose Ireland and Luxembourg (1 bank each) as well as a total of 36
banks located in Finland (3 banks), France (14), Germany (10), Greece (3), Italy (2),
Malta (2), Netherlands (1), and Spain (1). Finally, we exclude Slovenia (1 bank) from
the analysis because we have not found a Slovenian bank index in Datastream that trades
well over the respective period. Therefore, our final bank sample consists of 89 banks in
12 countries observed on 260 business days (23,140 bank-day observations), whereby each
security trades on at least 225 days (86.5% of the 260 total business).
For each country in the bank sample, we download a total market as well as a total
bank return index from Datastream.15 We work with the following total market return
indices (by country):
“ATX” (Austria), “BEL 20” (Belgium), “OMX Helsinki” (Finland), “CAC 40”
(France), “DAX 30” (Germany), “STOXX Malta”, “AEX all-share” (Netherlands),
“ATHEX” (Greece), “FTSE MIB” (Italy), “PSI all-share” (Portugal), “IBEX 35”
(Spain), and “STOXX Cyprus”. In robustness checks, we use the overall European
Union index “STOXX Europe 600”.
For further robustness checks, we use the following total bank return indices:
“FTSE Austria Banks”, “FTSE Belgium Banks”, “NOMXH Banks (Finland)”,
“FTSE France Banks”, “FTSE Germany Banks”, “Malta-DS Banks”, “Netherland-
DS Banks”, “FTSE Greece Banks”, “FTSE Italia all-shr Banks”, “FTSE Portugal
Banks”, “FTSE Spain Banks”, and “Cyprus-DS Banks”.
Table 3.5 provides summary statistics by country. Panel A shows descriptive statistics
for the bank equity return sample. For Malta, Greece, and Cyprus, the sample contains
only one bank. Italy exhibits with 26 banks the maximum number of banks per country
followed by France (18 banks) and Germany (13). Over the total 260 business days the
13The raw sample does not contain banks from the Eurozone countries Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, and
Lithuania.
14Notice that zero return days can also be country-specific holidays, for instance, where trading does
not take place because an exchange is closed.
15In line with the literature, we use the total return index as our main return variable since it accounts
for potential dividend payments which would be re-invested at the closing price on the ex-dividend date.
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maximum percent of zero returns is observed in Greece with 10.77% followed by France
(7.54%) and Austria (7.40%). The same statistic for the three [–7,7] event windows shows
that Austria exhibits with 13.75% the maximum percent of zero returns in the sample,
followed by Greece with 12.50%.16 On average, bank equity returns are negative in all
countries except for Malta (4 bps). The lowest average is observed in Greece with –
37 bps. Spanish banks exhibit both the minimum (–28.38%) and maximum (40.38%)
return over the sample period. The second-highest minimum return is held by the Greek
bank (–28.02%) and the second-highest maximum by an Italian bank (33.17%). In the
pooled sample as well as in most countries the median is zero or close to mean value
which provides evidence that the bank equity returns are nicely behaved in terms of the
normality assumption.
Insert Table 3.5 around here.
Panel B shows summary statistics for equally-weighted bank equity return portfolios
built across the banks in Panel A per country. For each country, we now observe 260
business days out of which 40 business days belong to at least one event window used
later on (see footnote 16). In total, the sample comprises 3,120 country-day observations.
For Malta, Greece, and Cyprus – with only one bank in the sample – values in Panel B
are the same as in Panel A. Abstracting from those countries, the number of zero returns
over the full sample period of 260 business days reduces drastically from between 2.60%
(Belgium) and 7.54% (France) in Panel A to between 1.15% (Belgium, France, Germany,
Netherlands, and Portugal) and 2.31% (Austria) in Panel B. The same observation is
made for zero returns on business days that are included in at least one event window:
zero returns reduce from between 2.50% (Belgium) and 13.75% (Austria) in Panel A to
between 2.5% (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain) and 5% (Austria) in Panel B. For countries with more than one bank in the sam-
ple, Portugal provides the minimum and maximum observed return with –10.63% and
11.63%. Including countries with only one bank in the sample, Greece leads this statis-
tic (minimum: –28.02%, maximum: 29.52%) followed by Cyprus (minimum: –16.38%,
maximum: 25.76%).
Panel C provides summary statistics for the market return indices for each country.
Again, for each country, we observe 260 business days out of which 40 business days belong
to at least one event window. The last row in Panel C shows the summary statistics for
16The event window figure includes days of all three event windows that we study later on. This figure,
therefore, includes the [–7,7] = 15 business days around December 8, 2011, December 22, 2011, and March
1, 2012. This is a total of 45 business days. However, the sub-windows [3,7] from event one (December
8) and [–7,–3] from event two (December 22) overlap, which reduces the number of overall event days by
five days. Thus, the figure discussed includes in total 40 event days.
92 ECB’s Three-Year Bank-Refinancing Operations and Eurozone Bank Equity
the “STOXX Europe 600” index. The highest numbers of zero returns across the full 260
business days are observed in Malta with 11.54%, followed by Austria with 4.62%. The
non-peripheral countries exhibit zero returns of between 1.15% and 3.46%. Restricting
the sample to days used in at least one event window shows that the same two countries
exhibit the highest percentage of zero return days: Malta with 17.50% and Austria with
7.50%. The non-peripheral countries exhibit percentages between 2.50% and 5.00%. Even
the “STOXX Europe 600” index does not trade on 1.15% of the full 260 business days
and 2.50% of days classified as event days. The mean returns are negative in all countries
except for Germany.
Panel D shows the summary statistics for the bank index sample that we use in ro-
bustness checks. Over the full 260 business days, we observe between 0.00% (Netherlands)
and 4.62% (Austria) zero returns. The same statistic for the 40 days classified as event
days shows that zero returns make up for between 0.00% (Malta and Netherlands) and
7.50% (Austria) of the observed event days. Across the full 260 sample days, the mean
return is negative in all countries.
3.4 Event Study: Methodology
We study the impact of the announcement and the two cash settlements of the three-year
LTROs separately on end-of-day stock prices of Eurozone banks. Therefore, an important
issue that this study has to deal with is the fact that we examine (cumulative) abnormal
returns in a cross-section of bank stocks using only one event which is the same for
the whole industry (banks). In this section, we explain how we calculate (cumulative)
abnormal returns and how we attempt to overcome this issue.
We estimate abnormal bank equity returns using the standard market model approach
as lined out by MacKinlay (1997).17 We set t = 0 as the event date (for each of the three
events – the announcement and the two cash settlements – separately), the period T0 to
T1 as estimation window, and T2 to T3 as event window. The abnormal return for bank i
on date t is calculated as
ARi,t = ri,t − E[ri,t|rm,t], (3.1)
where ri,t is the realized and E[ri,t|rm,t] the expected return on bank stock i on date t.
The latter term is estimated from a market model using the realized return on the market,
rm,t, with a regression model of the form
ri,t = βi0 + βi1rm,t + βi2rm,t−1 + βi3rm,t+1 + i,t. (3.2)
17For an extensive survey of event studies applied in the context of banking see Degryse, Kim, and
Ongena (2009).
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Adding lead and lag (rm,t−1 and rm,t+1) of the market index rm,t helps control for non-
synchronous trading. The market model is estimated individually per bank using the
estimation window [T0, T1] = [−192,−8].18 The cumulative abnormal return for bank i is
then calculated by summing up the abnormal returns over the event window [T2, T3],
CARi,[T2,T3] =
T3∑
t=T2
ARi,t. (3.3)
As we are interested in the impact of the three-year LTROs on bank equity on a country-
level we average both abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns across banks within a
country,
ARc,t =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
ARi,t and CARc,[T2,T3] =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
CARi,[T2,T3], (3.4)
where Nc is the number of banks in country c. We show estimated CARc,[T1,T2] not only for
the full event window [T2, T3] = [−7, 7] but also for shorter windows [0, 1], [0, 3], [−1, 1],
[−1, 3], [−3, 3], and [−5, 5] to evaluate the effect of each event in more detail.19 We
evaluate economic magnitudes using these definitions of (cumulative) abnormal returns.
To assess the statistical significance of the (cumulative) average abnormal returns, we
use two established test statistics. First, we use the crude dependence adjustment (CDA)
test by Brown and Warner (1980). This test statistic accounts for cross-correlations of
abnormal returns by calculating the standard deviation on country-level abnormal returns
across days in the estimation window. The test statistic for the country-level abnormal
return on date t is calculated as
tBW,ARc,t =
ARc,t
SARc
, (3.5)
where
SARc =
√√√√√ 1
185− 4
T1∑
t=T0
(ARc,t − ARc)2 (3.6)
18This procedure to calculate ARi,t yields in our case the same result as using both the estimation and
the event window and running the regression ri,t = βi0+βi1rm,t+βi2rm,t−1+βi3rm,t+1+
∑T3
k=T2 γi,kδi,k,t+
i,t, where δi,k,t is an indicator variable for date k. Each of these 15 indicator variables takes on the value
1 on one of the 15 days in the event window and is zero on the other days. The coefficient γi,k measures
the abnormal return on day k.
19A short event window has the advantage of minimizing the effects of confounding events (Degryse
et al., 2009). However, it runs the risk of missing the effect of complex information that requires time to
be incorporated in stock prices (Gagnon et al., 2011).
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and ARc is the average abnormal return across daily observations in the estimation win-
dow.20 The term 185−4 subtracts the number of parameters estimated in Eq. 3.2 from the
number of daily observations in the estimation window.21 The test statistic for cumulative
abnormal returns is calculated as
tBW,CARc,[T1,T2] =
CARc,[T1,T2]√
(T3 − T2) SARc
. (3.7)
This procedure is one way to control for cross-correlation. Brown and Warner (1980)
show that their test statistic is robust to event-induced changes in variance. Harrington
and Shrider (2007) demonstrate that cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns
always produces event-induced variance. Not controlling for it renders the independence
assumption for the abnormal returns incorrect and may lead to over-rejections of the null
hypothesis for zero abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). However, we examine
(cumulative) abnormal returns in a cross-section of bank stocks using only one event,
which is the same for the whole industry (banks). The Brown and Warner (1980) test
statistic does not explicitly control for this type of cross-correlation.
The second test statistic used is developed by Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010). The
authors propose a correction term (which controls explicitly for cross-correlation) to the
test statistic developed by Boehmer et al. (1991). The latter test statistic is based on
standardized abnormal returns, as proposed by Patell (1976). The Patell (1976) test
statistic standardizes abnormal returns by the regression residual standard deviation and
a correction term to reduce the weight of more volatile observations (forecast error), as
SARi,t =
ARi,t
SARi,t
, (3.8)
where
S2ARi,t = S
2
ARi
(
1 + 1185 +
(rm,t − rm)2∑T1
t=T0(rm,t − rm)2
)
, (3.9)
and
S2ARi =
1
185− 4
T1∑
t=T0
AR2i,t. (3.10)
20Notice that using the Brown and Warner (1980) test statistic to assess statistical significance in the
bank stock sample is in our case very similar to first averaging bank equity returns into an equally-
weighted portfolio per country, running the market model on the country-level (essentially this is one
regression per country), and assessing the statistical significance of ARc,t with a simple t-test in this
sample.
21The statistic is Student-t distributed with T − 4 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of zero
abnormal returns (see Serra, 2002).
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The term rm represents the average market returns during the estimation window, and
the term in brackets is the forecast error. Using this approach of standardized abnormal
returns, Boehmer et al. (1991) estimate a cross-sectional standard deviation on the event
day which then controls for event-induced changes in variance. The authors propose the
test statistic
zBMP,ASARc,t =
√
Nc ASARc,t
SASARc,t
(3.11)
where ASARc,t is defined as the average of the standardized abnormal returns, SARi,t,
across the Nc banks in country c for date t,
ASARc,t =
1
Nc
Nc∑
i=1
SARi,t, (3.12)
and its standard deviation as
SASARc,t =
√√√√√ 1
Nc − 1
Nc∑
i=1
(
SARi,t − 1
Nc
Nc∑
l=1
SARl,t
)2
. (3.13)
Notice that standardized (cumulative) abnormal returns are only used to assess statisti-
cal (not economic) significance.22 Boehmer et al. (1991)’s test statistic for standardized
cumulative abnormal returns is given by
tBMP,CARc,[T1,T2] =
CSARc,[T2,T3]
SCSARc,[T2,T3]
(3.14)
where bank-level standardized abnormal returns are cumulated over the event window,
CSARi,[T2,T3] =
T3∑
τ=T2
SARi,t, (3.15)
and the cross-sectional average is calculated by taking the mean of the bank-level stan-
dardized cumulative abnormal returns of all the Nc banks in country c,
CSARc,[T2,T3] =
1
N
Nc∑
i=1
CSARi,[T2,T3]. (3.16)
22Standardized (cumulative) abnormal returns have less meaningful interpretation than their non-
standardized counterparts (see Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010).
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The standard deviation of CSARc,[T2,T3] is estimated from the cross-section of event-
window standardized cumulative abnormal returns as
SCSARc,[T2,T3] =
√√√√ 1
Nc(Nc − 1)
Nc∑
i=1
(
CSARi,[T2,T3] − CSARc,[T2,T3]
)2
. (3.17)
Boehmer et al. (1991) provide evidence that their test statistic is comparable in size
to the one of Brown and Warner (1980) but has more power. If the event affects the
variances, Boehmer et al. (1991)’s test statistic controls for the variance change by cross-
sectionally estimating the average of variance on the event day (Kolari and Pynno¨nen,
2010). Otherwise, it collapses into the Patell (1976) test statistic.
However, the Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic does not control for cross-correlation.
Thus, we make use of the Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) correction that adjusts Boehmer
et al. (1991)’s test statistic and controls for both event-induced changes in variance and
cross-correlation. Based on Boehmer et al. (1991), Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) propose
the test statistic
tKP,ASARc,t = zBMP,ASARc,t ×
√
1− r
1 + (Nc − 1)r , (3.18)
which corrects Boehmer et al. (1991)’s test statistic with the term under the square root.
r is the estimation period mean sample cross-correlation of the residuals. Assuming that
the square-root rule holds for the standard deviation of different periods for the returns,
the statistical significance of cumulative abnormal returns can be assessed using the same
adjustment to Boehmer et al. (1991)’s cumulative abnormal return test statistic (see
Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010).
3.5 Event Study: Results
In this subsection, we present the event study results. First, we compare average abnormal
returns on event days to those on non-event days. Second, we discuss cumulative abnormal
returns that are calculated over different event windows. Third, we assess the statistical
significance of the cumulative abnormal returns in more detail. Moreover, fourth, we
describe conducted robustness checks.
3.5.1 Average Abnormal Returns: Event versus Non-Event Days
Table 3.6 shows the results of two-sample t-tests for equal means, Kruskal-Wallis χ2-tests
for equal medians, and variance-ratio F -tests for equal variances comparing event and
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non-event days, as shown in Delaloye, Habib, and Ziegler (2012). Countries are classified
into peripheral and non-peripheral countries. Each of the three panels provides sample
means, medians, and standard deviations (given as percentages) as well as the number
of observations on event days and non-event days. For each event and each country the
tests are based on [−192,−8] = 185 non-event days (estimation window) and [−7, 7] = 15
event days (event window).23 Panel A shows these tests for the announcement of the
three-year LTROs on December 8, 2011, and Panel B (Panel C) for the first (second)
three-year LTRO cash settlement on December 22, 2011 (March 1, 2012). Test statistics
and corresponding means, medians, and/or standard deviations that are statistically sig-
nificant at a level of at least 10% are marked in bold. a, b, and c next to the test statistics
denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Insert Table 3.6 around here.
Panel A provides the results using the three-year LTRO announcement as the event
day (t = 0). The results of the two-sample t-tests show that in particular the peripheral
countries profit in terms of average abnormal returns over the event window of [−7, 7]
days around December 8, 2011. The only exception is Greece (one bank). The Greek
bank exhibits a daily average abnormal return over the 15 days event window of −2.72%.
Abstracting from Greece, the daily average abnormal return for peripheral countries lies
between 42.5 bps (Portugal) and 102.1 bps (Spain). In non-peripheral countries, abnormal
returns range from 6.0 bps (France) to 43.5 bps (Malta). The average abnormal returns of
102.1 and 63.8 bps on event days in Spain and Italy, respectively, are statistically different
from those of 0.0 bps on non-event days at the significance levels of 5% and 1%. As seen
in Table 3.4, Spanish and Italian banks also have the largest liquidity uptakes in both
operations, which is in line with Nyborg (2017)’s indirect bailout argument. Notice that
in all countries (except Greece) the daily average abnormal returns are positive on event
days showing that banks in all countries profit from positive abnormal returns on their
equity. Peripheral banks (except for the Greek bank), however, profit on average more.
The Kruskal-Wallis χ2-tests for equal medians provide similar results both in terms of
economic magnitudes and statistical significance except for Austria and Finland where
abnormal returns on event days are statistically significantly higher compared to those on
non-event days.
Panel B shows the results using the first cash settlement as the event day. Neither the
two-sample t-statistics nor the Kruskal-Wallis χ2-statistics provide evidence for statistical
23Notice that the means of abnormal returns on non-event days across events and countries are zero.
This feature comes from the fact that non-event days in our sample correspond to the days in the
estimation window and by construction, the abnormal returns must be zero due to the OLS procedure
that we use to estimate the market model.
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significance. The only two countries with banks abnormally losing on their equity prices
are the Netherlands and – as in Panel A – Greece. In all non-peripheral countries, daily
average abnormal returns on event days are larger than on non-event days. Abstracting
from the Netherlands and Greece, the average daily abnormal returns range from 7.4
bps (Spain) to 64.7 bps (Cyprus, only one bank) in peripheral countries and from 3.6
bps (France) to 42.1 bps (Malta, only one bank) in non-peripheral countries. Even if in
most countries banks profit abnormally from increased equity prices over the first cash
settlement, banks in peripheral countries profit more (abstracting from Greece). Again,
the Kruskal-Wallis χ2-tests provide similar results both in terms of economic magnitudes
and statistical significance.
Panel C shows the results using the second three-year cash settlement as the event
day. As expected the results are mixed for the second cash settlement which is in line
with the argument that the large uptake in the second three-year LTRO was less of a
surprise for the market because of the large uptakes in the first three-year LTRO.
The results so far provide first evidence that in particular peripheral countries profit in
terms of abnormal returns on their equity over the announcement and first cash settlement.
3.5.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
This subsection shows country-level cumulative abnormal returns calculated as averages
across cumulative abnormal returns of banks within a country (see Section 3.4). Notice
that in this and the two subsequent subsections, we use the acronym CAAR, instead
of CARc, for “cumulative average abnormal returns” (country-level cumulative abnormal
returns) to keep the reading flow. Figure 3.3 plots the results over the event window [−7, 7]
for the three different events separately. The three columns of subplots represent the three
events (the announcement, the first cash settlement, and the second cash settlement),
respectively, as indicated by vertical lines in each subplot. The vertical line on December
1, 2011, in the first column of subplots, represents the ECB’s first indication of large-scale
help for Eurozone banks. Each line represents one country as indicated in the figure.
Insert Figure 3.3 around here.
Panel A compares CAARs of Germany, France, and the peripheral countries (except
for Greece) over the event window [−7, 7] around the announcement date. All countries
profit abnormally in terms of bank equity prices. However, banks in peripheral countries
profit more than German and French banks. Panel B shows that bank equity performs
similarly in other non-peripheral countries. German, French, and Finish bank stocks
exhibit only small positive abnormal returns. The CAARs in the Netherlands, Austria,
Belgium, and Malta lie between the CAARs in France (the minimum) and Spain (the
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maximum). Panel C shows that Greece (one bank) is a particular case. The Greek bank
loses abnormally over the announcement period of the three-year LTROs. Across all
three panels, CAARs start to increase (except for Greece) as of December 1, 2011, which
represents the first ECB statement about its awareness of banks’ funding difficulties.
The subplots in the middle column show CAARs over the event window [−7, 7] around
the first cash settlement. CAARs develop similarly in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
The middle column of subplots across panels shows no jump in CAARs on the cash settle-
ment day of the first three-year LTRO. However, the first cash settlement takes place on a
Thursday. Stock prices of banks in Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal react abnormally from
Monday to Tuesday the following week (2 and 3 business days after the cash settlement).
The third column of subplots provides the results for the second three-year cash set-
tlement. Not surprisingly the results are rather unspectacular except for Cyprus, with
the one sample bank exhibiting a large positive abnormal return on the cash settlement
day. Furthermore, some of the non-peripheral countries show slightly increasing CAARs
but compared to the announcement and first cash settlement the positive CAARs are
negligibly small.
Table 3.7 provides the numbers for the full event window of [−7, 7] days and six further
sub-windows as indicated in the table. Panel A shows the results for the announcement of
the three-year LTROs on December 8, 2011, and Panel B (Panel C) for the first (second)
cash settlement on December 22, 2011 (March 1, 2012). Significance is evaluated using
the test statistic proposed by Brown and Warner (1980), which is presented in brackets
underneath the CAARs. CAARs are marked in bold if significant at the level of at least
10%. a, b, and c next to the CAARs denote significance at levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. Numbers are given in decimals.
Insert Table 3.7 around here.
Panel A reveals that positive abnormal returns are particularly high for banks in pe-
ripheral countries over the announcement period. As already seen in Figure 3.3, the only
exception is Greece. The Greek bank exhibits CAARs of −18.1% and −40.8% over the
windows [−1, 3] and [−7, 7], respectively, which are statistically different from zero at
significance levels of 5% and 10%. Abstracting from Greece, 8 out of the 28 CAARs in
peripheral countries are significant at the level of at least 5% (which represents 28.6%).
In terms of economic magnitudes, significant CAARs range from 4.0% in Italy to 15.3%
in Spain over the windows [−3, 3] and [−7, 7], respectively. Looking at shorter windows,
only the CAARs of 5.3% and 7.1% in Portugal over the windows [0, 1] and [−1, 1], respec-
tively, are significantly different from zero. In the non-peripheral countries, CAARs are
significantly different from zero in 4 out of the 49 country-window combinations (8.2%)
100 ECB’s Three-Year Bank-Refinancing Operations and Eurozone Bank Equity
at significance levels of at least 10%. Statistically significant CAARs range from −4.9%
in Austria to −3.1% in the Netherlands over the windows [0, 3] and [−1, 3], respectively.
Panel B shows a similar picture for CAARs around the first three-year cash settlement.
In peripheral countries, CAARs lie between 4.4% in Italy and 16.0% in Portugal over
the window [−5, 5] if they are statistically significant at levels of at least 10%. Across
peripheral country-window combinations, 5 out of the 35 CAARs are statistically different
from zero (14.3%). Across non-peripheral countries, Belgium is the only country with at
least one CAAR (6.5% over the window [−5, 5]) statistically different from zero. Across
all non-peripheral country-window combinations, this represents 2.0%.
Panel C shows the results for the second three-year cash settlement on March 1, 2012.
Not surprisingly significance in Panel C is absent. The only exception is Cyprus (one
bank). As seen in Figure 3.3, the Cypriot bank profits abnormally on the day of the cash
settlement itself. The CAAR is 23.0% over the window [0, 1] and statistically different
from zero at the significance level of 1%.
The results provide evidence that over the announcement and the first cash settlement
periods first and foremost peripheral countries (except for Greece) profit. According to
statistically significant CAARs, non-peripheral countries even lose abnormally in terms
of their equity prices over the announcement period. Furthermore, high CAARs seem
to line up with large liquidity uptakes as seen in Table 3.4. The largest and second-
largest LTRO uptakes (including standard LTRO liquidity) of approximately EUR 160
and 113 bn were made by Spanish and Italian banks in the second three-year LTRO
(corresponding numbers for the first operation are EUR 112 and 94 bn, respectively).
Spanish and Italian banks take approximately 4.6 and 3.9 times as much LTRO liquidity
as German banks throughout the first cash settlement (corresponding multiples for the
second cash settlement are 5.3 and 3.7, respectively). Thus, the results are in line with
Nyborg (2017)’s argument of the indirect bailout.
3.5.3 Assessment of Statistical Significance
In this subsection, we reproduce Table 3.7 from the previous subsection but provide
statistical significance with the test statistics of Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) and, for the
sake of comparison, Boehmer et al. (1991). Throughout this subsection, we are going to
use the acronyms “BMP” for Boehmer et al. (1991) and “KP” for Kolari and Pynno¨nen
(2010). The comparison allows us to better understand the cross-correlation structure
across banks within a country. KP’s adjustment scales down BMP’s test statistic if
abnormal returns of banks within a country are, on average, positively correlated (in
the estimation window). For instance, if the average of cross-correlations of abnormal
returns of four bank stocks is r = 0.25 and BMP’s test statistic takes on a value of 2.0
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(significant at the level of 1%) then KP suggest to multiply the value of BMP’s test
statistic by
√
(1− r)/(1 + (Nc − 1)r) = 0.4472, which results in an adjusted value for the
test statistic of 2.0× 0.447 = 0.894 (not significant even at the level of 10%). We restrict
the analysis to countries with more than one bank in the sample because the calculation
of both test statistics is based on the cross-section of banks within a country.
Table 3.8 provides the results. BMP’s test statistic is presented in round brackets
underneath the CAARs. KP’s test statistic is presented in square brackets underneath
BMP’s test statistic. a, b, and c next to the CAARs denote significance at the levels of
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, with the BMP test statistic and, in square brackets, the
KP test statistic.24 CAARs that are significant at the level of at least 10% with the BMP
test statistic are marked in bold. Numbers are given in decimals.
Insert Table 3.8 around here.
Comparing statistical significance with BMP in Table 3.8 and Brown and Warner
(1980)’s test statistic in Table 3.7 shows that, even if both tests are robust to event-
induced variance, the CAARs are more often significant with the BMP as compared to
the Brown and Warner (1980) test statistic. This is due to its higher power.
Panel A shows CAARs over the announcement period of the three-year LTROs. In
the peripheral (non-peripheral) countries using the BMP test statistic 9 (11) out of the
21 (42) country-window combinations for CAARs, which represents 42.9% (26.2%), are
statistically significantly different from zero at the significance level of at least 10%. In
peripheral countries, statistically significant CAARs lie between 1.7% in Italy and 15.3%
in Spain over the windows [−1, 1] and [−7, 7], respectively. The corresponding numbers
for non-peripheral countries are −4.9% in Austria and 5.4% in Germany over the windows
[0, 1] and [−7, 7], respectively. Using the KP test statistic instead leaves only the CAAR
of 11.7% in Spain over the window [−5, 5] statistically significant at the level of 10%
in peripheral countries. Notice, however, that the CAARs of 4.0%, 6.3%, and 9.6% in
Italy over the windows [−3, 3], [−5, 5] and [−7, 7], respectively, have KP t-statistics of
1.593, 1.589, and 1.527 which result in p-values of 11.3%, 11.4%, and 12.9%. Using the
KP test statistic in the non-peripheral countries leaves 7 out of the 42 country-window
combinations statistically significant covering the same range of CAARs as with the BMP
test (−4.9% in Austria and 5.4% in Germany).
Panel B shows CAARs over the first cash settlement period. In peripheral countries, 7
out of the 21 statistically significant CAARs (using BMP test) lie between −2.1% in Spain
and 16.0% in Portugal over the windows [0, 3] and [−5, 5], respectively. Correspondingly,
24Notice that we provide the BMP test statistic first not because it is the more relevant test statistic
but because it makes results more visible in Table 3.8.
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in non-peripheral countries, 7 out of 42 statistically significant abnormal returns range
from −0.9% in the Netherlands to 4.0% in Germany over the windows [0, 3] and [−7, 7],
respectively. Using the KP test statistic in the peripheral countries leaves only the CAAR
of 2.3% in Spain over the window [−5, 5] statistically different from zero at the level of
10%. Correspondingly for the non-peripheral countries, the KP test statistic leaves only
the 1.9% CAAR in Finland over the window [−5, 5] statistically significant (at the 5%
level).
The results in Panels A and B support the previous findings that CAARs are higher
for banks in peripheral than in non-peripheral countries if they are statistically significant
with the KP test-statistic. The comparison of test statistics reveals a higher correlation
across bank stocks in peripheral countries, in particular over the announcement period,
than in non-peripheral countries. Furthermore, notice that the CAAR of 16.0% for Por-
tugal in the window [−5, 5] has a KP t-statistic of 1.563 that results in a p-value of 12.0%.
Crosignani et al. (2017) show that Portuguese banks ran “collateral trades” on high-
yielding Portuguese sovereign bonds using the three-year liquidity uptake. Essentially
this means that Portuguese banks have invested the three-year uptake into Portuguese
sovereign debt, which provides evidence in line with Nyborg (2017) that these operations
have served as indirect bailout not only for financially weaker banks (which is supported
by the CAARs) but also to weaker sovereigns.
Panel C shows CAARs over the second cash settlement period. Using the KP test
statistic for the peripheral countries leaves only the CAAR of −11.0% in Portugal over
the window [−7, 7] to be statistically different from zero at the level of 5%. Using the
KP test statistic for the non-peripheral countries leaves 8 out of the 42 country-window
combinations statistically significant covering the range of CAARs from 0.9% in Belgium
to 4.2% in Austria over the windows [0, 1] and [−5, 5] respectively. The results in Panel C
are generally (also with the BMP test statistic) more mixed across peripheral and non-
peripheral countries.
Overall, these results echo the previous findings even if we control for cross-correlation
of abnormal returns on bank stocks across banks within a country (using the Kolari and
Pynno¨nen, 2010, or KP, test statistic).
3.5.4 Robustness Checks
We ran a number of robustness checks similar to Nyborg (2017). First, we examine
whether we receive the same results if we build equally-weighted portfolios of bank stock
returns and use that sample for the event study. Table C-1 in the appendix compares
average abnormal returns on event to non-event days (the equivalent to Table 3.6) for the
equally-weighted portfolio sample. Not surprisingly the results are practically identical
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because the only difference is the order of running the market model regressions and the
averaging process. Due to the lower number of observations for countries with more than
one bank in the sample, test statistics are generally less significant. Nevertheless, the
findings in terms of evaluating statistically significant means and medians remain the
same compared to Table 3.6. Results remain basically the same in Panels B and C for
the first and second cash settlements, respectively. As described in Footnote 20 also, the
assessment of statistical significance for the CAARs remains unchanged.
Second, instead of using country-level total market return indices as described in Sec-
tion 3.3, we use the “STOXX Europe 600” index as the market index for each country.
Table C-2 in the appendix shows that the results for the comparison of means and medians
of abnormal returns on event versus non-event days are both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively very similar to the results in Table 3.6. Results for the analysis of the CAARs
are provided in the Tables C-3 and C-4 as well as in Figure C-1 in the appendix (these
are the equivalents to the Tables 3.7 and 3.8 as well as Figure 3.3, respectively). Again,
both qualitatively and quantitatively the results are very similar to the previous findings
independent of the applied test statistic (Boehmer et al., 1991; Brown and Warner, 1980;
Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010).
Third, instead of using bank stock-level data, we use total return bank indices for each
country (see Section 3.3 for an overview). Comparing Figure C-2 in the appendix to Fig-
ure 3.3 shows a few noteworthy differences. Results with the bank index sample show that
CAARs are smaller over the announcement period of the three-year LTROs as compared
to results with the bank stock-level sample. Furthermore, also non-peripheral countries
profit from abnormal returns over the announcement period (in particular, France from
December 1 to 8, 2011). However, the positive abnormal returns over the first cash set-
tlement two weeks later, on December 22, 2011, are higher for Cyprus and Portugal than
they are in Figure 3.3. Using country-level bank indices seems to shift the higher abnor-
mal returns in peripheral countries, as compared to non-peripheral countries, from the
announcement to the first cash settlement of the three-year LTROs. Both Tables C-5
and C-6 in the appendix confirm these findings also in terms of economic magnitudes
and statistical significance (these are the equivalents to Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively).
Both the economic magnitudes and the statistical significance are lower for peripheral
countries over the announcement period but higher over the first cash settlement period
of the three-year LTROs, in particular in Portugal and Cyprus.
Overall, the robustness checks confirm the results of the principal analysis. However,
using country-level bank indices instead of bank stock-level data shifts the effects from the
announcement of the three-year LTROs to the first cash settlement. Banks in peripheral
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countries profit more as compared to non-peripheral countries in particular over the first
cash settlement period in terms of abnormal equity price increases.
3.6 Conclusion
This study uses an event study to examine the impact of the ECB’s three-year LTROs
on banks’ stock prices. Compared to other studies, we exclusively focus on the three-year
LTROs and bank equity. The study aims at comparing (cumulative) abnormal returns
across Eurozone countries using a variety of tests to assess the statistical significance. In
the main setup, the paper estimates a market model to predict abnormal returns on 89
bank stocks from 12 different Eurozone countries with country-level total market return
indices (the data is from Thomson Reuters Datastream).
The results provide evidence that over the announcement and the first cash settlement
periods banks in peripheral countries profit more compared to banks in non-peripheral
countries. The only exception is Greece (one bank in the sample). The Greek bank loses
abnormally in terms of its equity price, especially over the announcement period. As
expected, we find no differential results across peripheral and non-peripheral countries
over the second cash settlement.
Even if we use the test statistic developed by Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010), which con-
trols explicitly for cross-correlation and renders many country-level cumulative abnormal
returns (CAARs) insignificant, we find that Spanish banks, on average, exhibit a CAAR
of 11.7% over the window of [−5, 5], which is significant at the level of 10%. Spanish
banks have, at the same time, the largest liquidity uptake over both cash settlement
periods. CAARs for Italian banks of 4.0%, 6.3%, and 9.6% over the event windows of
[−3, 3], [−5, 5], and [−7, 7] have p-values of 11.3%, 11.4%, and 12.9%, respectively. Italian
banks have the second-largest liquidity uptake. At the same time, statistically significant
CAARs in non-peripheral countries lie between -4.9% in Austria and 5.4% in Germany
for the windows [0, 1] and [−7, 7], respectively. Austrian and German banks take less in
both operations.
Using the Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010) test statistic to assess statistical significance
over the first cash settlement leaves only the CAAR of 2.3% in Spain over the window
[−5, 5] statistically different from zero at the level of 10%. The CAAR of 16.0% in
Portugal over the same window, however, has a p-value of 12.0%. Portuguese banks take
1.4 times as much LTRO liquidity as Austrian banks and have already 10.6 times as
much outstanding prior to the three-year LTROs. At the same time, the only statistically
significant cumulative abnormal return in non-peripheral countries is the one of 1.9% in
Finland over the same window.
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Using less conservative test statistics (Boehmer et al., 1991; Brown and Warner, 1980)
renders CAARs more significant. The findings, however, remain qualitatively the same.
CAARs in peripheral countries are higher than in non-peripheral countries. A number of
robustness checks do not change them.
These results provide evidence that the three-year LTROs help in particular financially
weaker Eurozone banks. This is in line with Nyborg (2017)’s argument that the three-
year LTROs possess the features of an indirect bailout for banks in financially weaker
Eurozone countries. The finding that bank CAARs are especially high in countries with
large liquidity uptake strengthens Nyborg (2017)’s point further.
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Figure 3.1
ECB Liquidity Uptakes from 2006 to 2014. This figure depicts the amounts of ECB liquidity
uptakes from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2014. Panel A shows the absolute amounts of liquidity
provided using LTRO and MRO as compared to funds deposited at the ECB deposit facility. Panel B
shows the relative amounts of LTRO, MRO, FT, and MLF over the same period. The vertical lines
indicate our key events: (1) December 8, 2011: announcement of the three-year LTRO, (2) December 22,
2011: first settlement date, and (3) March 1, 2012: second settlement date. Source: ECB.
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Figure 3.2
Relative Share of LTRO Liquidity Uptake. This figure depicts the weighted average remaining
maturity of outstanding MRO and LTRO liquidity in number of days. The vertical lines indicate the
same key events as in Figure 3.1. Source: ECB.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1
Main Monetary Policy Operations of the ECB. This table lists the most important monetary
policy instruments of the ECB divided into open market operations (OMO) and standing facilities (SF).
Source: adapted from ECB (2011, p. 95).
Type of transaction
Monetary policy Liquidity Liquidity
operations providing absorbing Maturity Frequency Procedure
Panel A: Open market operations (OMO)
Main refinancing opera-
tions (MRO)
Reverse
transactions
– One week Weekly Standard
tenders
Longer-term refinancing
operations (LTRO)
Reverse
transactions
– Three
months
Monthly Standard
tenders
Panel B: Standing facilities
Marginal lending facility Reverse
transactions
– Overnight Access at the discretion
of counterparties
Deposit facility – Deposits Overnight Access at the discretion
of counterparties
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Table 3.2
ECB Open Market Operations. This table shows the average allotted amounts in billion EUR in
panel A, the average number of bidders in panel B, and the absolute number of ECB OMO MRO and
LTRO transactions for the period 2000 – 2013 categorized by duration. Source: Woschitz (2017).
MROs LTROs
7d 14d 1m 3m 6m 12m 36m
Panel A: Number of Transactions per Year
2000 51 12
2001 2 52 12
2002 53 1 11
2003 3 52 1 11
2004 43 9 1 11
2005 52 2 11
2006 52 1 11
2007 51 1 1 15
2008 53 5 18 5
2009 52 14 22 12 3
2010 52 13 11 2
2011 52 13 11 1 1 1
2012 52 13 11 1
2013 53 14 10
Panel B: Average Number of Bidders per Transaction
2000 721.4 270.0
2001 247.5 410.4 225.2
2002 306.9 220.0 182.5
2003 132.3 274.5 106.0 134.9
2004 351.3 282.7 138.0 160.5
2005 351.0 147.0 151.4
2006 377.4 136.0 164.7
2007 336.9 390.0 159.0 144.5
2008 442.9 157.6 156.4 144.4
2009 401.2 73.1 47.8 51.3 644.7
2010 114.8 38.3 90.5 59.0
2011 191.8 59.5 166.8 114.0 181.0 523.0
2012 94.7 27.8 42.3 800.0
2013 75.6 24.7 45.5
Panel C: Average Alloted Amounts per Transaction [mill EUR]
2000 79,961 17,500
2001 63,000 79,060 20,000
2002 66,477 20,000 17,273
2003 53,667 98,303 15,000 15,000
2004 244,082 107,184 25,000 25,000
2005 290,144 30,000 28,864
2006 307,087 40,000 40,000
2007 255,186 348,607 50,000 52,232
2008 201,113 75,073 54,934 35,928
2009 149,753 53,675 14,723 11,132 204,806
2010 133,831 38,462 39,712 26,772
2011 158,968 72,475 66,489 49,752 56,934 489,191
2012 97,849 17,852 13,984 529,531
2013 108,040 5,456 7,400
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Table 3.3
ECB Liquidity Providing Allotments. This table shows the details of the announcement, allotment,
and settlement of the 1-year and 3-year extraordinary longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in
2011/2012. Panel A gives the details of the announcement, allotment, and settlement details. On the
allotment date participating banks hand in the amount, they would be willing to borrow, on the settlement
date, the requested amount is paid out from the ECB to the counterparties. On the redemption date,
the borrowed amount has to be redeemed. Panel B lists the total amounts outstanding from earlier MRO
and LTRO transactions for the week preceding the settlement date. Panel C finally shows the overall net
changes during the week of the settlement. A positive (negative) value for ∆ MRO / LTRO lending means
an increase (reduction) of the amount outstanding in MRO / LTRO financing. LTRO substitution finally
gives the net substitution effect of MRO financing that has been replaced by LTRO financing. Source:
ECB.
1-year LTROs 3-year LTROs
announced 06-Oct-2011 announced 08-Dec-2011
#1 #2 #1 #2
Panel A: LTRO allotment / settlement / redemption details
Allotment date 26-Oct-2011 21-Dec-2011 21-Dec-2011 29-Feb-2012
Settlement date 27-Oct-2011 22-Dec-2011 22-Dec-2011 1-Mar-2012
Redemption date 1-Nov-2012 31-Jan-2013 29-Jan-2015 26-Dec-2015
Maturity [days] 371 406 1,134 1,092
Alloted amount [mill EUR] 56,934 replaced 489,190 529,530
Number of counterparties 371 – 523 800
Panel B: Previous Weeks Amount Outstanding [mill EUR]
LTRO lending 201,182 291,629 166,490
MRO lending 585,241 – 665,008 819,682
Panel C: Overall Net Change in Settlement Week [mill EUR]
∆ LTRO lending 16,522 335,285 447,979
∆ MRO lending (3,744) – (122,605) (137,021)
LTRO substitution (40,412) – (153,905) (81,551)
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Table 3.4
Estimates of Net Liquidity Uptake over the Three-Year LTRO Cash Settlements. This table
shows estimates of liquidity uptake in MROs, LTROs, and the total by country for those countries whose
national central banks provide separate figures on MROs and LTROs on their balances sheets. As different
national central banks provide the figures in different formats, we proceed according to Woschitz (2017) to
make the numbers comparable. Panel A provides outstanding liquidity end of October 2011 and liquidity
uptake from the beginning of November 2011 to the end of January 2012 as well as from the beginning
of February to the end of April 2012, two periods which span over the first and second three-year LTRO
cash settlements, respectively. Numbers are in million EUR. Countries are sorted according to LTRO
uptake in the period from November 2011 to January 2012. Panel B calculates the percentage change on
outstanding liquidity end of October 2011 and January 2012. “(P)” indicates countries that are classified
as peripheral countries. (∗) indicates countries that our sample of bank stocks used in the event study
later on does not cover. Our bank stock sample, however, additionally covers the Netherlands, Malta,
and Cyprus (P). Source: Bruegel data (see Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012).
Panel A: Estimates of absolute net liquidity uptake over 3y-LTRO implementations [in million EUR]
Absolute net uptake Absolute net uptake
Outstanding liquidity over 1st 3y-LTRO over 2nd 3y-LTRO
End of Oct-2011 Nov-2011 to Jan-2012 Feb-2012 to Apr-2012
MRO LTRO Total MRO LTRO Total MRO LTRO Total
Spain (P) 43,185 42,994 86,178 -36,740 111,983 75,243 -4,664 160,176 155,513
Italy (P) 46,821 61,164 107,985 4,083 94,191 98,274 -48,402 112,637 64,235
France 33,090 63,897 96,987 -31,400 68,558 37,158 -157 36,645 36,488
Germany 6,394 19,025 25,419 -3,185 24,186 21,001 -1,907 30,341 28,435
Belgium 11,579 6,650 18,229 -715 11,253 10,538 -10,699 21,893 11,194
Port. (P) 12,814 32,764 45,578 -4,792 5,432 640 -3,575 13,074 9,500
Austria 2,333 3,099 5,432 37 3,898 3,935 -2,282 8,741 6,460
Finland 0 105 105 5 2,201 2,206 -5 1,375 1,370
Luxemb.(∗) 1,797 1,727 3,524 -278 1,528 1,251 -1,467 1,740 273
Slovenia(∗) 4 625 629 52 1,058 1,110 -20 2,088 2,068
Ireland(∗) 22,206 77,715 99,921 3,861 -5,341 -1,480 -19,225 6,702 -12,523
Greece (P) 8,886 66,858 75,744 6,054 -7,146 -1,092 19,375 -23,645 -4,269
Total 189,109 376,622 565,731 -63,017 311,799 248,782 -73,025 371,767 298,742
Panel B: Relative net liquidity uptake as a percentage of outstanding liquidity end of last period [as %]
Relative net uptake Relative net uptake
over 1st 3y-LTRO over 2nd 3y-LTRO
Nov-2011 to Jan-2012 Feb-2012 to Apr-2012
as of Oct-2011 as of Jan-2011
MRO LTRO Total MRO LTRO Total
Spain (P) -85.1 260.5 87.3 -72.4 103.4 96.3
Italy (P) 8.7 154.0 91.0 -95.1 72.5 31.1
France -94.9 107.3 38.3 -9.3 27.7 27.2
Germany -49.8 127.1 82.6 -59.4 70.2 61.3
Belgium -6.2 169.2 57.8 -98.5 122.3 38.9
Port. (P) -37.4 16.6 1.4 -44.6 34.2 20.6
Austria 1.6 125.8 72.4 -96.3 124.9 69.0
Finland - 2,096.2 2,101.0 -100.0 59.6 59.3
Luxemb.(∗) -15.4 88.5 35.5 -96.6 53.5 5.7
Slovenia(∗) 1,300.0 169.3 176.5 -34.8 124.1 119.0
Ireland(∗) 17.4 -6.9 -1.5 -73.8 9.3 -12.7
Greece (P) 68.1 -10.7 -1.4 129.7 -39.6 -5.7
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Part III
Appendices

A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Experiment Instructions
Figure 1.2 shows the flow chart of the experiment with the ordering of the different
treatments. Questions in the priming treatments are identical to Cohn et al. (2015, Online
Appendix). Risk aversion elicitation is based on the ten paired lorry-choice with low
payoffs as proposed by (Holt and Laury, 2002, p. 1645). Questions about the experiment
have been ordered randomly to avoid order effects. All questions were asked in German.
A.1.1 Introduction
Welcome!
You successfully logged in for the experiment. Please take the following points into con-
sideration before you start with the experiment:
• It is vital that you take part in the experiment all alone and that you do not talk
to other students about how you played
• During the experiment you will receive video instructions: watch these instructions
in full length before you start the experiment
• Duration of the experiment: app. 45 minutes
• Examination points: 5 points (you receive these points irrespective of how “well”
you play)
• Please post a message in the OLAT forum in case of technical problems while playing
the experiment
Now watch the following video instruction: SWITCHTube Video
Welcome in the experiment with chocolate. My name is Rene´ Hegglin and I will guide
you through this experiment. The experiment is a regular part of the lecture “Banking”
and gives you points for the exam. However, it is not only about points for the exam.
You will become part of a form of teaching that is almost unused at the University of
Zurich: the main goal is the implementation of an internet based classroom experiment.
This, however, is only the official goal. The effective goal is to gain as many chocolate
pralines as possible. During the experiment you gather Taler that may be converted into
chocolate pralines afterwards. You may well be greedy since the chocolate is donated by
the FinanceClub of UZH. Thanks for that. Per six Taler you earn, you will get one praline
paid out.
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During the experiment we investigate the investment behavior in different situations. It
is imminently important that you focus on the specific task because you want to earn
as many Taler as possible. It is also important to notice that during the complete ex-
periment you are anonymous and all the data generated in the experiment is treated
completely confidential, and will only be analyzed in an anonymous form. To avoid that
your colleagues are influenced you should not talk to them about how you played the
experiment.
Now the experiment starts. You may begin by clicking the “start” button below.
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A.1.2 Priming Treatments
Priming Start Questionnaire
Investment behavior and power of concentration
• This introductory part of the experiment investigates investment behavior and the
individual power of concentration.
• This part is split in six separate steps.
• To generate a complete overall picture, you are kindly asked to fill in all questions.
• Important: All answers are treated completely confidentially and are only analyzed
in an anonymous form.
Q1. How often do you make investment decisions (e.g. purchase / selling of shares)?
© never
© once a year
© once every half-year
© every 3 months
© once a month
© every 2 weeks
© once a week
© daily
Q2. Which one of the following statements best describes your investment behavior?
© I make my own investment decisions based on information which I collect myself
© I follow the advice of my financial advisor but I take the final decision
© I leave the decisions to my financial advisor but I want to be kept up to date about it
© I leave the decision to my financial advisor and I do not want to know all the details
about it
Q3. Do you think that one can trust most financial advisors or not?
One can trust few
financial advisors
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 One can trust most
financial advisors© © © © © © ©
Q4. Concerning financial decisions: To what extent are you willing to forgo something in
order to benefit from it in the future?
Not at all willing
to forego something
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very willing to
forego something© © © © © © © © © © ©
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Boom Priming
Imagine you are in a situation of a stock market boom like illustrated below. Assume you
are an investor with a large investment volume. Your expectation is that the positive stock
market boom continues in a similar way like indicated by the arrow in the illustration.
P
ri
ce
 [
in
d
e
x]
Time
Shares: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell shares? Please give a brief
explanation.
long text field
Gold and other precious metals: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell gold
and other precious metals? Please give a brief explanation.
long text field
Real Estate: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell real estate? Please give a
brief explanation.
long text field
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Bust Priming
Imagine you are in a situation of a stock market crash like illustrated below. Assume you
are an investor with a large investment volume. Your expectation is that the negative
stock market crash continues in a similar way like indicated by the arrow in the illustration.
P
ri
ce
 [
in
d
e
x]
Time
Shares: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell shares? Please give a brief
explanation.
long text field
Gold and other precious metals: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell gold
and other precious metals? Please give a brief explanation.
long text field
Real Estate: For such a situation would you rather buy or sell real estate? Please give a
brief explanation.
long text field
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Priming End Questionnaire
How well are you feeling at the moment?
© © © © © © © © ©
To what extent are you experiencing the emotion “fear” at the moment?
not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 a lot
© © © © © © ©
A Appendix 131
A.1.3 Bank Run Treatment
The Bank Run Treatment consists of an instruction part and 20 periods of two stages.
Instructions were given in a video with oral explanations.
Instructions
Welcome to the main part of the experiment. In this video I explain the rules of the game
that follows. In this part you assume the role of a depositor of a bank. We will play 20
periods. In each period you have to decide whether you want to withdraw your money
early or late. However, in the decision situation you are not alone. At the beginning of
every round you are randomly assigned to a group of six depositors together with five
other depositors. The decisions of the other five depositors are real decisions that had
been recorded in an earlier study.
All six depositors deposit their money with a single bank. It is important to notice
that after each round the groups are dissolved and will be randomly reshuﬄed with new
depositors in the next round. Thus, in every round you will be in a new group with new
players and your reputation, how you played i earlier stages, does not play a role.
A round always consists of three sub periods. At time t = 0 all of the six depositors
deposit one Taler with the bank. At time t = 0 the bank thus has six Taler. The bank
invests these six Taler in a long-term project with a duration of two years. At time
t = 2 the project will be liquidated and return is distributed evenly among all depositors.
However, if a depositor wants to withdraw at time t = 1 the bank has to divest a part of
the project early. The bank gives 1.5 Taler to the depositor. It is important to notice that
at time t = 0 neither the bank nor any investor knows the true return of the project, i.e.,
the exact value of R is unknown. It is only known that the return is uniformly distributed
in the range of 1.3 and 3.0.
6 ECU 6 ECU
6 ECU
PROJECT
Amount: 6 ECUDuration: 2 yearsReturn: R [1.3-3.0]
Θ=..
Θ=..
Θ=..
Θ=..
Θ=..
Θ=.. R=?
It is obvious that at time t = 1 every depositor would like to know the approximate
return R. Unfortunately, this information is not given. All that the depositors get is a
private noisy signal, θ, about the approximate value of the return of the project. One can
imagine that depositors have read in the newspaper how well the project does and how
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large the return R might be. Note that the signal that every depositor receives is specific,
i.e., every depositor receives a signal that can be higher or lower than the signals of other
depositors in the group.
At time t = 1, every depositor has to decide whether he wants to withdraw early. He
knows that his private signal is noisy. The true return lies in the interval of plus minus 0.1
of the signal θ. Using this information, every depositor decides individually to withdraw
early in t = 1 or to wait until the end of the two years.
If we assume that two depositors decide to withdraw early, i.e., two depositors go to the
bank at t = 1 and request a payment of 1.5 Taler. The bank then has to divest a part
of the long-term project to generate enough liquidity to pay out the two depositors. Out
of the initial 6 Taler that were invested in the project only 3 Taler remain invested. The
balance sheet of the bank thus shrank to a new value of 3 Taler. On these 3 Taler that
remain invested a return R is generated.
At time t = 2, the project is liquidated and makes the balance sheet of the bank grow. All
the money that is in the balance sheet of the bank will then be distributed equally among
the remaining depositors. We immediately see that the return of any given investor does
not only depend on the return of the project but also on how many depositors withdraw
their money in t = 1.
What happens if at time t = 1 many depositors decide to withdraw early? Let us look at
a situation in which five depositors decide to withdraw early. The depositors collectively
ask for an early payment of 5 times 1.5 Taler at time t = 1 from the bank. The bank,
however, can only liquidate 6 Taler from the project. Thus, the bank has to close down the
project and declares bankruptcy. The bank distributes the proceeds of 6 Taler among four
of the five early withdrawers. A random mechanism chooses four out of the five depositors
that receive the 1.5 Taler. It is thus possible that an investor decides to withdraw early
but nevertheless does not receive any payment since the bank is bankrupt. One early
withdrawer and one late withdrawer get nothing.
Let us summarize the process: At time t = 0 six depositors invest 1 Taler each in a bank.
The bank collects 6 Taler and invests them in a long-term project. At time t = 1 the
depositors receive a private noisy signal θ about the value of R and then decide whether
they want to withdraw early. The bank has to liquidate part of the investment if there
are depositors that withdraw early. If four or more depositors decide to withdraw early
the bank goes bankrupt. Any remaining investment yields a return R at time t = 2 and
is equally distributed among the remaining depositors.
The following illustration shows how to interpret the signal. At time t = 0 we do not
know the return R. We only know that it lies in the interval of 1.3 and 3.0. At time
t = 1 every depositor receives a private signal θ that limits the range of the true return
to R = θ ± 0.1.1 The values in that range are uniformly distributed.
To help you decide quickly you will see a payout table as follows. In the first two columns
you see a possible combination of early and late withdrawers. Depending on the number
of early and late withdrawers a different result realizes in time t = 1 and t = 2. As an
example we assume that the project yields a return of R = 3. In every row we see a
possible combination of early and late withdrawers. If we assume that no one withdraws
money early then we are in the first row. We thus face zero early withdrawers and six late
1The “Noisy Bank Run Treatment” equals the regular bank run treatment with the only exception
that the value for the noise term  equals 0.3 instead of 0.1, i.e., the range of R is [θ − 0.3, θ + 0.3].
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1.30 3.00 Return R
P
ro
b
(R
)
Probability distribution of return R in t=1
Θ+0.1Θ-0.1
Θ
R=Θ±0.1
withdrawers. At time t = 1 no one has to paid out and the project is liquidated in period
t = 2. Since the project offers a return of R = 3, every depositor receives a payment of
3 Taler. Of the six late withdrawers all six are happy with their decision since they got
their money back.
If we assume that two depositors withdraw their money early we are in the third row.
We thus have two early withdrawers and four late withdrawers. The bank has enough
funds to pay out the two early withdrawers in t = 1. Both receive their payment of 1.5
and are happy that they got their requested money. In time t = 2 the four remaining
depositors get the proceeds of what remained invested in the project. In this case they
get 2.25 Taler per depositor. How do we get to these 2.25? The payoff of 2.25 is the result
of the remaining investment, i.e., 6 Taler minus the payment for the early withdrawers,
is multiplied with the return of the project R. This amount is divided by the number of
late withdrawers. In this example, two depositors withdraw their deposits early, i.e., 3
Taler remain invested and yield a return of 3. We thus have an amount of 9 Taler that is
distributed among the four remaining depositors.
Since all late withdrawers can be paid out, all of them are happy.
Now the experiment starts. Remember that you have to focus on your task and collect as
many Taler as possible in order to get as many pralines as possible. Have fun investing
and withdrawing money. Thank you.
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A.1.4 Guess the Number Treatment
Guess the Number (1/5): Introduction
Information
• In this part of the experiment you try to guess the right number.
• Depending on how good you are at guessing you will receive a bonus paid out in
Taler.
• Important: All answers are treated completely confidentially and are only ana-
lyzed in an anonymous form.
Guess the Number (2/5): First guess
Rules of the game
• All participants of the experiment guess a number in the interval of 0 to 100.
• The person that comes closest to 2/3 of the average of all estimates wins a
bonus of 50 Taler.
• If there is more than one winner, the 50 Taler will be split among the winners.
• Example: 5 persons play the game and estimate 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. The
average is 30, 2/3 of 30 is 20. Thus, the person that was guessing 20 wins the game.
Guess
Your guess for 2/3 of the average of all estimates:
short text field
(Format: XXX.YY with a point for decimal notation)
Guess the Number (3/5): First explanation
Your guess
Your guess of 2/3 of the average was: [guessi,2]
Explanation
Please describe in a few words your thoughts how you came to your decision.
long text field
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Guess the Number (4/5): Second guess
***Additional information***
In an earlier round the average of all estimates was at 36.73. The guess 24.49 (=2/3 of
36.73) was the winning number then.
Rules of the game
• All participants of the experiment guess a number in the interval of 0 to 100.
• The person that comes closest to 2/3 of the average of all estimates wins a
bonus of 50 Taler.
• If there is more than one winner, the 50 Taler will be split among the winners.
• Example: 5 persons play the game and estimate 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. The
average is 30, 2/3 of 30 is 20. Thus, the person that was guessing 20 wins the game.
Guess
Your guess for 2/3 of the average of all estimates:
short text field
Guess the Number (5/5): Second explanation
Your guess
Your guess of 2/3 of the average was: [guessi,2]
Explanation
Please describe in a few words your thoughts how you came to your decision.
long text field
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A.1.5 Questionnaire
Final questionnaire (1/4): Decision Taking
This is the end of the main part of the experiment. Now some questions about the game
and your chosen strategy will follow.
Your last decision in the bank run game
Your private signal θ for the decision to withdraw early or late was: θ = [θi,20]
Your decision for this signal was: [withdraw early,withdraw late]
The true return for this decision situation was: R = [Ri,20]
Your payoff from this decision situation was: Payoffi,20 Taler
Please describe in a few words your thoughts how you came to your decision.
long text field
Final questionnaire (2/4): Lottery Choice
Please decide between the two lotteries in the next ten cases. The payoffs remain the
same but the corresponding probabilities change from row to row.
Reading example: in the first row you decide between lottery A and B. Lottery A offers
a payoff of $2.00 in 10% of all cases, and $1.60 in 90% of all cases, while lottery B offers
$3.85 in 10% of all cases, and $0.10 in 90% of all cases.
Please indicate your relative preference for every row.2
Lottery A Lottery B
with 10% $2.00 / with 90% $1.60 © © with 10% $3.85 / with 90% $0.10
with 20% $2.00 / with 80% $1.60 © © with 20% $3.85 / with 80% $0.10
with 30% $2.00 / with 70% $1.60 © © with 30% $3.85 / with 70% $0.10
with 40% $2.00 / with 60% $1.60 © © with 40% $3.85 / with 60% $0.10
with 50% $2.00 / with 50% $1.60 © © with 50% $3.85 / with 50% $0.10
with 60% $2.00 / with 40% $1.60 © © with 60% $3.85 / with 40% $0.10
with 70% $2.00 / with 30% $1.60 © © with 70% $3.85 / with 30% $0.10
with 80% $2.00 / with 20% $1.60 © © with 80% $3.85 / with 20% $0.10
with 90% $2.00 / with 10% $1.60 © © with 90% $3.85 / with 10% $0.10
with 100% $2.00 / with 0% $1.60 © © with 100% $3.85 / with 0% $0.10
2The program tested for consistency of the replies: subjects were prohibited to change preferences
more than once. Furthermore, the program produced a pop up error message (“Please check your choice
in the last row. Are you sure you prefer a secure payment of $2.00 over a secure payment of $3.85?”) if
the last decision was not lottery B.
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Final questionnaire (3/4): Experiment Details
How much do you like chocolate?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all © © © © © © very much
How much do you like Lindt & Spru¨ngli Lindor pralines?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all © © © © © © very much
How much did you enjoy participating in the experiment?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all © © © © © © very much
Would you like to participate again in classroom experiments?
1 2 3 4 5 6
not at all © © © © © © very much
How well did you understand the instructions of the experiment?
1 2 3 4 5 6
very badly © © © © © © very well
Did you already know the “Bank Run Game” from an earlier experiment?
© yes
© no
Did you already know the “Guess the Number Game” from an earlier experiment?
© yes
© no
Have you participated / watched the lecture on “Bank Runs”?
© yes, as an online podcast
© yes, as a live lecture in the lecture hall
© no
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Final questionnaire (4/4): Demographics
Gender
© female
© male
Age
short text field
Semester
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 >8
© © © © © © © © ©
Field of study
© Banking & Finance
© Business Administration
© Management & Economics
© Economics
© Informatics
© Other major (minor subject student)
Other remarks / comments / feedback
long text field
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B.1 Scene of Gnomes in “Faust”
Gnomes.
The little crowd comes tripping there
They don’t associate pair by pair.
In mossy garb, with lantern bright.
They move commingling, brisk and light,
Each working on his separate ground,
Like fire fly insects swarming round;
And press and gather here and there,
Always industrious everywhere.
With the ”Good People” kin we own;
As surgeons of the rocks we’re known.
Cupping the mountains, bleeding them
From fullest veins, depleting them
Of store of metals, which we pile,
And merrily greet: ”Good cheer!” the while.
Well-meant the words, believe us, then!
We are the friends of all good men.
Yet we the stores of gold unseal
That men may pander, pimp, and steal ;
Nor iron shall fail his haughty hand
Who universal murder planned:
And who these three Commandments breaks
But little heed o’ the others takes.
For that we’re not responsible:
We’re patient – be you, too, as well.
Gnomen.
Da trippelt ein die kleine Schar,
Sie ha¨lt nicht gern sich Paar und Paar;
Im moosigen Kleid mit La¨mplein hell
Bewegt sich’s durcheinander schnell,
Wo jedes fu¨r sich selber schafft,
Wie Leucht-Ameisen wimmelhaft;
Und wuselt emsig hin und her,
Bescha¨ftigt in die Kreuz und Quer.
Den frommen Gu¨tchen nah verwandt,
Als Felschirurgen wohlbekannt;
Die hohen Berge schro¨pfen wir,
Aus vollen Adern scho¨pfen wir;
Metalle stu¨rzen wir zuhauf,
Mit Gruß getrost: Glu¨ck auf! Glu¨ck auf!
Das ist von Grund aus wohlgemeint:
Wir sind der guten Menschen Freund.
Doch bringen wir das Gold zu Tag,
Damit man stehlen und kuppeln mag,
Nicht Eisen fehle dem stolzen Mann,
Der allgemeinen Mord ersann.
Und wer die drei Gebot’ veracht’t,
Sich auch nichts aus den andern macht.
Das alles ist nicht unsre Schuld;
Drum habt so fort, wie wir, Geduld.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Faust – a Tragedy
Translated by Bayard Taylor; Ward, Lock and Co., London and N.Y., 1889; Ch. 11.
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B.2 Supplementary Tables
Supplementary Table B-1
Media Dummy Generation and Search Terms. For each institution in the database we conduct a
media search in LexisNews Academic International News and Wire database. In a first step all articles are
collected from two large national Swiss newspapers and the largest Swiss news agency that fulfill certain
search criteria. In this step each institution’s name is connected with the following search terms. In order
to account for different spellings or plural/singular occurrences of distinct word, we use the following
search operators. “!” picks up any number of letters after a root word; “∗” serves as a placeholder
for one letter; “w/n” is a proximity connector which is used to establish a relationship between terms;
the letter “n” can present an arbitrary number. This results in a list of 4,380 articles for 98 banks
in the period 2002-2014. From this list we generate for every bank and every year a dummy variable
whether the bank has been covered in the newspaper in relation with any of the search terms. The
dummy variable Overall Media Coverage takes on a value of 1 if there has been at least one newspaper
article about the institution in the given year. In a second step we analyze all these manually whether
the media coverage has had a negative sentiment. To rule out personal biases we conduct this second
step twice by two different individuals. The dummy variable Negative Media Coverage takes on a value
of 1 if there has been at least one negative newspaper article about the institution in the given year.
Search Terms
Amnestie w/10 steuer Kunden!
nicht w/2 deklariert* Repatr!
Amtshilf! Schwarzgeld
angeklag! Scudo!
anklage Steuerab!
Bankd! Steuerbe!
Bankgeheim! Steuerdaten
Doppelbest! Steuerfl!
Finanza! Steuerhinter!
Finanzp! Steuersu¨nd!
Geldw! Steuerver!
Gesetz! Strafsteuer
IRS! unversteuert*
Kont**dat!
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Supplementary Table B-4
Robustness Check – Rich CIR Model Residuals. This table presents random effects panel regres-
sion results for six different models to estimate the performance of a private bank as measured by net
new money flows. The dependent variable is the Net New Money scaled by AvAuM. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one year. The bank-specific abnormal cost-income ratio (ζi) as well as the bank-
year-specific cost-income ratio (it) are predicted from the richest model specification (6) in Table 2.4.
All other regressors definitions are identical to the descriptive statics Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Z-statistics
based on robust standard errors clustered on banks are reported in parentheses. *** indicate statistical
significance at p < 0.01, ** at p < 0.05, and * at p < 0.1.
Models
Net New Money / AvAuM Hyp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abnormal CIR (ζi) (–) -0.075*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.114*** -0.073** -0.084**
(-2.70) (-2.98) (-3.13) (-3.49) (-2.57) (-2.43)
Abnormal CIR Year (it) (?) -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.136*** -0.119*** -0.097** -0.110**
(-2.75) (-2.72) (-3.28) (-2.72) (-2.05) (-2.37)
Negative Media Coverage (–) -0.095*** -0.101*** -0.094*** -0.108*** -0.099*** -0.106***
(-3.63) (-3.70) (-3.42) (-3.49) (-3.54) (-3.70)
NegMedCov X [AuM > Med] (+) 0.059** 0.067** 0.059** 0.075** 0.061** 0.075**
(2.10) (2.31) (1.98) (2.33) (2.01) (2.48)
AuM Above Median (+) 0.036** 0.033* 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.040** 0.042**
(2.10) (1.94) (3.11) (2.85) (2.39) (2.51)
Equity Ratio (?) -0.124* -0.208*** -0.214***
(-1.81) (-2.95) (-3.03)
Service Quality (+) 2.324*** 1.833** 2.268***
(2.74) (2.22) (2.72)
Wage Costs per Employee (+) 0.195 0.204 0.281*
(1.31) (1.30) (1.78)
Growth of Number of Emp. (+) 0.040 0.024
(1.16) (0.71)
Client Value (+) 0.028 0.014
(0.64) (0.32)
Own Funds / AvAuM (+) 0.142**
(2.12)
Mgmt Mandates / AvAuM (–) 0.051
(1.31)
Bank domiciled in FL (?) 0.071***
(3.16)
Constant 0.064*** 0.092*** -0.036 -0.010 0.033*** -0.054
(3.56) (3.80) (-0.79) (-0.22) (2.66) (-1.19)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 607 607 607 551 536 536
Number of Banks 96 96 96 92 92 92
R2 within 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.17
R2 between 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.13
R2 overall 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.16
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Supplementary Table B-5
Robustness Check – NNM Fixed Effects Estimation. This table presents fixed effects panel
regression results for six different models to estimate the performance of a private bank as measured by
net new money flows. The dependent variable is the Net New Money scaled by AvAuM. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one year. The bank-specific abnormal cost-income ratio (ζi) as well as the bank-
year-specific cost-income ratio (it) are predicted from the richest model specification (6) in Table 2.4.
All other regressors definitions are identical to the descriptive statics Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Z-statistics
based on robust standard errors clustered on banks are reported in parentheses. *** indicate statistical
significance at p < 0.01, ** at p < 0.05, and * at p < 0.1.
Models
Net New Money / AvAuM Hyp (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abnormal CIR Year (it) (?) -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.156*** -0.135*** -0.093* -0.117**
(-2.77) (-2.78) (-3.42) (-2.79) (-1.90) (-2.33)
Negative Media Coverage (–) -0.082** -0.083** -0.083*** -0.091*** -0.082** -0.089***
(-2.52) (-2.49) (-2.71) (-2.98) (-2.61) (-2.88)
NegMedCov X [AuM > Med] (–) 0.050 0.051 0.047 0.057* 0.046 0.052
(1.41) (1.42) (1.43) (1.78) (1.34) (1.57)
AuM Above Median (+) 0.068** 0.069** 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.065** 0.073***
(2.54) (2.53) (3.26) (3.16) (2.27) (2.86)
Equity Ratio (?) -0.037 -0.227** -0.231**
(-0.35) (-2.12) (-2.14)
Service Quality (+) 4.411*** 4.834*** 5.340***
(3.72) (3.18) (3.29)
Wage Costs per Employee (+) 0.277 0.355 0.295
(1.14) (1.38) (1.16)
Growth of Number of Emp. (+) -0.024 -0.059
(-0.65) (-1.58)
Client Value (+) 0.034 0.062
(0.77) (1.29)
Own Funds / AvAuM (+) 0.108
(0.75)
Mgmt Mandates / AvAuM (–) 0.132
(1.46)
Constant 0.052*** 0.060** -0.112* -0.116* 0.043** -0.134**
(2.98) (2.14) (-1.78) (-1.74) (2.30) (-2.00)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 607 607 607 551 536 536
Number of Banks 96 96 96 92 92 92
R2 within 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.20
R2 between 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 overall 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
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